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abstract
Research on human judgement and decision making has documented a wide-
range of psychological biases in how people perceive, evaluate, and ultimately
decide between alternatives. These biases are understood in contrast to nor-
mative economic principles of utility and risk, which reduce alternatives to
quantitative variables and define axiomatic frameworks to find the optimal
choice. Understanding and modelling this incongruity has been the focus of
behavioural economics research, which aims to align economic models with
human behaviour. Such research has been productive in understanding hu-
man decision-making behaviour: from investment decisions, to consumer
purchases, job prospects, and academic performance – but there has been
little investigation in its application to human–computer interaction.
Users of interactive systems encounter decisions that share many proper-
ties with those studied in the behavioural economics literature. In particular,
users often choose to invest actions and effort into using an interface, antic-
ipating that they will receive a return of at least commensurate value in pro-
ductivity. Models from behavioural economics have the potential to describe
how users value such interfaces, and how they decide between them. For
example, when faced with a text-entry interface that automatically replaces
incorrect words, such models could predict the utility of instances where a
correct replacement happens, where an incorrect replacement happens, and
the influence of these events on the preferences held by the user. These are
important issues for the designers of such interfaces, but are currently poorly
understood and under-investigated.
This thesis adapts a model of reference-dependent preferences from the
behavioural economics literature to interaction. The model predicts the rela-
tionship between the outcomes that a user experiences and their evaluation
of those outcomes via measures of utility. In particular, themodel emphasises
the importance of salient positive progress towards a task goal.
Some of the model’s predictions were initially tested in two experiments
that involved simple text-selection tasks using either a conventional letter-
by-letter selection technique, or a technique that attempted to assist the user
by snapping their selection to word boundaries. The first experiment found a
negativity bias: small components of negative progress (when the attempted
assistance failed) overwhelmed subjects’ assessment of overall utility, and sub-
stantial objective performance (time) gains were required to overcome this
assessment. The second experiment found that this effect was neutralised by
manipulating the interface’s behaviour to appear more helpful – even though
xiii
Abstract
it contained the same performance disadvantages. A new task (drag-and-
drop) was developed for a third experiment that extended this manipula-
tion, and found a positivity bias: subjects preferred small elements of positive
progress, despite substantial objective performance losses.
The methodology developed for these experiments is based on subjects
making binary choices between an experimental interface and a neutral ref-
erence condition. From a series of these binary choices, a utility/preference
scale can be constructed to identify biases in subject preferences against a
manipulated objective variable. The flexibility of this method for analysing
interactive choices is demonstrated in a fourth experiment, which examined
two psychological biases that are not predicted by the model – the peak-end
rule and duration neglect – and found some support for their presence during
interactive experiences.
The main contribution of this thesis is the demonstration of a connec-
tion between human–computer interaction research and the behavioural eco-
nomics literature: that the psychological biases and economic principles in
prior work are present and applicable to interactive tasks. The model and ex-
perimental methodology provides a robust foundation for improving practice
in human–computer interaction work on understanding user behaviour and
experience.
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introduction 1
interaction with user interfaces can be expressed as a chain of user ac-
tions and system responses: a user presses a key and a character appears, they
double-click on a file and it opens in an editor, they drag an icon and it follows
the cursor. Compositions of these primitive actions are used to complete sur-
prisingly complex tasks: from word processing and financial accounting, to
photo manipulation and film editing. Computer systems also frequently have
the opportunity to actively assist users in completing their tasks – for exam-
ple, a text entry system might automatically replace a mistyped teh with the,
a drawing tool might facilitate object alignment by snapping dragged objects
to neighbouring ones, and a web browser might aid url entry by searching
the user’s browsing history and suggesting addresses.
User interface and interaction designs are often analysed and assessed by
researchers and practitioners in objective terms: the number of steps required
to complete a task, the time for the system to respond, the speed of users in
performing actions, and the frequency with which they make errors. Assis-
tive interfaces are often designed and deployed on the basis that they provide
the opportunity to improve these metrics and make user interactions more
productive. However, a user’s experience of interaction is rarely so disinter-
ested: users are annoyedwhen a system takes a long time to respond, they dis-
trust systems that impair their productivity, and they form preferences that
cannot be articulatedwith objective qualities. Although designers intend that
a system’s assistance will increase a user’s efficiency and productivity on bal-
ance – inevitably, a system’s attempts to assist will periodically impede. While
average objective performance may be positive, these impediments can have
a negative impact on subjective experience in excess of the productivity loss.
For example, an automatic correction of harnomy to harmony is clearly sat-
isfying, but an incorrect replacement of tome with time can be unexpected
and aggravating – the frustration of an incorrect replacement is not always
balanced by the satisfaction brought by a comparable correct replacement.¹ 1. See http://theoatmeal.com/
comics/autocorrect for a hu-
morous personification of the
autocorrection user experience.
This asymmetry in experience is known more generally in psychology as
negativity bias or in economics as loss aversion, where it has been found that
negative outcomes are consistently more potent than their positive counter-
parts. With few exceptions, negative experiences dominate positive experi-
ences of equal measure across domains such as learning, investment, personal
relationships, memory, and impression formation (Baumeister, Bratslavsky,
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). The sentiment is that
1
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‘losses loom larger than gains’ (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 279): for exam-
ple, if offered to gamble on a coin-flip that wins $150 on tails and loses $100
on heads, most people refuse because the psychological value of potentially los-
ing $100 dominates the potential gain of $150 (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
Such research has also uncovered other psychological biases in the ways that
people perceive, evaluate, and respond to choices between alternatives. Their
findings have been applied to understanding behaviour across varied choice
domains: whether it be monetary gambles, consumer goods, medical treat-
ments, or job prospects. The conflict these biases create between the objective
analyses of decisions and the often-illogical behaviour when people actually
encounter them are captured in models of utility that describe the relation-
ship between the objective and subjective factors of decision making.
1.1 research hypothesis
Certain cognitive biases – revealed in the judgement and decision-
making literature – apply to users during interaction, and their ef-
fects can be captured in economic models of utility. Establishing a
relationship between these fields of research can lead to improved de-
sign and research practice in human–computer interaction.
This thesis contends that the psychological biases found in people’s monetary,
cognitive, and interpersonal (etc.) evaluations are equally applicable to how
users perceive, evaluate, and choose to use interactive systems. For instance,
the psychological loss aversion a person feels when faced with the prospect
of losing money is also felt when a system’s assistance can cost them time
and productivity. Furthermore, economic models of utility and reference-
dependent preferences can be operationalised in human–computer interac-
tion contexts to understand and explain choices that result from the influence
of such biases. This has implications for both the design of interactive systems
and their evaluation – in particular, although it is tempting to focus on the
positive outcomes that a system can provide, it is the negative outcomes that
are potentially more formative of their overall experience. However, this bi-
ased aversion to negative outcomes can be tempered by crafting experiences
to balance the most salient aspects that influence user satisfaction.
1.2 research contributions
The breadth and scope of the prior psychological and economic work – span-
ning over half a century of productive research (reviewed in Chapter 2) –
makes it unrealistic to comprehensively establish the presence, nature, and ex-
tent of its relationship with human–computer interaction in a single research
2
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agenda. Therefore, this thesis focusses on establishing parallels with several
fundamental principles from the prior work that are a compelling argument
for its broad applicability in human–computer interaction and a robust basis
for future work. This is done through the following specific contributions:
• A model of reference-dependent preferences is adapted from the be-
havioural economics literature to the domain of interactive actions and
system responses (Chapter 3). This utility model is based on a formal-
isation of several key psychological biases (namely, loss aversion and
reference-dependence), and describes (a) the components of an interac-
tion and (b) how the relationship between those components informs
preferences between alternatives.
• The methodological considerations for assessing utility models and psy-
chological biases for interactive tasks are discussed (Chapter 3). These
include: (a) how to construct experimental manipulations that test util-
ity, (b) how to expose subjects to those manipulations and elicit their
preferences, and (c) how to analyse those preferences to assess utility
models. These issues are not specific to the model developed herein but
are generally applicable to work that investigates decision-making be-
haviour and subjective preferences in interaction.
• To establish support for features of the model, two experiments (Exper-
iments 4.1 and 4.2) were conducted. The experiments explored subjects’
loss aversion towards an interface that factually assisted their perfor-
mance but included an element of interactive progress loss (i.e. the in-
terface appeared to contain a loss of productivity). The first experiment
establishes the presence of this loss aversion, while the second finds that
it can be neutralised by manipulating the perceived progress loss (while
maintaining near-identical objective outcomes).
• A third experiment (5.1) further studied this effect using a new exper-
imental task that appeared to contain progress advantages, but had an
objective performance disadvantage. The results find subjects exhibited
a bias in favour of the interface’s perceived progress gains – despite ex-
periencing significant objective performance losses.
These three experiments can be understood within the parameters
of the model, and establish a relationship between human–computer in-
teraction behaviour and the behavioural economics literature. Table 1.1
summarises their designs (the objective outcome given to subjects) and
their results (the subjective preference observed).
• Finally, the generality of the choice-basedmethodology is demonstrated
in an experiment that tests psychological biases that are not captured by
themodel: the peak-end rule and duration neglect (Experiment 6.1). The
3
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Objective Outcome
Negative Neutral Positive
Subjective
Preference
Negative — 4.1(Negativity Bias)
Neutral 4.2(Unbiased)
Positive 5.1 —(Positivity Bias)
TABLE 1.1
Summary of experimen-
tal designs and results.
experiment demonstrates themethodological principles in a context be-
yond the scope of the model, and finds some support for the existence
of other psychological biases in interaction.
1.3 thesis outline
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the ex-
tensive economic and psychological research on judgement and decisionmak-
ing. This includes perspectives from normative economic models that aim
to calculate correct and rational behaviour, and the psychological biases and
heuristics that permeate people’s intuitions and empirical behaviour. Chap-
ter 3 adapts a model from the literature to the context of human–computer
interaction. This involves an analysis of how interactive tasks can be de-
composed and user choices examined. The model describes the relationships
between user actions, system responses, and preferences. A choice-based
methodology for testing hypotheses about this model (and these psychologi-
cal biases in general) is also described.
Chapter 4 examines the loss aversion and reference-dependence compo-
nents of the model in two experiments that demonstrate their presence and
isolate their cause – in particular, that losses in perceived progress towards a
task goal weigh heavily on people’s subjective choices (regardless of objective
performance). Chapter 5 presents an experiment that uses a different interac-
tive task to further test the model in a design that finds subjective preferences
in favour of an interface that is objectively poor (but perceptually positive).
The new task and the choice-based methodology are used in Chapter 6
to examine two psychological biases that are not captured by the model: the
peak-end rule and duration neglect effects.
Finally, Chapters 7 and 8 reflect on this work and its implications. Chap-
ter 7 places this research into broader literature and discusses its applications,
limitations, and suggests a number of directions for continuing to explore
these issues. Chapter 8 summarises the main findings and contributions.
4
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understanding how people perceive, evaluate, and ultimately decide be- This chapter reviews economic
and psychological work on
judgement & decision mak-
ing relevant for building and
testing a model of choice for
human–computer interaction
decisions (described in the fol-
lowing chapter).
tween alternative choices (e.g. which product to purchase in a store or where
to go on vacation) is the focus of psychological research on judgement and de-
cision making. Early work was influenced by behavioural economics research
that sought to understand similar issues for economic choices (e.g. investment
or gambling decisions), and the discrepancies economists observed between
how they thought people ought to behave and how people actually do (Ed-
wards, 1954c). For example, people exhibit an aversion to losses that is incon-
sistent with the simple economic model of expected value, but is consistent
with the idea that losses are psychologically more potent than gains. Later re-
search has generalised these findings to other choice domains and continues
to investigate the processes that elicit them.
Theories of judgement and decisionmaking consider two components of a
choice between alternatives: (a) how people assess the value of an outcome (its
attractiveness), and (b) how people assess the risk of obtaining that value. En-
quiry into these components has its origins in seventeenth century philosoph-
ical and mathematical treatises on utility and probability, with modern aca-
demic research stimulated by John von Neumann (1903–57) and Oskar Mor-
genstern’s (1902–77) game theory and the psychological paradoxes highlighted
by Maurice Allais (1911–2010) in the 1950s. The economics side of the litera-
ture has sought to find functional relationships between the objective prop-
erties of these components (such as monetary value and probability) and the
responses people should make to maximise their returns (reviewed by Arrow,
1958; Camerer, 1995, 1998; Fehr-Duda & Epper, 2012; Machina, 1987; Rabin,
1998; Starmer, 2000). The psychological side has sought to understand the
perceptual and cognitive processes that underly the choices observed from
human subjects (Edwards, 1954c, 1961; Pitz & Sachs, 1984; Slovic, Fischhoff,
& Lichtenstein, 1977; E. U. Weber & Johnson, 2009). In concert, this body of
work has developed rich insights into vagaries of human decision-making be-
haviour (DellaVigna, 2009; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Hastie, 2001; Kah-
neman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).¹ 1. See Wakker (2015) for an ex-
tensive annotated bibliography.However there is also a tension between these fields (Bell, Raiffa, & Tver-
sky, 1988; Hogarth & Reder, 1986a; Lopes, 1994; Rabin, 1998; Simon, 1959).
Economists typically aspire for people to make stable and cogent choices that
maximise some definite return, and develop normative rules and models that
prescribe people to these ideals. Behaviour that does not conform is deemed
5
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to be irrational. On the other side, psychologists do not diagnose violations
of economic rules as abnormal, and develop models to account for whatever
behaviour is observed. Behaviour that does not conform renders the model
incomplete. This dualism presents a dilemma for practitioners who want to
apply these models to improve people’s success and performance: what is the
balance between telling people the choices they should bemaking, or adapting
to the choices they want to make?
Understanding the history of this divergence in economic and psycholog-
ical approaches is important for reading current theory and practice, and for
applying it to new kinds of decision problems. Compared with the field of
judgement and decision making,²2. These areas of research are typ-
ically referred to as ‘judgement
and decision making’ in psychol-
ogy and ‘behavioural economics’
in economics. Here these terms
are all-encompassing, and differ-
ences between the two fields are
noted explicitly.
human–computer interaction is a fledgling
field that is only beginning to enquire into the nature of its user’s choices: how
users make interactive choices, and how interaction can be used to improve
and support decision-making behaviour. The breadth and depth of judgement
and decision making research can be a significant aid to understanding these
questions if the right parallels between the fields can be established. In dis-
cussing how to improve the synergy between economics and psychology, Ra-
bin (2013) argued that the most useful theories are those that (a) extend ex-
isting models with new parameters and (b) define them across domains with
measurable variables. This thesis adopts a similar approach in order to place
human–computer interaction research within this literature.
This chapter reviews the development of judgement and decision making
research with a focus on the theories and debates that have shaped the re-
search agenda and exposed pitfalls that may impede or confound new appli-
cations. This begins with a discussion on the judgement of human behaviour
as either rational or irrational (§2.1), and then reviews the development of
economic theories of utility and the influence of psychological biases on peo-
ple’s preferences. This includes the quantification of how people interpret
and assess the value and risk of outcomes (§2.2 and §2.3), the psychological
factors that induce systematic biases (§2.5 and §2.6), and the broader decision-
making process (§2.4). Finally, the theorised and applied uses of this work in
human–computer interaction research are reviewed (§2.7). Much of this work
examines monetary decisions due to their convenient units that are easy to
experimentally manipulate (e.g. it is obvious that a reward of $2 is better than
$1), but the principles behind those decisions are believed to be general – and
in particular, the following chapter develops an interactive context for those
principles and reviews the methodological issues for evaluating them.
2.1 rational behaviour
Models of human behaviour can be framed as either normative or descriptive.
Normative models explain how people ought to behave under a set of logical
6
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axioms that can be used to deduce which alternative is the optimal choice;
whereas descriptive models aim to capture how people actually behave by
observing their decisions and postulating about the decision-making process
that led to them (Becker & McClintock, 1967; Bell et al., 1988; March, 1978).
This is not a dichotomy, however, and models often straddle both sides: nor-
mative models do not want to be ignorant of actual human behaviour, and
descriptive models want to be able to distinguish good judgement from bad.
Rather, the division is in how researchers apply these models, interpret exper-
imental data, and define rational behaviour: the criteria for labelling a person’s
decisions as either sensible or foolish.³
3. There is also a significant
philosophical discussion of this
question, reviewed in Mank-
telow and Over (1993), Stigler
(1950b), and Briggs (2014).
2.1.1 Normative Models
Normative models structure decision-making behaviour around a set of ax-
ioms that define a formal system for expressing outcomes (reviewed by Becker
&McClintock, 1967; Camerer, 1995; Fishburn, 1979; Luce & Suppes, 1965). Us-
ing quantifiable variables that describe alternative outcomes (such as mone-
tary values and probability scores), a decision can be expressed with a set of
well-formed formulae, and an optimal choice can be discovered through the
model’s rules of inference.
Notation. Outcomes are labelled A, B, C, and so forth, from some set of
mutually exclusive alternatives S . Each outcome is conditional on a probabil-
ity p ∈ [0, 1], which sums to 1 across the set S . The binary relation ≻ denotes
preference between outcomes: A ≻ B indicates A is strictly preferred to B;
whereas ∼ denotes the absence of a preference: A ∼ B indicates an indiffer-
ence between A and B. These relations can be combined as A ≽ B if either
A ≻ B or A ∼ B is the case, but are otherwise incompatible (i.e. A ≻ B only if
A ≁ B). Only ∼ is symmetric (A ∼ B if and only if B ∼ A) and reflexive (A ∼ A).
Other properties that are sometimes ascribed to these objects and relations
are reviewed by Fishburn (1986), and Hansson & Grüne-Yanoff (2012).
Some of the axioms that are generally pursued by normative models in-
clude (see also Kreps, 1988):
• Comparability or Completeness. For any two outcomes A and B, where
A ≠ B, either A ≻ B, B ≻ A, or A ∼ B (if A = B, then A ∼ B).
• Transitivity. If A ≽ B and B ≽ C, then A ≽ C.⁴,⁵
• Continuity. For any A ≽ B ≽ C, there is a unique probability p such that
pA + (1 − p)C ∼ B.
• Independence. If A ≽ B, then pA + (1 − p)C ≽ pB + (1 − p)C for any C.
• Dominance or Sure-thing. If A is sure to yield more than B,⁶ 6. e.g. if for some utility (§2.2)
function u, u(A) > u(B).then A ≻ B.
4 This is known as the transitivity of weak preference to distinguish it from the transitivity of in-
difference or strict preference when applied with the ∼ and ≻ operators, respectively – although
the transitivity of ∼ is debated (Schumm, 1987).
5 It also follows that [(A ∼ B) ∧ (B ≻ C)]⇒ (A ≻ C); and similarly [(A ≻ B) ∧ (B ∼ C)]⇒ (A ≻ C).
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• Irrelevance or Invariance. If two actions result in the same outcome,
preference should not be influenced by any factors that do not alter the
outcomes, and desires for or against an outcome should not affect beliefs
about its likelihood.
Models that accept such axioms (reviewed by Fishburn, 1981) discuss alterna-
tives in terms of quantitative scores (i.e. their utility and probability). Those
alternatives that maximise these scores are the rational choices for an individ-
ual to select (the so-called economic man [Edwards, 1954c]⁷7. And perhaps economic pigeons,
too (Battalio, Kagel, Rachlin, &
Green, 1981).
).
Normative models are attractive to economists because they define a set
of quantifiable variables that should influence choices, and an algebra for dis-
criminating and comparing alternatives impartially. The choices made under
these models can be deductively proven to satisfy certain properties that are
argued to epitomise good decision making (such as maximising investment
returns). Violating these axioms would create logical inconsistencies or arbi-
trage opportunities that would lead a person to ruin (reviewed by Hansson &
Grüne-Yanoff, 2012).
Although there is some support for the application of these axioms (see
Plott, 1986), empirical data finds that actual decision-making behaviour fre-
quently violates them (reviewed by Anand, 1993; Becker & McClintock, 1967;
MacCrimmon&Larsson, 1979; Shafir&LeBoeuf, 2002; Tversky&Kahneman,
1986, and with examples throughout this chapter). This is not surprising to
psychologists, who readily accept that ‘human beings are neither perfectly
consistent nor perfectly sensitive’ (Edwards, 1954c, p. 388) and ‘make mis-
takes, have remorse, suffer anxieties, and cannot make up their minds’ (Bell
et al., 1988, p. 9). But such data raise questions about the validity and inter-
pretation of normative models: are violations a failure of people to behave
correctly, or a failure of a model’s axiomatic construction?
Tversky (1969) presented subjects with pairs of gambles that were con-
structed to test the transitivity of preferences by gradually increasing the
probability of winning, while decreasing the pay-off – but at a rate that in-
creased the overall expected value (reviewed in §2.2.1). He found that when
the difference between gambles was small, subjects preferred the one with
the higher pay-off;⁸
8. Between a 7/24 chance at $5 and
a 8/24 chance at $4.75,
subjects preferred the former. but when the difference was large, subjects preferred the
gamble with the higher expected value⁹9. Between a 7/24 chance at $5 and
a 1½4 chance at $4,
subjects preferred the latter.
– a violation of transitivity once all
of the gambles were sorted by these choices.
From a normative perspective these violations are poor choices that ought
to be corrected; but from a descriptive perspective they are simply the ran-
dom errors of human fallibility (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; March, 1978), or
the model’s neglect for some other aspect of the decision (Pitz & Sachs, 1984;
Regenwetter, Dana, & Davis-Stober, 2011). However, normative models are at
least inspired by observed human behaviour, and if a person’s actual behaviour
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deviated too far from a model’s behavioural axioms, then their choices could
be exploited by people who follow them (Bell et al., 1988). In their account of
game theory – themost influential axiomaticmodel – vonNeumann andMor-
genstern (1947) argued that ‘each axiom should have an immediate intuitive
meaning by which its appropriateness may be judged directly’ (p. 25).
However, even when subjects are instructed on the rationale behind nor-
mative axioms, they reject the axioms’ validity and application. For example,
Slovic and Tversky (1974) asked subjects for their preferences in two gambling
problems designed to expose a violation of the independence axiom. One of
the problems is known as the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961):
An urn contains 90 balls: 30 are red, and the remaining 60 are ei-
ther black or yellow in some unknownproportion. One ball will be
drawn, and you may bet according to i or ii below. Then imagine
the scenario again, under the same circumstances, but according
to bets iii or iv.
30 60
Red Black Yellow
i $100 $0 $0
ii $0 $100 $0
iii $100 $0 $100
iv $0 $100 $100
The experimenters explained the arguments for both conforming to¹⁰ 10. Choosing either i and iii,
or ii and iv.
and vi-
olating¹¹
11. Choosing either i and iv,
or ii and iii.
the independence axiom,¹² and collected subjects’ evaluations of the
arguments and their choices to the gambles. They found opinions on each
argument’s logical persuasiveness varied, and actual choices generally did not
conform to the axiom. That is, even when educated on the axioms that would
lead to consistent behaviour, subjects were not persuaded that they would
lead to the best choice.
These conflicts arise because normative models lack variables to account
for the subjective tastes, preferences, goals, and desires that have strong in-
tuitive effects on human decision-making behaviour. For proponents of nor-
mative models, these are intentional omissions: introducing subjective fac-
tors that cannot be measured or reasoned about only vindicates errors that
need to be corrected, and risks formulatingmodels that are tautological. How-
ever, responding to frequent empirical violations, economists have explored
12 Note that the outcomes for a yellow ball are the same between i/ii and iii/iv, thereby making
this outcome irrelevant to the decision (no matter which bet is chosen, the drawing of a yellow
ball results in the same payout). Once the outcomes for a yellow ball are removed from the table,
i and ii are identical to iii and iv, respectively, and therefore should elicit consistent responses.
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diverse approaches for interpreting and redressing axiomatic models – while
retaining the ability to rationalise decisions (reviewed by Anand, 1993):
• Savage (1972) admitted that humans make mistakes in their application
of logic, but insisted that they could – and should – be corrected when
brought to light. That is, such models rely on their logical consistency
and not empirical verification (see also Raiffa, 1961).
• Some models relaxed, weakened, or removed dependence on trouble-
some axioms (e.g. Chew, 1983; Machina, 1982); and others attempted to
include psychological factors, such as disappointment (Bell, 1982; Gul,
1991), or interpret the axioms stochastically (Luce, 1958).
• Conversely, Anand (1987) argued that the completeness, transitivity, and
independence axioms are unnecessary and do not imply rationality at
all (see also Fishburn, 1988).
• Machina (1989) proposed a compromise: consistency with the axioms
is desirable at some deep level of decision making, but this is unobserv-
able through economicmethods. Therefore, there is value in descriptive
models that explain the factors of choice from observable behaviour.
However, revised models eventually have to justify why the empirical data
that contradicts their predictions should be labelled irrational. In a review of
the cat-and-mouse game between normative models and empirical data, Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1986) remarked that ‘the dream of constructing a theory
that is acceptable both descriptively and normatively appears unrealizable’
(p. S272).
2.1.2 Bounded Rationality
Simon (1957) argued that the demands of reliable and unlimited information
processing that normative models ask of people are too great, and any no-
tion of rationality must be bounded by the psychological limits of human
beings. Given limited computational and predictive abilities, ‘actual human
rationality-striving can at best be an extremely crude and simplified approx-
imation to the kind of global rationality that is implied’ (p. 243) – but still,
‘people have reasons for what they do. They have motivations, and they use
reason (well or badly) to respond to these motivations and reach their goals’
(Simon, 1986, p. S209). He contended that rationality – in economics and
psychology – is fundamentally about the proper allocation of scarce resources.
Economic models consider factors of a choice to be made (such as monetary
value and the probability of occurrence), but not factors of the process that is
used to decide between choices: the costs of thought and attention that must
be expended to examine, understand, and discriminate – the scarce resources
of the mind (Simon, 1978).
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When these factors are considered, the result is a bounded rationality that
leads to a satisficing behaviour (March, 1978; Simon, 1978). That is, people
make generalisations and take shortcuts in their decision-making processes
to make the resulting behaviour as effective as possible within the constraints
of time and mental power – even if it is known to be occasionally faulty. This
can be observed in the tendency for people to occasionally follow normative
axioms, but sometimes fall back to heuristics and generalisations (Brandstät-
ter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006; Shugan, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
2.1.3 Prescribing Behaviour
Descriptive models do not make judgements about what is or is not rational
behaviour. Rather, they describe the relationships between the contributing
factors of observed decision-making behaviour – without regard for whether
these relationships are logically robust. However, there is still a desire to be
able to critique choices, and descriptivemodels are open to criticism for a lack
of explanatory power if they go no further than fitting the data (Simon, 1959).
Bell et al. (1988) argued that the divide between normative and descrip-
tive models can be bridged by prescriptive models that are evaluated on their
pragmatic value to ‘help people make better decisions’ (p. 18). For instance:
normative models demand a transitivity over choices, and descriptive models
capture the fact that people often hold intransitive preferences – but prescrip-
tive models should expose the ‘psychological nuances’ (p. 14) that lead to the
divergence between real and ideal behaviour so that it can be reduced or elim-
inated (or at least, better assessed by the decision maker).
Another approach is to view rationality and the application of normative
axioms as a personal ideal, rather than a global rule. Allais (1979a) argued that
rational behaviour only needs to (a) be a pursuit of ends that are not contra-
dictory and (b) use means that are appropriate to those ends. This would still
imply that choices are ordered, the dominance axiom applies, and objective
probabilities should be considered – but it would not enforce a particular set
of principles (see also Allais, 1979b). A person may subscribe to any model of
behaviour that allows them to meet those goals, thereby turning a descriptive
model into a personal normativemodel. That is, a personmust have the desire
to behave optimally, and normativity is a property of a person’s acceptance
of a set of axioms to achieve that. In the same sense that there are opposing
and varied schools of economic thought, rational behaviour is a raison d’être
to be adopted by an individual (Morgenstern, 1972).
Although there is little agreement about how to define rational behaviour
or how to prescriptively correct people’s choices, the debate and experimen-
tal evidence in pursuit of these questions has provided significant insight into
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the complexity of human behaviour. In particular, it is difficult to criticise
a decision as foolish or irrational solely on the basis of presupposed objective
criteria or axioms, as there are many factors of an individual’s disposition that
can influence what is sensible for them to do.¹³13. Although people are often
willing to criticise others and
attribute responsibility for
poor outcomes on the basis of
supposed irrational behaviour
(S. G. B. Johnson & Rips, 2015).
March (1978) argued that these
influences are ‘not necessarily a fault in human choice to be corrected but of-
ten a form of intelligence to be refined by the technology of choice rather than
ignored by it’ (p. 598). For researchers designing experiments and interpret-
ing subject behaviour, Mellers, Schwartz, and Cooke (1998) summarised three
faulty assumptions that we should be cognisant of: (a) that there exists a sin-
gle, correct choice; (b) that people should be internally coherent and logically
consistent; and (c) that rationality is the same for subjects and experimenters.
2.2 economic utility
Models in the economic literature are typically normative, but are based on
an idea of utility that is inspired by empirical behaviour (Stigler, 1950a, 1950b).
Utility models take an objective outcome (such as a payout) and use a utility
function to transform it into a utility score, which better represents the value
of that outcome to the person receiving it. A utility score is a quantitative
value with constraints that allow it to be algebraically manipulated. When
paired with a set of axioms in a model of choice (the conditions for when A ≻
B), outcomes can be compared and decisions analysed. The focus of utility
theories is not so much on the formulation of a particular utility function
(as it varies between people and is largely unmeasurable), but on the shape
and constraints of the curve produced by the function across the domain of
outcomes – which predicts people’s attitudes towards prospects.
Notation. A prospect is a set of outcomes X = (x1, …, xn) and associated
probabilities P = (p1, …, pn) that a contract may yield (e.g. a flip of a coin, an
insurance policy, or a financial derivative), where ∑pi = 1 and an outcome xi
is obtained with corresponding probability pi. For example, a fair coin that
wins $100 on heads and loses $75 on tails is represented as: X = (100,−75),
P = (.5, .5).
The value of a prospect is some measure of its worth. Measures of value
depend on the nature of the outcomes, but in general the value of a prospect is
what a person expects to receive from it, howmuch they would pay to receive
its outcomes, or how much they would need to be paid to give them up. For
example, is it worth gambling on the above coin flip, or is it worth offering
the gamble to someone else?
The value of a prospect with nothing but a single, certain outcome (i.e.
X = (x), P = (1)) is simply its outcome (i.e. x). However, when there are
multiple probabilistic outcomes – and especially when some of the outcomes
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are negative – the question of assessing value is the subject of considerable
debate (reviewed by Kreps, 1988; Starmer, 2000).
2.2.1 Expected Value
Originally discussed through a series of letters in the summer of 1654, Blaise
Pascal (1623–62) and Pierre de Fermat (1601–65) proposed that the total value
of a prospect should be divided by the odds with which its outcomes could be
obtained (de Fermat, 1654/1894).¹⁴
14. The question at the time con-
cerned the inexplicable losses of
the gambler Chevalier de Méré
(1607–84) in his aleatory games.This was formalised by Christiaan Huygens
(1629–95) as the value of his expectation (Huygens, 1657/1714):¹⁵ 15. For a historical review, see
Daston (1988).
E(X,P) = n∑
i=1 pixi. (2.1)
For example, the expected value of the fair coin described above is:
E(X,P) = (.5 ⋅ 100) + (.5 ⋅ (−75))= 12.50.
Therefore it is worth playing the gamble for less than $12.50 as it has a positive
expected value (and it is a poor gamble to be offering someone else to play for
more than $12.50).¹⁶
16. Irrespective of whether it is
played once, or 100 times – even
though repetition influences
choice (Wedell & Böckenholt,
1990). The following chapter dis-
cusses this as a methodological
concern.
Although this disinterested approach to assessing value is arguably fair,
it is an extremely poor predictor of how people actually behave (reviewed
below). Even worse, as a prescriptive model for rational behaviour, gambles
can be easily constructed where it encourages ostensively irrational choices.
2.2.2 Expected Utility
In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli (1700–82) contemplated a problem given to him by
his cousin Nicolas Bernoulli (1687–1759) with Gabriel Cramer (1704–52) that
demonstrated a reductio ad absurdum problemwith using the expected value
analysis for decision making – since known as the St. Petersburg paradox:
You are invited to play a game where a fair coin is repeatedly
tossed. The pot starts at $1 and doubles with each head that ap-
pears. Upon a tail, the game ends and you win whatever is in the
pot. How much would you pay to play this game?
Under an expected value analysis:
X = (1,2,4, …),
P = (½,¼,⅛, …),
E(X,P) = (½ ⋅ 1) + (¼ ⋅ 2) + (⅛ ⋅ 4) +…= ½ +½ +½ +…
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=∞.
An infinite expected value suggests that it is reasonable to wager everything
you own for an opportunity to play this game – but this is intuitively absurd!
Bernoulli (1738/1954) observed that (a) the value of money is not linear in
its price and (b) the value of a prospect is influenced by the circumstances of
the person considering it. For example, an increase of $100 in weekly income
has a higher utility to someone whose current weekly income is $500 than to
one whose current weekly income is $5,000. He called this subjective value
of a prospect its utility (cf. §2.5), and developed an expected utilitymeasure of
a prospect’s value:
U(X,P) = n∑
i=1 piu(W + xi). (2.2)
WhereW is a person’s current asset position and u is an increasing, concave
utility function that reflects the diminishing marginal utility of wealth (Fig-
ure 2.1). The concavity of u describes three important properties:
• The diminishing marginal utility of wealth as amounts increase:¹⁷17. e.g. $100 has more utility
when added to a payout of
$50 than a payout of $10,000.
0 <
[u+2] − [u+][+2x] − [+x] < 1.
• A strong aversion to decreases inW:
∣u−∣ > ∣u+∣ when ∣x−∣ = ∣x+∣.
• A preference for more certain outcomes over riskier ones – risk aversion:
p ⋅ u(x) > p
λ
u(λx), for λ > 1.
Bernoulli used his expected utility theory to explain the existence of in-
surance policies and answer the St. Petersburg paradox: if the utility of the
rapidly increasing payouts in X diminishes with a concave function,¹⁸18. Such as u(x) = loge(x). the ex-
pected utility of the gamble U(X,P) converges and is fairly small.¹⁹19. IfW is $100,000,
its utility is $11.51. Coombs and Komorita (1958) developed experimental support for utility
as a measure of value by asking subjects to choose between pairs of fair coin-
flip gambles (X or Y). Each gamble had a winning outcome (x1 or y1) and a
losing outcome (x2 or y2) such that:
u(y1) > u(x1) ≥ u(x2) > u(y2).
Therefore, X ≻ Y if and only if:
u(x2) − u(y2) > u(y1) − u(x1).
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Utility
Assets+x
−x
u−
u+
W0 +2x
u+2
FIGURE 2.1 Bernoulli’s (1738/1954) utility function u (Equation 2.2). The function inter-
sects the abscissa at a person’s total current assetsW fromwhich the utility of gains (e.g.+x→ u+ and +2x→ u+2) and losses (e.g. −x→ u−) are measured.
For example, between either X = ($5,−$5) or Y = ($6,−$6), X ≻ Y if and
only if the loss of utility in losing a dollar from -$5 to -$6 is greater than the
gain of winning a dollar from $5 to $6 (and vice versa; Siegel, 1956). The in-
fluence of risk in the decision can be examined with a pair like X = ($0,$0)
and Y = ($6,−$6) – that is, whether or not to gamble at all. Results generally
supported a concave utility function for the ordering of preferences (although
among only three subjects), butwithmixed results for riskless gambles. Hurst
and Siegel (1956) found similar results when using this procedure to test the
expected value versus the expected utility of cigarettes for prisoners. For sim-
ple gambles, a utility analysis with an independence axiom²⁰ 20. Usually additivity: if u(a) >
u(b) and u(c) > u(d), then
u(a) + u(c) > u(b) + u(d).
appears tomodel
choices with fairly consistent utility functions between subjects (e.g. David-
son, Suppes, & Siegel, 1957; Tversky, 1967a, 1967b).
However, a strictly concave utility function fails to describe some known
behaviours that are difficult to observe in a laboratory – for example, the ten-
dency for poor people to purchase insurance policies but also buy lottery tick-
ets (a contradiction of risk aversion and risk seeking, respectively). Friedman
and Savage (1948) proposed a modification to the utility function’s shape: con-
vex at high wealth levels (along the abscissa of Figure 2.1) but concave at low
wealth levels – dividing a risk averse area (concave) from a risk seeking area
(convex). Markowitz (1952) argued that a third inflection point was necessary
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to capture behaviour close to a person’s current level of wealth, with the util-
ity curve alternating between concavity and convexity as wealth increases.
Despite a lull of 200 years, the ideas of Bernoulli’s expected utility theory
became the basis for normative models in modern economics (Arrow, 1958;
Schoemaker, 1982). This was led by game theory (von Neumann & Morgen-
stern, 1947), which derived expected utility from a set of axioms thatmodelled
choices when U is maximised (reviewed by Fishburn, 1979). That is, for any
A and B ∈ S , U(A) > U(B) implies A ≻ B, and preferences subsequently follow
axioms like those described in Section 2.1.1.
However, as a descriptive model of behaviour a large set of experimental
data has found thatmany of the decisions peoplemake imply contradictions –
particularly when varying the probabilities of outcomes (reviewed by Luce &
Suppes, 1965; Machina, 1982, 1987; Tversky &Kahneman, 1986, and the axiom
violations in §2.1). For example, if asked to choose between:
$3,000 with certainty or an 80% chance at $4,000,
most people prefer the $3,000 – implying u(3000) > .8u(4000). But if the
probabilities are divided by four:
a 25% chance at $3,000 or a 20% chance at $4,000,
most people prefer the $4,000 gamble – implying .2u(4000) > .25u(3000).
Rearranging the inequalities, the first implies:
u(3000)/u(4000) > .8,
while the second implies the opposite (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979):²¹21. First presented by Allais
(1953, 1979a) as a violation of
independence (§2.1.1). u(3000)/u(4000) < .8.
This behaviour is known as the common ratio effect (Cubitt, Starmer, & Sug-
den, 1998; Starmer & Sugden, 1989): as probabilities decrease, preferences for
small (but more certain) outcomes reverse and begin to favour large (but less
certain) outcomes.
Along similar lines, the most influential (and controversial; Allais, 1979b)
counterexample to utility theories is the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953, 1979a):
First choose which of these two gambles you would rather play:
i-a i-b
Probability Winnings Probability Winnings
100% $1,000,000 89% $1,000,000
10% $5,000,000
1% $0
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And then which of these two gambles you would rather play:
ii-a ii-b
Probability Winnings Probability Winnings
11% $1,000,000 10% $5,000,000
89% $0 90% $0
Most people select gambles i-a and ii-b: implying opposite utility inequali-
ties (as above). The only stated difference between the games in i and those
in ii is the removal of an 89% chance of $1,000,000 from both sides. Thus,
expected utility theories analyse both pairs of gambles identically. However,
empirical behaviour exhibits the common consequence effect (Wu & Gonzalez,
1998): when a common outcome is either added or removed from a pair of
prospects, preferences reverse (also a violation of independence – §2.1.1).²²
22. Another analysis of this
behaviour is that people prefer
the certainty of the large sum
in i-a, and view the 1% chance
of nothing in i-b as too risky;
but somehow find the extra
1% chance of nothing in ii-b
acceptable for the chance at a
larger sum.
2.2.3 Subjective Expected Utility
Although the value of outcomes (i.e. X alone) appears to follow simple utility
curves, violations of expected utility models consistently appear under ma-
nipulations of risk – that is, when the probabilities of obtaining the outcomes
are manipulated. This behaviour could not be accounted for solely by adjust-
ing the shape of u (Rabin, 2000a), so attention turned to the probability term
pi (in Equation 2.2): if the value of an outcome xi can be non-linearly trans-
formed by a utility function u, then perhaps a similar treatment should be
given to the probability pi.
There is substantial psychological evidence that, unlike what Equation 2.2
describes, the probability of an outcome does not linearly influence the value
of a prospect. In another example of the common ratio effect Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) found that people prefer a 0.1% chance at $6,000 over a 0.2%
chance at $3,000 – but when the probabilities are multiplied by 450 (a 45%
chance at $6,000 or a 90% chance at $3,000), the preference reverses (see also
MacCrimmon & Larsson, 1979).
To examine the shape of this influence, Preston and Baratta (1948) had
subjects bid (using a pre-allocated sum of points that were exchanged for a
tangible reward at the end of the experiment) for cards that offered them
varied chances of winning more points (e.g. a 5% chance of 100 points). They
found subjects consistently overbid for cards with low probability scores, and
underbid for those with high probability scores (relative to the expected value
of the cards) – there was no relationship between the size of the outcome and
their relative bids.
Through a series of experiments, Edwards (1953; 1954a; 1954b) found that
subjects did not necessarily prefer outcomes with a higher expected value to
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those with lower, and they did not seek to maximise winnings or minimise
losses in their gambles – rather there was a systematic preference for gambles
that offered certain probabilities, and to either take big risks or avoid them.
This culminated in a subjective expected utility (seu) theory of a prospect’s
value (Edwards, 1955):²³
SEU(X,P) = n∑
i=1 w(pi)u(xi). (2.3)
Where w is a non-linear transformation of an objective probability pi into a
subjective probability (in [0, 1]).²⁴ The shape of this function was not tightly
defined but has been regularly found to resemble Figure 2.4 – with an over-
weighting of low probabilities and an underweighting of high probabilities.
The seu model was given extensive treatment in the psychology litera-
ture (reviewed by Becker & McClintock, 1967; Edwards, 1961, 1962; Luce &
Suppes, 1965), but largely ignored in economics²⁵25. Until prospect theory (§2.2.4). as it is repugnant with the
dominance axiom and jeopardises the concavity of u (Machina, 1982; cf. re-
joinder in Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Introducing a new degree of freedom
also increases the difficulty of testing the theory as it requires separating the
probability and utility components of choice,²⁶26. To the extent that they
are actually separable
(Irwin, 1953; Slovic, 1966).
and necessarily guarantees a
better fit the with the data if the shape ofw is not constrained (Edwards, 1961).
However, subsequent work has demonstrated its descriptive success through
methodologies that isolate the probability component of a choice, and by dis-
covering constraints for w (e.g. Coombs et al., 1967; Tversky, 1967a, 1967b;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Wallsten, 1970; Wu & Gonzalez, 1996).
Prelec (1998) reviewed four properties that have come to characterise w:
• Regressive. At low levels of p, w(p) > p; but as p increases, w(p) < p after
some point, which begets subcertainty:
w(p) +w(1 − p) ≤ 1. (2.4)
• Asymmetric. It is not mirrored along the diagonal axis, and has a fixed
point at around p = ⅓.
• Inverse S-shaped. It is initially concave, and then convex.
• Reflective. It is invariant on the value (i.e. xi) being weighted.
Critically, w(0) = 0, w(1) = 1, and must obey subproportionality: for any λ ∈(0, 1) and 1 ≥ p > q > 0,
w(p)
w(q) > w(λp)w(λq) . (2.5)
23 In the economics literature, ‘subjective expected utility’ or ‘subjective probability’ usually refers
to a component of a normative model by Savage (1972), which concerns the assessment of prob-
ability when there is uncertainty about the objective probabilities (reviewed in §2.2.5). For
economists, if an objective probability is known, the only defensible action is to use it directly.
24 The subjective probability functionw can also be applied to an expected valuemodel: SEV(X,P) =∑w(pi)xi. However, this model shares the same problems that expected value does and was not
given serious consideration (Coombs, Bezembinder, & Goode, 1967; Edwards, 1961).
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w(p)
Probability p
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FIGURE 2.2 Theweighting functionw of Prelec (1998) – Equation 2.6 – at several levels
of α, with β = 1.
That is, for any ratio of probabilities p/q, the correspondingw(p)/w(q) is closer
to 1 for small probabilities than for large – making them less distinguishable
(Fehr-Duda& Epper, 2012; Kahneman&Tversky, 1979). Prelec also developed
an axiomatic construction of w and proposed a formulation that fitted much
of the empirical evidence (Gonzalez &Wu, 1999; Prelec, 2000):
w(p) = exp(−β[− ln(p)]α). (2.6)
Where α ∈ [0, 1] is an index of the subproportionality²⁷ 27. The ‘Allais Paradox Index’
(Prelec, 2000, p. 78).
(illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.2) and β > 0 independently increases the convexity by shifting the in-
flection point vertically. Fehr-Duda and Epper (2012) reviewed the substantial
theoretical and empirical evidence for Prelec’s (and other) proposed formula-
tions for the shape of w. However, while the general shape of w is robust,
there is evidence that factors other than p influence its parameters (reviewed
later in §2.6).
The Allais paradox (and other effects) can be understood with such a func-
tion w that is first concave and then convex. The certainty effect that subpro-
portionality implies also disproportionately devalues certain outcomes that
become risky (cf. theories of disappointment aversion in §2.6.3).
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2.2.4 Prospect Theory
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed an seu account of the seemingly
contradictory behaviours under expected utility models with prospect theory,
which models the psychological value of a prospect’s outcomes. Prospect the-
ory combined three major advances over expected utility theories:
• Outcomes are measured as gains and losses relative to a neutral reference
point. That is, prospect theory considers the changes that are brought
about by an outcome instead of the final state that results. This refer-
ence point may be the current asset position of the person considering
the outcome (as in expected utility theory), but crucially, it can also
be altered by their expectations or the formulation of the prospect (re-
viewed in §2.3.1).
• The shape of the utility function (known as the value function) in the do-
main of losses is different from that in the domain of gains: it is concave
above the reference point, convex below it, and steeper for losses than
it is for gains.
• Probabilities are replaced with decision weights that incorporate infor-
mation about the subjective desirability of a prospect, and perceptions
of its likelihood.
Under prospect theory, the value of a prospect is:
V(X,P) = n∑
i=1 π(pi)v(xi). (2.7)
Where v is a value function forwhich v(0) = 0, and π is a decisionweight func-
tion for which π(0) = 0 and π(1) = 1. The general shape of the value function
v is shown in Figure 2.3 and must be concave for gains, convex for losses, and
steeper for losses than for gains (akin to Friedman& Savage, 1948; Markowitz,
1952). The function v also transforms its argument to be measured as a gain
or loss relative to some reference point. The general shape of the decision
weight function π is shown in Figure 2.4, and must satisfy subcertainty and
subproportionality (§2.2.3).²⁸
The shape of v encapsulates three common empirical observations in how
people evaluate the outcomes of prospects (with examples from Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979, and Kahneman & Tversky, 1984):
• Risk aversionwhen all outcomes of a prospect are in the domain of gains
– people prefer a certain $3,000 to an 80% chance at $4,000.
28 A revised cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Wakker & Tversky, 1993)
changed the weighting function to transform the cumulative probability distribution function,
rather than individual probabilities – which can lead to violations of dominance (Fishburn, 1978;
Starmer, 2000). This update brings it into the class of rank-dependent expected-utility theories,
which make seu theories more acceptable to economists (Diecidue & Wakker, 2001; Quiggin,
1982). Cumulative prospect theory also split π into a function for losses (v(x) < 0) and a function
for gains (v(x) ≥ 0). These changes are immaterial to the discussion in this thesis.
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0
FIGURE 2.3 The value function of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979): the
psychological value of an outcome’s losses or gains: concave for gains, convex for losses,
and steeper for losses (e.g. −x→ v−) than for gains (e.g. +x→ v+).
π(p)
Probability p
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0
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FIGURE 2.4 An example of prospect theory’s decision weight function (cf. Figure 2.2).
The dashed line shows an objective π(p) = p function, whereas the solid line shows an
overweighting of low probabilities and underweighting of high probabilities – similar to
the functions experimentally found by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and other investi-
gations of SEU subjective probability functionsw (Fehr-Duda & Epper, 2012).
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• Risk seekingwhen all outcomes of a prospect are in the domain of losses
– people prefer to gamble on an 80% chance at losing $4,000 than to
accept a loss of $3,000 with certainty.
• Loss aversionwhen the outcomes of a prospect aremixed – people reject
a gamble with a 50% chance of winning <$30 and a 50% chance of los-
ing $10 (i.e. a stronger preference for avoiding losses than for acquiring
gains; v(x) < −v(−x)).
The sentiment is that ‘losses loom larger than gains’ (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979, p. 279).²⁹
Loss aversion is a key contribution of prospect theory, and is part of a
broader negativity bias observed in psychological research (reviewed in §2.6.1).
In support of it, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) reviewed several experiments
where subjectsmade choices between alternatives that combined positive and
negative elements (e.g. a job that was socially isolated, but had a short com-
mute – or vice versa). Results showed that the negative outcomes dominated
preferences, and in general the magnitude of a loss was weighted approxi-
mately two timesmore than a comparable gain – the coefficient of loss aversion
(see also Köbberling &Wakker, 2005).
An editing phase occurs prior to the evaluation of V that captures the per-
ceptual process of interpreting a prospect, and prepares it for evaluation: (a) a
reference point is established to define the domain of outcomes for gains and
those for losses, (b) identical outcomes are combined or cancelled, (c) riskless
components are separated from risky ones, (d) outcomes and probabilities are
simplified, and (e) dominated prospects are removed from consideration.
Prospect theorymakes no normative claims or comment on the rationality
of the choices it describes, but exists to capture the influences of psychological
factors on choice in an economic context – which may be overcome through
training or experience (Barberis, Huang, & Santos, 2001; List, 2003, 2004). It
has been remarkably successful as a descriptive model to explain why many
of the choices people make conflict with prior economic utility models (re-
viewed by Barberis, 2013; Camerer, 1998; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; Shafir
& Tversky, 1995; Starmer, 1999), and has been applied to behaviour across a
number of fields (e.g. Camerer, 2004; Chou, Chou, & Ko, 2009; Mercer, 2005;
M.Weber & Camerer, 1998;Wu, Heath, & Larrick, 2008). However, prospect
theory also has its own paradoxes – experimental data that do not conform
to its hypotheses (reviewed by Birnbaum, 2008; Gonzalez & Wu, 2003) and
challenges in applying it to new domains (Barberis, 2013) – reviewed for inter-
action in the following chapter.
29 Cf. ‘We suffer more . . .when we fall from a better to a worse situation, than we ever enjoy when
we rise from a worse to a better’ (Smith, 1759/1976, p. 213).
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2.2.5 Uncertainty and Risk
In the choice problems discussed so far, the exact probability of an outcome
has always been given with the definition of a prospect – and many experi-
mental tests of economic utility theories make objective probabilities explicit
to subjects. However, rarely is probability so explicit: most decisions out-
side of the laboratory feature not only risk in obtaining their probabilistic
outcomes, but also uncertainty in what those probabilities are. Einhorn and
Hogarth (1985) distinguished between three types of this precariousness:
• Risk. The exact probability distribution is known (e.g. P = (.3, .5, .2)).
• Ignorance. There is no information about the probability distribution
for the outcomes (e.g. P = (?, ?, ?)).
• Ambiguity. There is some information about the probability distribution
for the outcomes (e.g. P = (.3, ?, ?) or P = (.3,≈.5,≈.2)).
For example, the Ellsberg paradox in Section 2.1.1 asks subjects to make a bet
about an urn that contains balls of three different colours for which
P(Red,Black,Yellow) = (⅓, ?, ?).
That is, there is ambiguity throughout the bets: risk about the drawing of a red
ball, and ignorance about the drawing of a black or yellow ball. The ignorance
could be resolved into ambiguity if a sample of several balls was drawn from
the urn before the bet is made: for example, if yellow, yellow, black, yellow,
and red balls were drawn (without replacement), then P = (⅓,≈1/6,≈½).³⁰ 30. Ambiguity remains in theestimated black and yellowproportions.
In economics, exposition of the division between risk and uncertainty
is attributed to Knight (1921), and its influence on preferences to Ramsey
(1926/1931), de Finetti (1937/1980), and Savage (1962, 1972). They use the term
subjective probability³¹ 31. Distinct from that reviewed
in §2.2.3.
to refer to a person’s opinion on the probability of an
uncertain outcome. As withmodels of choice, their research focussed on how
to measure uncertainty and resolve it towards risk as relevant information is
obtained (reviewed by Pratt, Raiffa, & Schlaifer, 1964). For example, consider
a one-urn version of the Ellsberg paradox (1961; also given by Keynes, 1921):
You are confronted with two urns:
urn-i : contains a total of 100 red and black balls in
some unknown proportion.
urn-ii : contains exactly 50 red and 50 black balls.
For each of the following gambles, either choose the bet youwould
prefer to make (i.e.A ≻ B) or state that you are indifferent between
them (i.e.A ∼ B). Bets are labelledwith a colour and an urn number
– for example, ‘Red-i’ is a bet (of say, $100) on a red ball being
drawn from urn-i.
(a) Red-i or Black-i, (b) Red-ii or Black-ii,
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(c) Red-i or Red-ii, and (d) Black-i or Black-ii.
From the responses subjects give to questions like these, a probability distri-
bution for the proportion of red or black balls in urn-i can be estimated. As
more information is obtained (such as fromwatching other people play, draw-
ing samples from the urns, or consulting an oracle), these distributions should
be updated following Bayesian principles (Savage, 1962):
P(α∣x)∝ P(x∣α)P(α). (2.8)
That is, the probability of an unknown α given some information x is propor-
tional to the product of the probability of observing x supposing α is true, and
the initial probability of α.
However, most people are indifferent to the first two bets and have a def-
inite preference for urn-ii in the others. This implies under Savage’s (1972)
axioms that the probability of Red-ii is greater than Red-i, and at the same
time not-Red-ii (i.e. Black-ii) is greater than not-Red-i (i.e. Black-i) – a con-
tradiction (Roberts, 1963):
(a) P(Red-i) = P(Black-i) = 0.5, (b) P(Red-ii) = P(Black-ii) = 0.5,
(c) P(Red-i) > P(Red-ii), and (d) P(¬Red-i) > P(¬Red-ii).
That is, people’s preferences for prospects with uncertainty do not behave as
if they are assigning and manipulating numeric probability scores. Ellsberg
(1961) and Roberts (1963) argued that the uncertainty in the contents of urn-
i is itself a factor in the choice – which has subsequently been refined into a
general uncertainty aversion (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Fox & Tversky, 1995;
Schmeidler, 1989).³²
Uncertainty aversion is distinct from the risk aversionmodelled by utility
theories (§2.2.2 and reviewed by Camerer & Weber, 1992). Risk aversion de-
scribes preferences for low risk outcomes (i.e. high values of pi) over high risk
outcomes (i.e. low values of pi), whereas uncertainty aversion describes pref-
erences for more certain outcomes (i.e. a narrower distribution of possible pi
values) over less certain outcomes (i.e. a wider distribution of possible pi val-
ues). Risk aversion is also matched by a corresponding risk seeking behaviour
when outcomes are uniformly in the domain of losses (§2.2.4), but there is no
matching ‘uncertainty seeking’ behaviour.
Tversky and Fox (1995) developed a modification of prospect theory’s de-
cision weight function π to capture the effects of uncertainty. Unlike ex-
pected utility theories, which expect probabilities to be additive (i.e. P(A∨B) =
32 Subsequent work has also found that the application of Bayesian logic (Equation 2.8) to updating
probability estimates is likewise faulty (Grether, 1980): people underweight base rates (Bar-Hillel,
1980), place too much belief in small samples (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971), and display a bias
towards representativeness over likelihood (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman,
1983) – further reviewed in §2.6.
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P(A)+P(B) for any disjointA and B ∈ S), Tversky and Fox permitted π to have
subadditivity:
π(A) ≥ π(A ∨ B) − π(B), and (2.9)
π(S) − π(S −A) ≥ π(A ∨ B) − π(B). (2.10)
Where π(S) = 1. This captured their empirical findings that ‘an event has
more impact when it turns impossibility into possibility [Equation 2.9], or
possibility into certainty [Equation 2.10], than when it merely makes a pos-
sibility more likely’ (p. 281). A measure for the degree of subadditivity – the
influence of uncertainty when compared against a certainty equivalent³³
33. The minimum value a person
would prefer with certainty over
taking a gamble.–
can be found by rearranging the inequalities:
D(A,B) = π(A) + π(B) − π(A ∨ B), and (2.11)
D′(A,B) = π(S) − π(S −A) − π(A ∨ B) + π(B). (2.12)
Similarly, if risk aversion is solely a property of the shape of u (as assumed
by expected utility models), then it too can be measured by examining its
curvature (Arrow, 1970; Pratt, 1964):
r(x) = −u′′(x)
u′(x) . (2.13)
Where, u′ and u′′ are the first and second derivatives of u, respectively. That
is, for some asset position x, r measures the local risk aversion around that
area of the utility function u – essentially, a measure of the concavity at x.³⁴ 34. When multiplied by x (i.e.
r′(x) = x ⋅ r(x)), it is a measure
of aversion in proportion to
total assets x.
Under an expected utility model, as total assets W increase (Equation 2.2),
an individual is more willing to accept risk if r is decreasing. However, as
highlighted in seu and prospect theories, risk attitudes are expressed with a
combination of the utility or value function, and a non-linear probability or
decision weighting function (Fehr-Duda & Epper, 2012; Kahneman & Tver-
sky, 1979; Rabin, 2000b). In these cases, r is not a complete measure of risk
aversion, but it is still a useful measure for the other properties of a utility
curve (diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion).
2.3 preferences
Prospect theory expands the scope of economic models of utility with the
influences of a decision-maker’s beliefs, desires, and expectations – that is,
their preferences. These psychological factors drive the non-linearity of v and
π. However, the original formulation of prospect theory was vague about
the source of these subjective qualities – for example, how a reference point
is established (Barberis, 2013). Subsequent research has refined these proper-
ties through extensive empirical research (reviewed in Lichtenstein & Slovic,
2006): resulting in more complete models of reference-dependent preferences.
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2.3.1 Reference-Dependence
Prospect theory’s reference point is based on a hypothesis that people respond
to the changes that an outcome delivers from an adapted neutral state (Tver-
sky & Bar-Hillel, 1983; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991), rather than the resultant
state (assumed by expected utility). In simple monetary prospects this refer-
ence pointmay be the currentwealth of the person considering the prospect –
but importantly, even for simple prospects, the reference point can be shifted
by a person’s expectations of what they want to receive or by unadapted
changes (such as a recent windfall or loss).
Experiments with riskless prospects (i.e. with a single outcome X = (x)
and P = (1)) have supported the hypothesised shape of prospect theory’s value
function v and its reference-dependence. For example, Kahneman, Knetsch,
and Thaler (1990) gave a group of subjects a mug that retailed for $5 and
asked them howmuch they would sell it for (awillingness-to-acceptmeasure),
while another group of subjects were asked how much they would buy it for
(a willingness-to-pay measure). They found subjects were willing to accept
around $7, but willing to pay only $3.50. This reluctance to trade³⁵35. Known generally as the
endowment effect (§2.6.2).
– and
in particular, the stronger aversion to selling – indicates that possession of
the mug established a reference point for subjects that weighted their evalua-
tion of losing it in excess of its fair value (see also Bateman, Munro, Rhodes,
Starmer, & Sugden, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).
Outside the laboratory, evidence for reference-dependent loss averse be-
haviour has been found in across a range of products. For example, Putler
(1992) found changes in egg sales were 2.4 times greater when egg prices in-
creased (a relative loss) than when they decreased (a relative gain). Similar ef-
fects have been found for orange juice sales (Hardie, Johnson, & Fader, 1993),
Boston apartment listing prices (Genesove & Mayer, 2001), the evaluation
of job candidates (Highhouse & Johnson, 1996), and New York City taxicab
driver wage elasticities (Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, & Thaler, 1997).
Although it is often convenient to assume that the reference point for
choices is the status quo state (whatever a person currently has or recently
experienced), there is a large body of experimental work showing that refer-
ence points can be manipulated without any material change to outcomes or
the status quo – these are reviewed later for the endowment effect (§2.6.2),
framing effects (§2.6.3), and sunk costs (§2.6.5). The method for establishing a
reference point experimentally or identifying one ethnographically is also de-
pendent on the nature of the outcomes being evaluated (money, mugs, eggs,
etc.), and demands experimental controls that validate it – discussed in the
following chapter.
26
2.3. Preferences
2.3.2 Expectations
Akey influence on a person’s reference point is their expectation of a prospect’s
outcome: their beliefs about an outcome prior to its occurrence. As with em-
pirical reference points (e.g. current wealth or possessions), expectations can
provide a benchmark against which an outcome can be measured: is an out-
come better orworse than expected? Expectationsmay be developed through
a careful analysis of knowledge and experience, or wishful thinking about
ideal outcomes; they may be swayed by anxiety or suspense in anticipation of
an event (Caplin & Leahy, 2001); and theymay be held with strong conviction
or with relative disinterest.
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) distinguished between three main types of
‘perceptual expectancies’ (p. 144):
• Active expectancies occupy conscious thought and draw on attention
and consideration.
• Passive-temporary expectancies are automatic and effortless, and are
driven by the effects of context and priming.
• Passive-permanent expectancies are similarly automatic, but are built on
long-lasting experiences and models of reality.
These expectancies determine not only what an outcome is anticipated to be,
but also influence how it is perceived and the strength with which it is held.
When there is limited knowledge about the cause–effect relationship of an
action and its outcome, there is uncertainty about the belief (§2.2.5).
It is desirable that expectations be based on robust forecasts made from
reliable data (Muth, 1961). For example, businesses can forecast future sales
from prior data and economic models, and sports betting odds are usually cal-
culated from past performance. However, such forecasts for economic data
– such as sales, price inflation, and wages – are frequently found to contain
errors (Lovell, 1986; Williams, 1987). These errors are not random (i.e. their
mean is not zero), but contain systematic biases. The psychological litera-
ture calls this the ‘illusion of validity’ (reviewed by Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978,
p. 395), wherein expert clinicians are found to frequently make confident pre-
dictions that contain large systematic errors. For example, the judgement
of university student performance by academic admissions faculty is often
worse than predictions from a simple linear model of the relevant variables
(reviewed by Dawes, 1979; Meehl, 1954; Simon, 1959). If these forecasts and
judgements are used as the basis for reference points, then choices about al-
ternatives will be similarly biased.
Heath, Larrick, and Wu (1999) studied the effect of goals on the evalua-
tion of outcomes in the context of prospect theory’s predictions about loss
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aversion and diminishing sensitivity – hypothesising that goals establish ac-
tive expectations that set a reference point for v (formalised into a model by
Wu et al., 2008). For example, if a person establishes a goal of scoring 90%
on an exam but only achieves 87%, they would feel negatively about their
performance (as a loss) – even if their typical level of performance was only
80%. In a series of such scenarios described to subjects, Heath et al. found
goals had a systematic effect on the evaluation of outcomes that was consis-
tent with prospect theory’s model. They argued that prospect theory’s value
function could be used to explain the effects observed in the goal literature
of effort, persistence, and performance (reviewed by Krantz & Kunreuther,
2007; Locke & Latham, 2002).
The influence of expectations on perceived value also received attention
in the marketing literature, where researchers considered how expectations
influence consumer purchasing decisions and satisfaction (reviewed byOliver
& Winer, 1987).³⁶36. Usually without prospect
theory (cf. Thaler, 1980).
This literature uses models of disconfirmation (e.g. Oliver,
1980): a consumer’s expectation of a product or experience can either be
(a) confirmed if it is met by the outcome, (b) positively disconfirmed if the out-
come is better than expected, or (c) negatively disconfirmed if the outcome
is worse than expected. Yi (1990) reviewed these models, the theories of re-
solving disconfirmation,³⁷ and studies of their effects. In general, negative dis-
confirmation has a stronger impact on overall experience than either of the
others (see also Rozin & Royzman, 2001). However, the proposed resolution
theories predict conflicting responses, and observing the subtle effects and
relationships that may distinguish them has been difficult (Yi, 1990). Recent
attention in the marketing literature has turned towards the behavioural eco-
nomics models discussed in this chapter (Goldstein, Johnson, & Sharpe, 2006;
Ho, 2006).
2.3.3 A Reference-Dependent Preferences Model
Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) developed a general model of reference-dependent
preferences based on a person’s probabilistic beliefs about outcomes – com-
bining much of the prior theoretical and empirical work into a unified model.
In this model, the utility of a prospect is analysed using a consumption bundle
c of what the prospect yields, and an endogenous reference bundle r of what
a person expects it to yield. These bundles are K-dimensional vectors (in RK)
that contain a collection of objective outcomes. This model, with an account
37 For example, in contrast theory (Spector, 1956) the surprise of disconfirmation causes perceptions
to be exaggerated (positive disconfirmation is perceived as more positive than is objectively the
case, and vice versa), while in dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) disconfirmation is psychologi-
cally uncomfortable and is resolved by distorting the perception of performance to bring it closer
to what was expected.
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of the consumption and reference bundles that express interactive prospects,
is further detailed in the following chapter.
The consumption bundle c is derived from the specification of a prospect’s
outcomes, and the reference bundle r is based on a person’s ‘rational expec-
tations held in the recent past about outcomes’ (p. 1133). By using bundles
of outcomes, multiple factors of a decision can be given consideration. For
example, if a consumer goes shopping for shoes, they may assess outcomes
along at least two dimensions:
1. Their wealth adjusted by the price of the shoes (in R).
2. Whether or not they possess new shoes (in {0, 1}).
Therefore, their reference bundle r will contain:
1. Their wealth adjusted for the amount they expect to spend.
2. 1 (indicating a purchase).
And the consumption bundles they encounter during their trip c (i.e. goods
being sold) will contain:
1. Their wealth adjusted for the amount they need to spend.
2. Whether or not they will obtain new shoes.
Using consumption bundles allowed Kőszegi and Rabin to separately eval-
uate the influence of the multiple, independent dimensions of an outcome
that bear upon a decision. For example, when the consumer visits a store
with their expectation of purchasing shoes (i.e. r = ⟨θ, 1⟩, where θ is their
purchase-adjusted wealth), the expectation of making a purchase sets a belief
about future consumption that may make them less sensitive to the prices
they encounter (i.e. movements in θ). To avoid experiencing a sensation of
loss if no purchase is made (an unrealised expectation of consumption) they
will prefer to buy at higher prices than if they had no prior expectation of
making a purchase (i.e. r = ⟨θ,0⟩).
Using these consumption bundles, the utility of a prospect is:
u(c∣r) =m(c) + n(c∣r), (2.14)
m(c) = K∑
k=1mk(ck), (2.15)
n(c∣r) = K∑
k=1 µ(mk(ck) −mk(rk)). (2.16)
Where—
• u(c∣r) is the overall utility of a consumption bundle c, given reference
expectations r.³⁸
38. This is distinct from the u in
Equation 2.2.
• m is the consumption utility of obtaining a particular bundle. This is a
purely objective utility measure associated with those outcomes (analo-
gous to u in Equation 2.2). Consumption utility is evaluated separately
for each dimension of a bundle, and summed across them.
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• n is the gain–loss utility function that weights gains and losses according
to the difference between consumption utility for an actual outcome c
and the reference expectations r.
• µ is the universal gain–loss function that satisfies the properties of pros-
pect theory’s value function (essentially v from Equation 2.7), and mod-
els the subjective aspects of the gain or loss in marginal utility.
In general, people prefer prospects that (a) have high consumption utilitym(c)
and (b) are aligned with or exceed reference expectations n(c∣r). Using the
properties of prospect theory’s value function in µ exaggerates the effect of
failing to meet reference expectations (loss aversion), and dampens the effect
of exceeding them (diminishing sensitivity).
When outcomes are drawn from a probability distribution F (i.e. there is
risk), the utility is integrated across that distribution:
U(F∣r) = ∫ u(c∣r)dF(c). (2.17)
And similarly if expectations are drawn from a probability distribution G (i.e.
there is uncertainty):³⁹
39. Kőszegi and Rabin note that
for simplicity these formulations
are wilfully ignorant of the non-
linearity of prospect theory’s π.
U(F∣G) = ∫∫ u(c∣r)dG(r)dF(c). (2.18)
This formulation captures several psychological properties of reference-
dependent preferences in an axiomatic formulation:
• If an outcome c is fixed, lowering the reference point r increases satis-
faction with the outcome.
• Preferences have a status-quo bias: if a reference point r is better than
an outcome c along some dimensions, then for c ≻ r, the bundle c must
offer larger gains in the remaining dimensions.
• Small changes in utility share the properties of prospect theory’s value
function, but when there are dramatic differences between outcomes
(such as life-and-death scenarios), loss aversion may not be observed.
This model is built on the experimental findings of prospect theory and
reference-dependence, and has subsequently found support in modelling and
explaining labour supply choices (e.g. Abeler, Falk, Goette, & Huffman, 2011;
Crawford & Meng, 2011; Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006), consumer behaviour in the
marketing literature (Ho, 2006), and other psychological effects (Barberis,
2013; Heidhues & Kőszegi, 2008; Herweg, Müller, & Weinschenk, 2010). The
following chapter will develop this model for interactive contexts and discuss
approaches for applying it in human–computer interaction research.
2.4 decision-making processes
As with the introduction of uncertainty (§2.2.5), the models of choice dis-
cussed so far have assumed that all of a prospect’s outcomes are defined: the
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complete set of outcomes, their values, and all relevant parameters are known.
For instance, although the Ellsberg paradoxes (§2.1 and §2.2.5) have uncertain
outcomes, all possible choices and their resultant outcome states are given.
However, as the decisions under consideration shift from monetary gambles
in a laboratory to more conventional questions outside of one – where to go
on holiday, which breakfast cereal to buy, which text editor to use, etc. –
it usually becomes less clear to people what the consequences of each alter-
native are, or even what the complete set of alternatives is. Understanding
how people approach these uncertainties crosses multiple areas of cognitive
psychology – attention, memory, learning, etc. – and are brought together in
information processing theories of decisionmaking (reviewed byOppenheimer
& Kelso, 2015; E. U. Weber & Johnson, 2009). Although applying these the-
ories is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is useful to briefly review them as
context for economic theories of choice.
Identifying a set of alternative choices depends upon the complexity of the
decision, the significance of its consequences, and the will of the individual.
For example, selecting a poor breakfast cereal is far less disastrous than select-
ing a poor holiday location, and therefore demands less scrutiny. However,
even important decisions cannot be given an unlimited amount of consider-
ation – for example, when thinking about a holiday location, people do not
give conscious consideration to every location on Earth. As the number of
factors that could contribute to a decision is unbounded, people apply heuris-
tics and simplification strategies to reduce the set of alternatives – for exam-
ple, favouring familiar brands or recommendations from friends (reviewed
by Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Strategies such as information foraging de-
scribe how people balance the resource costs of seeking new informationwith
the opportunity costs of attending to other decisions (Pirolli & Card, 1999).
Kahneman (2003) argued for an overarching dual-system approach: decision
making is divided between a fast, parallel, and emotional intuition system for
quick judgements of little consequence, and a slow, serial, and neutral rea-
soning system for complex judgements. The system that is engaged to solve a
decision-making problem depends on a person’s available resources, training,
and psychological priming (Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, Sherman, & Sherman,
2006; Stanovich &West, 2000).
Oppenheimer and Kelso (2015) reviewed the major approaches to under-
standing this cognitive architecture of decision making. Unlike expected util-
ity models (which assume preferences are stable) and heuristic models (which
are only sporadically applicable), such theories approach decisionmaking as a
dynamic system: information is collected under the constraints of a person’s
memory and attention, and is stochastically sampled based on current goals
and preferences. Importantly, there is also a temporal element that allows
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feedback to adjust preferences over time (either from observing the conse-
quences of a choice, or deliberating on a problem for longer).
A particularly compelling theory is decision by sampling (Stewart, Chater,
& Brown, 2006), which explicitly rejects the idea that people calculate utility
scores for outcomes. Instead, Stewart et al. argued that people sample the
available outcomes from memory and choose between them with a series of
binary comparisons. That is, the value of an outcome is its rank among the
sampled alternatives – and not a global utility score. This hypothesis was
based on findings that people are good atmaking comparative judgements (i.e.
that A is better or worse than B), but are poor at estimating the magnitude of
that relationship (reviewed by Stewart, Brown, & Chater, 2005).
Evidence against the use of utility scores for judgment was found in ex-
periments that asked subjects to value a gamble from a set of options (e.g.
Stewart, Chater, Stott, & Reimers, 2003). For example, when subjects were
asked how much the following gamble was worth:
a 50% chance of winning £200;
£40, £50, £60, or £70?
Most chose £60. But when the options were:
£90, £100, £110, or £120?
Most chose £100 (reviewed by Vlaev, Chater, Stewart, & Brown, 2011). Ex-
pected utility theories assert that prospects have a stable utility that is inde-
pendent of any options presented – people should choose the option that is
closest to the utility of the prospect. That is, if the gamble is worth £80, people
should select the £70 and £90 options. However, the experimental procedure
demonstrated that the options presented can skew a person’s perceptions of
a prospect’s value – suggesting a comparative approach to judgement that is
based on the sample of options presented.
The implications of decision by sampling are consistent with the risk aver-
sion, risk seeking, and loss averse predictions of utility models (in particu-
lar, prospect theory; §2.2.4), but are derived from accumulated comparisons
from samples of outcomes rather than an assumed utility function curvature
(Stewart et al., 2006). The sampling approach is also better equipped to ex-
plain temporal aspects of a choice: how the order of decisions or incidental
priming can affect preferences (e.g. Ungemach, Stewart, & Reimers, 2011).
However, the rejection of utility scoring as a cognitive model is not detri-
mental to the use of utilitymodels for understanding preferences. Most utility
models do not depend on utility scores actually being calculated,⁴⁰
40. It is also unclear if they
were ever intended to be
cognitively admissible.
but rather
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that the relative order of outcome utilities implies a certain ordering of prefer-
ences (discussed further in the following chapter). This only requires that out-
comes be ordinally comparable to be able to construct a utility scale. Modern
utility models – such as Kőszegi and Rabin’s (2006, §2.3.3) – include parame-
ters for psychological influences on this ordering through comparisons with
malleable reference points and expectations. However, the assumption that
utility scales are temporally stable is thoroughly refuted (reviewed by Stewart,
Reimers, & Harris, 2015; Vlaev et al., 2011).
2.5 experienced utility
The idea of utility maximisation has its roots in Jeremy Bentham’s (1748–1832)
utilitarianism theory of normative ethics.⁴¹
41. Except for this section, un-
qualified uses of the term utility
in this thesis refer to the eco-
nomic utility described in §2.2.
Bentham (1789/1948) defined util-
ity as a measure of pleasure and pain: our two ‘sovereign masters [that] point
out what we ought to do, as well as determine what we shall do’ (p. 1). He
classified 14 kinds of pleasure⁴² 42. Sense, wealth, skill, amity,
good name, etc.
and 12 kinds of pain⁴³
43. Privation, awkwardness,
enmity, ill name, etc.
that could be measured
by their intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, and purity. Ac-
tions that promote pleasure should be pursued, and those that promote pain
should be avoided.
Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin (1997) reintroduced these ideas as experi-
enced utility to understand how people retrospectively evaluate events, and
why such evaluation often conflicted with objective accounts of them. Kah-
neman et al. argued that people experience events (such as psychological ex-
periments, surgical procedures, and personal relationships) as a series of dis-
cretemoments, rather than as a continuous stream. The construction of these
moments, and biases in one’s memories of them, introduces discrepancies be-
tween the recollection of an experience and what was actually experienced.
2.5.1 Experience by Moments
Experiences are not stored in a person’s memory as if they were a photo-
graphic recording – with each second stored in perfect experiential and tem-
poral fidelity. Rather, memories are formed from snapshots of the represen-
tative moments in an experience: the most significant or interesting episodes
(Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993). Analyses of these moments – both at the
time they occur and retrospectively after the fact – are used to characterise
experienced utility.
Kahneman et al. (1997; and further refined by Kahneman, 2000a, 2000b)
distinguished four types of this utility:
• Decision utility. The economic utility discussed in Section 2.2.
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• Instant utility. A ‘measure of hedonic and affective experience, which
can be derived from immediate reports of current subjective experience’
(p. 376). That is, an account of the pleasure or pain in an experienced
moment at the instant it is experienced.
• Total utility. A temporal integral of the instant utilities for the moments
that constitute an event: a measure of the total amount of pleasure or
pain that was experienced.
• Remembered utility. A retrospective account of the total utility measure:
what a person remembers and is able to recall about their experience of
an event.
Total utility is considered an objective measure: it is an account of the total
pleasure and pain experienced by a person during an event from real-time
measures as it is experienced. That is, it is a ground truthmeasure of a person’s
experience that is unaffected by theirmemory. Kahneman et al. proposed two
rules that govern total utility:
• Separability. The order in which moments are experienced does not
affect total utility.
• Time neutrality. All moments are weighted equally. That is, the time gap
between experience and choice does not influence total utility – utility
does not diminish over time.
However, experimental evidence has found that these rules do not hold for
remembered utility – the retrospective account of total utility (Varey & Kah-
neman, 1992). Remembered utility is vulnerable to the psychological biases
and frailties of memory, including:
• Peak-end. The most intense (i.e. most pleasurable or most painful) and
terminating moments of an event have a disproportionally high influ-
ence on its remembered utility.
• Duration neglect. The total duration of an event has little influence on
its remembered utility.
• Violations of temporal dominance. The remembered utility of a strongly
negative event can be increased by extending it with moments that re-
duce the average pain, even if they increase the overall (summed) pain.
2.5.2 Peak-End
Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, and Redelmeier (1993) conducted a ‘cold-
pressor’ experiment, which had subjects submerge their hands in water un-
der two conditions: short and long. Both began with the subject’s hand in
unpleasantly cold water (14°C) for one minute. Then: in the short condition
subjects removed their hand from the water, but in the long condition they
kept their hand submerged for an additional 30 seconds while the water was
surreptitiously warmed to a less-unpleasant 15°C. When subjects were asked
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which condition they would prefer to repeat, most chose the long condition:
preferring the longer unpleasant experience that had a marginally less un-
pleasant ending – effectively choosing more pain over less.
Subjects were also asked to report a real-time measure of their discomfort
using a potentiometer (their instant utility). The discomfort during the first
minute was comparable between conditions, but the final 30 seconds of the
long condition had a significant drop in discomfort for the majority of sub-
jects (the main finding was robust under replication without this measure).
That is, subjects were able to recognise the drop in discomfort at the end of
the long condition, and despite also correctly identifying that they endured
it for more time, they felt it had less overall discomfort (their remembered
utility). This apparent conflict was attributed to the peak-end rule: reports
of subjective experience are dominated by the average of the most intense
moment and the terminating moment.
The peak-end rulewas also observed in retrospective reports from patients
of a colonoscopy procedure, whose experience was dominated by their peak
discomfort and by their discomfort at the end of the procedure – it was unre-
lated to the procedure’s duration, which varied between 4 and 69minutes (Re-
delmeier & Kahneman, 1996; Redelmeier, Katz, & Kahneman, 2003). Ariely
(1998) also observed the rule in two experiments that applied pain to partici-
pants using a heating element or vice: they found a peak-end effect in global
retrospective evaluations of the experience, and mixed results for the influ-
ence of its duration.
Judgements about pleasurable experiences are also subject to the peak-end
rule. For example, Do, Rupert, and Wolford (2008) examined the perceived
pleasure in receiving gifts. In their first experiment, two lists of dvds were
produced (A and B) and given to participants as part of a raffle. The A list
was populated with high-rated movies, and the B list with low-rated movies.
Participants reported their pleasure upon receiving either: (a) one A movie,
(b) an A movie and a B movie later, (c) a B movie and an A movie later, or
(d) one Bmovie. Receiving a Bmovie alone was rated positively, but receiving
an Amovie followed by a Bmovie was rated worse than receiving an Amovie
alone. These findings were further supported in a second experiment that
gave sweets to children on Halloween. They concluded their paper with some
advice for gift giving: ‘youmight consider giving only the best one – or at least
making sure that you give the best one last’ (p. 98).
2.5.3 Duration Neglect & Violations of Temporal Dominance
The effects of duration neglect are closely related to the peak-end rule – re-
sults of both the cold-pressor and colonoscopy studies found subjects ignored
the duration of the events in their attention to the peak and end moments.
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However, duration neglect and violations of temporal dominance are also in-
dependent effects.
Fredrickson and Kahneman (1993) exposed subjects to films containing
either pleasant or aversive imagery, and recorded both their real-time and
retrospective affect ratings. They found that the duration of the films had
only a small effect on retrospective evaluation, and that evaluations appeared
to be based on a weighted average of the moments in the experience – that is,
adding less-negative imagery to a substantially negative experience improved
the reported evaluation of the overall experience. This contrasts with the
assumption of temporal dominance, which asserts that adding a moment of
negativity to an experience should make the overall evaluation more negative
(as it reduces the sum of the experienced utility).
Schreiber andKahneman (2000) conducted a similar series of experiments
using unpleasant sounds of varied loudness and duration. Although they
found peak-end responses to the stimuli, they did not find duration neglect:
the duration of the experience had an additive effect on remembered utility.
However, they did observe violations of temporal dominance: extending an
aversive sound with a less aversive one improved the remembered utility of
the total experience.
Related effects have been observed in many other fields, including arti-
cle pricing (Nasiry & Popescu, 2011) and effortful study (Finn, 2010). How-
ever, the effects are sometimes subtle: for example, experiments involving
purchase payment sequences found that peak-end effects were not observed
when subjects were focused on the experimental manipulation, but became
significant when they were concurrently engaged in a distractor task (Langer,
Sarin, & Weber, 2005). Experiments on gastronomic experiences validated
duration neglect and demonstrated preference for increasing pleasure across
courses, but failed to validate reliable effects of peak or end experience (Rode,
Rozin, & Durlach, 2007).
2.5.4 Time Perception
These effects on experienced utility are part of a broader range of influences
on the perception of time (reviewed by Grondin, 2008), including:
• Vierordt’s law (Lejeune &Wearden, 2009; von Vierordt, 1868). The dura-
tions of short events are overestimated, and the durations of long events
are underestimated (with a smooth transition in the amount of error).
This includes both events of immediate interest (such as in a controlled
experiment to reproduce a beat) and retrospective accounts (Fortin &
Rousseau, 1998; Yarmey, 2000).
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• Interruption effects (Weybrew, 1984). People tend to overestimate the
duration of interrupted tasks, and underestimate the duration of unin-
terrupted ones.
• Rhythm effects. The rhythm and pacing of stimuli influences people’s
perception of time through interference with their internal clock (e.g.
McAuley, 1995; Treisman, Faulkner, Naish, & Brogan, 1990).
Such effects also have implications for models of choice when outcomes
are received over time (such as retirement savings) – in particular, how peo-
ple discount the utility of an outcome that may be received in the future (re-
viewed by Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002; Loewenstein, 1987,
1988; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). This issue will be revisited in Chapter 7.
2.6 psychological influences
Although descriptive models, such as prospect theory, are used to explain
the psychological influences on decisionmaking within an economic context,
they are generally not predictors of psychological influences. For example,
the endowment effect (§2.3.1 and §2.6.2) can be understood as a manipula-
tion of prospect theory’s reference point, but ‘prospect endowment’ is not a
parameter of the theory nor a consequence of its construction. Awareness
of these effects is important for not only understanding behaviour, but also
ensuring adequate controls in choice experiments to avoid confounding and
misinterpreting results.
2.6.1 Negativity Bias
Studies across multiple areas of psychology have found that, in general ‘bad is
stronger than good’ (Baumeister et al., 2001, p. 355). That is, negative events
(such as losing money or receiving criticism) have a greater impact on peo-
ple than corresponding positive events (such as gaining money or receiving
praise). A single negative event can overpower the psychological effects of
many positive ones.
In a review across psychological disciplines, Baumeister et al. (2001) found
that almost without exception, negative events
• have stronger effects on initial impressions,
• are remembered in more detail and for longer,
• are responded to faster,
• are processed more thoroughly, and
• have a larger impact on learning.
In a similar review of such work, Rozin and Royzman (2001) described four
aspects that characterise this bias:
37
Chapter 2. Judgement & Decision Making
• Potency. Negative events are more potent and of higher salience than
corresponding positive counterparts.
• Steeper gradient. The strength of negative events increases as they are
approached in space or time.
• Dominance. The holistic perception of an object with both positive and
negative attributes is more negative than the algebraic mean of those
attributes.
• Greater differentiation. Negative events are construed to be more elabo-
rate than corresponding positive ones.
For example, negative attributes can spike an otherwise positive evaluation
– but the inverse does not apply (reviewed by Highhouse & Johnson, 1996;
Peeters & Czapinski, 1990).⁴⁴
44. ‘A spoonful of tar can spoil
a barrel of honey, but a spoon-
ful of honey does nothing for a
barrel of tar’ [ложка дёгтя портит
бочку мёда] (Rozin & Royzman,
2001, p. 296).
These effects have also received considerable at-
tention in themarketing and consumer satisfaction literature (Bettman, Luce,
& Payne, 1998; Yi, 1990, §2.3.1).
There is also evidence for a converse positivity biaswhen past experiences
are being recalled – sometimes referred to as the Pollyanna Principle (Matlin
& Stang, 1978). Recalling experiences of an event appears to engender a bias
towards its positive aspects or a minimisation of its negative aspects – espe-
cially as the time between experience and recollection increases (Peeters, 1971;
Rozin & Royzman, 2001).
Both positivity and negativity biases are speculated to have evolutionary
roots, but it is not clear if they are contradictory effects or parallel processes
(Baumeister et al., 2001; Taylor, 1991).
2.6.2 Endowment Effects
People exhibit a bias towards maintaining the status quo – a feature of a
broader endowment effect (Thaler, 1980, §2.3.1). Under this effect, goods that
are currently possessed are valued more than those that are not, and the loss
from giving up a good is greater than the gain of receiving it. That is, a person
may prefer A to B if they currently have A, and B to A if they currently have
B. For example, Knetsch (1992) randomly awarded subjects with either a mug
or a pen, and asked if they wanted to swap. The trade was rejected by most
subjects, indicating a preference for whichever item they held (i.e. regardless
of its objective value or their preference if they were not endowed). This ef-
fect is not restricted to tangible objects and has been observed in hypothetical
situations involving investment decisions, job opportunities, and healthcare
plans (W. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Sprenger, 2010).
However, the prospect of giving up something does not always engender
the endowment effect, and the limits of the effect have been debated (Bate-
man, Kahneman, Munro, Starmer, & Sugden, 2005; Bateman et al., 1997).
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For example, Chapman (1998) found there was a relationship between the
strength of the effect and the similarity of the goods being traded: the more
similar goods were, the weaker the effect. Similarly, when the good being
given up is intended to be used for exchange (such as money or something
highly fungible), there are no feelings of endowment for that item (Novem-
sky & Kahneman, 2005).
2.6.3 Description Invariance Violations (Framing Effects)
Normative economic theories assume that decisions do not depend on the
way that outcomes are described: manipulating the phrasing or constant fac-
tors of a prospect’s outcomes should have no effect on preferences. However,
there are many examples where this principle of description invariance is vi-
olated under manipulations of framing effects (reviewed by Levin, Schneider,
& Gaeth, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986).
The canonical example of a framing effect is the Asian disease problem
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981):
An unusual Asian disease is expected to kill 600 people. Two al-
ternative programmes are available to combat the disease:
a : 200 people will be saved.
b : there is a⅓ probability that 600 peoplewill be saved,
and a ⅔ probability that nobody will be saved.
Or (to a second group of subjects):
c : 400 people will die.
d : there is a ⅓ probability that nobody will die, and a
⅔ probability that 600 people will die.
The outcomes of a and b are identical to c and d, but phrased in terms of either
the people that ‘will be saved’ or ‘will die’, respectively. However, Tversky and
Kahneman (1981) reported that subjects were willing to accept a over b, but
reject c for d.
Levin et al. (1998) reviewed three types of framingmanipulations that have
been found to effect choices:
• Risky choice framing. Outcomes that involve different levels of risk are
described differently.
• Attribute framing. Some characteristic of an object or outcome is em-
phasised over another.
• Goal framing. The goal of an action is emphasised over the outcomes.
For example, people respondmore positively to surgical procedures described
in terms of survival rates than mortality rates (attribute framing), and are
more willing to forego a gain than sustain an equivalent loss (goal framing).
Reviewing studies across many different task domains, Levin et al. found
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framing to have a significant and consistent impact on decisions (although
the degree to which these are manipulations of the reference point or sim-
ply outcome salience has been debated [Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 2013;
Kühberger, 1998; van Schie & van der Pligt, 1995]).
Description invariance violations are also found in prospects that stimu-
late regret: when the comparison between a selected outcome andwhatmight
have been received under another reduces the overall satisfaction of the se-
lected outcome (Loomes & Sugden, 1982, 1987). Similarly, if outcomes have
the potential to fall short of expectations (§2.3.2), then people exhibit an aver-
sion to those that may trigger feelings of disappointment (Bell, 1982).⁴⁵45. And vice versa for feelings of
joy and elation at the possibil-
ity of receiving some outcomes
(Bell, 1985; Loomes & Sugden,
1982).
For
example, if offered a 60% chance at £13 or a guaranteed £7, the latter is more
appealing because of the sensation of regret that would be felt if the gamble
at £13 resulted in nothing. However, this preference reverses when the odds
are halved and the choice is between a 30% chance at £13 and a 50% chance
at £7 (Loomes, 1988).
Axiomatic models of disappointment and regret (e.g. Bell, 1985; Gul, 1991;
Loomes & Sugden, 1982) have been used to explain the Allais paradox (§2.2.2;
Loomes & Sugden, 1986), and are unique amongst expected utility models in
that they permit outcomes within a prospect to influence the utility of each
other (cf. decision by sampling, §2.4). There is also evidence that suggests the
strength of this effect interacts with the framing of the prospect (Starmer &
Sugden, 1993).
2.6.4 Procedure Invariance Violations
Decisions should (normatively) also be invariant to the procedure used to
elicit them: for example, asking if someone would accept a particular out-
come is logically equivalent to asking if theywould reject the competing alter-
natives. However, Shafir (1993) found that compatibility between the scales
used to describe prospects and the requested response can affect choices. In
particular, positive aspects are weighted more when asked to choose, and neg-
ative aspects are weighted more when asked to reject. In an experiment that
presented subjects with the pros and cons of two alternatives and asked them
(between-subjects) to either choose or reject one (e.g. award/deny custody,
choose/give up an ice-cream flavour, voting for/against a candidate), Shafir
found that responses were not complements of each other. The options with
more substantial positive and negative featureswere both chosen and rejected
more often than the blander alternatives.
Similarly, Fischer, Carmon, Ariely, and Zauberman (1999) found that pref-
erences amongst logically equivalent alternatives ( job offers and consumer
products) could be systematically manipulated by controlling the salience of
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the attribute that subjects had to differentiate. For example, subjects were
given a description of two job options:
a : $31,500 annual salary with 15 vacation days.
b : $36,500 annual salary with 5 vacation days.
In a choice condition subjects simply chose their preferred option, but in a
matching condition (between-subjects) the salary of Option b was hidden and
subjects specified a salary that would make the two options equally attractive.
For subjects in the matching condition, their preference between a and b in a
hypothetical choice condition can be inferred from their response – for exam-
ple, a response that a salary of $40,000 would make b equivalent to a strictly
dominates the $36,500 in the original option: indicating that a ≻ b (Tversky,
Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). Fischer et al. found that in choice conditions, most
subjects preferred the job with the higher salary (the salient attribute), but
this preference was reversed in the matching conditions.
This example is part of a larger class of paradoxes known as preference re-
versals (reviewed by Camerer, 1995): people’s choices are correlated with an
outcome’s probabilities, but the prices people assign to outcomes are corre-
lated with its pay-offs (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968). For example, Lichten-
stein and Slovic (1971) presented subjects with pairs of bets that had roughly
equal expected values, such as:
p : a 99% chance to win $4, and a 1% chance to lose $1.
$ : a 33% chance to win $16, and a 67% chance to lose $2.
That is, a bet with a high probability of winning a small amount (p) and a bet
with a low probability of winning a large amount ($). When asked which bet
theywould rather play, most subjects chose the p bet, but when asked to price
the bets (i.e. if they owned a ticket to play each bet, what is theminimumprice
they would sell it for), most priced the $ bet higher.⁴⁶
46. Later replicated with casino
patrons placing real bets (Licht-
enstein & Slovic, 1973).
Evidence of these reversals, where a ‘preference measured one way is the
reverse of preference measured another and seemingly theoretically compati-
ble way’ (Grether & Plott, 1979, p. 623), generated significant debate about the
possible economic, experimental, and psychological explanations (reviewed
by Grether & Plott, 1979; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006; Slovic & Lichtenstein,
1983). Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman (1990) examined several competing
explanations, concluding that preference reversals are predominantly due to
the scale compatibility: asking subjects to choose between gambles emphasises
their probability components, while asking them to price the gambles empha-
sises their pay-offs. The more salient component is given more weight in the
decision-making process (Tversky et al., 1988).
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2.6.5 Sunk Costs & Mental Accounting
Investments that have been made and cannot be recovered are known as sunk
costs. Individuals that experience sunk costs through a significant financial
investment are found to have a tendency to invest further – even when the
return is no longer worthwhile (reviewed by Thaler, 1980). For example:
A man joins a tennis club and pays a $300 yearly membership fee.
After two weeks of playing he develops a tennis elbow. He con-
tinues to play (in pain) saying ‘I don’t want to waste the $300!’
(Thaler, 1980, p. 47)
Normative economics argues that only incremental costs (e.g. if the tennis
club had a $25 monthly fee) should influence decisions (cf. McAfee, Mialon,
&Mialon, 2010), but these sunk costs have strong psychological effects (Arkes
& Blumer, 1985).
Tversky andKahneman (1981) reported the results of an experimentwhich
demonstrated an interaction between sunk costs and framing effects. Sub-
jects were presented with the following hypothetical scenario (p. 457):
Imagine that you have decided to see a playwhere admission is $10
per ticket. As you enter the theatre you discover that you have lost
a $10 bill. Would you still pay $10 for a ticket for the play?
Amajority of subjects said theywould pay. Butwhen the ticket was described
as lost after it had been purchased and the question was whether or not to pay
for another, their responses were evenly split. Both scenarios have the same
monetary premise: $10 has been sunk, and the decision is financially the same:
do you spend another $10? However, the framing of the circumstances under
which the premises are faced affects how people choose.
Thaler (1980; 1985) argued that problems involving sunk costs are treated
as mental accounting exercises: people mentally segregate resources into ac-
counts, and respond to prospects as if their outcomes only manipulate the
stated accounts (rather than the aggregate of all relevant accounts). For ex-
ample, a ‘$10 bill’ is not mentally fungible with a ‘$10 play ticket’: losing the
former has no bearing on the desire spend another $10 to see the play, but
losing the latter appears to increase the cost of seeing the play to $20 and de-
creases its desirability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Thaler (1999) reviewed
observations of mental accounting in personal finance, gift giving, and my-
opic loss aversion.
2.7 human–computer interaction
There are few direct applications of this literature within human–computer
interaction despite interaction decisions sharing many features with those
studied in the economic and psychological literature (detailed in the following
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chapter). Interactive tasks introduce new aspects to decision making with a
system’s ability to adapt to a user’s choices and customise the alternatives pre-
sented to them. That is, users do not experience computer systems passively
– they are actively engaged in perceiving feedback from the system and decid-
ing how to respond. For interaction designers, this engagement is also viewed
from the system’s perspective – processing the user’s input and deciding upon
the best feedback to give them (e.g. Bunt, Conati, & McGrenere, 2007; Find-
later &McGrenere, 2010; Gajos, Czerwinski, Tan, &Weld, 2006). Understand-
ing the relationship between system behaviour and user behaviour is an active
area of research; however, only recently has the literature on psychological
biases and economic models begun to receive attention.
2.7.1 Emotion & User Experience
Studies of emotion during interaction investigate the relationship between
users and technology: how elements of interaction influence affective experi-
ence with computer interfaces (reviewed by Brave & Nass, 2008; Hassenzahl,
2005). Despite computers being deterministic machines, users often anthro-
pomorphise them by projecting social qualities onto their behaviour: they
can be perceived as co-operative (Nass, Fogg, & Moon, 1996), elicit courte-
sies (Nass, Moon, & Carney, 1999), and felt to have a personality (reviewed by
Nass &Moon, 2000). While the connection to human social biases studied in
psychology (such as negativity bias, §2.6.1) has not been well-studied, there is
extensive research on emotional responses to interaction experiences.
Ceaparu, Lazar, Bessiere, Robinson, and Shneiderman (2004) used sur-
vey and diary studies to characterise the events that evoke user frustration
with interfaces. These included flaky network connections, system crashes
and freezes, unclear error messages, and other events that require time and
effort to fix – particularly when they distract from an important primary
task (Lazar, Jones, Hackley, & Shneiderman, 2006). An important moder-
ator of this frustration is the user’s knowledge, experience, and feelings of
self-efficacy (Bessière, Newhagen, Robinson, & Shneiderman, 2006; Jokinen,
2015; Kay, 2008; Wilfong, 2006): users with higher self-efficacy beliefs have
reduced feelings of frustration, anxiety, and anger. However, these studies
are very broad in their objectives and do not experimentally manipulate these
factors (they are based on post hoc surveys or diaries). Therefore it is difficult
to model these findings in a causal relationship (such as whether self-efficacy
reduces the incidence of frustrating experiences, or reduces the sensation of
them through acclimatisation).
Studying more positive experiences, Hassenzahl, Diefenbach, and Göritz
(2010) found a strong connection between need fulfilment and positive affect
– in particular, the stimulation, relatedness, competence, and popularity of
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an interface influenced affective responses from users and subsequent assess-
ment of user experience (see also Tuch, Trusell, & Hornbæk, 2013; Venkatesh,
2000). Picard and Klien (2002) reviewed how computer systems could better
support the emotional needs of users: including how to detect a user’s emo-
tional state (e.g. frustration or despair with the system) and intervening by
modelling human social skills (e.g. active listening and empathy).
2.7.2 Subjective Measures of Experience
Quantitative analyses of user experience have focussed on how interface at-
tributes, such as aesthetic quality and usability, influence user satisfaction
and preferences (reviewed by Hartmann, Sutcliffe, & De Angeli, 2008). How-
ever, experimentally manipulating and measuring these factors is a difficult
and unsettled problem, and studies often have conflicting results.
For example, Tractinsky, Katz, and Ikar (2000) found a strong relationship
between the aesthetics of an Automated Teller Machine (atm) user interface
and perceptions of its usability – concluding that ‘what is beautiful is usable’
(p. 127). This was challenged by Hassenzahl (2004), who found no such rela-
tionship in an analysis of mp3 players – but was supported by a study of text-
entry interfaces (Ben-Bassat, Meyer, & Tractinsky, 2006), and with mixed re-
sults for web pages (Lavie & Tractinsky, 2004; Thielsch, Engel, & Hirschfeld,
2015). In a meta-analysis of 25 reported correlations between aesthetics and
usability across the literature, Hassenzahl and Monk (2010) found a general
lack of consistency in both the methodology and results of these studies.
In response to this medley of results, researchers have discussed the com-
plexity in accurately measuring subjective attributes and highlightedmethod-
ological differences between studies (Hassenzahl & Monk, 2010; Tractinsky,
2004). In particular, the manipulation and measurement of aesthetic and
usability factors has varied substantially: Tractinsky et al. (2000) manipu-
lated aesthetics exclusively through the interface’s layout, whereas Hassen-
zahl (2004) used the layout and visual design, and Ben-Bassat et al. (2006) used
only the visual design. Tractinsky (2004) also raised concerns that within-
subjects experimental designs common in human–computer interaction re-
search allow subjects to make comparative judgements between all possible
design alternatives (rather than an independent value judgement), which does
not reflect the environment that these decisions are typically made in.
To improve measurement validity, techniques from economics have been
applied in recent work. Ben-Bassat et al. (2006) paid subjects according to
their task performance and had them make auction bids on different inter-
faces they could use to complete tasks – hypothesising that the price subjects
were willing to pay is indicative of the interface’s value to them. They found
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subjects bid significantly higher for conditions/interfaces that had easier task
requirements, and that an interface’s aesthetic quality had no effect on bid
values. Similarly, Toomim, Kriplean, Pörtner, and Landay (2011) used labour
supply curves and survival analysis to determine how much subjects would
need to be paid to complete pointing tasks of varied difficulties, or data entry
tasks with distracting aesthetic elements.
However, the trade-off subjects made in these experiments was to de-
crease their financial reward in return for easier experimental tasks (e.g. fewer
actions), or perseverance with a difficult task. That is, the quality of the inter-
action itself was not manipulated⁴⁷
47. Typing in Ben-Bassat et al.
(2006) and pointing in Toomim
et al. (2011).– rather, it was the difficulty of the tasks
that subjects were asked to complete that elicited the effect. While this may
be useful for plotting an indifference curve for a particular interface design or
interaction technique,⁴⁸
48. The equity between task
difficulty and price.it does not necessarily reflect preference.
Furthermore, although auctions and labour supply models are well-estab-
lished for economic problems, their methodological validity for interaction
problems is unclear. In particular, it has not been established that willingness-
to-pay or willingness-to-accept measures are indicative of user choice when
the financial aspect is removed (nor the influence of the endowment effect,
§2.6.2). Interactive outcomes rarely involve direct monetary incentives or
costs, and although reducing interactive decisions to a monetary value facil-
itates analysis of those decisions, it does not reflect the environment such
decisions are actually made in.
2.7.3 Subjective and Objective Measures
Objectivemeasures of user performance – for example, the time to complete a
task or the incidence of errors – are easy to obtain and are the most common
device for inferring interface calibre. However, as with the paradoxes ob-
served between the objective value of prospects and the choices people make,
there are gaps between objective and subjective⁴⁹ 49. Sometimes referred to as
usability.
measures of experience.
Hornbæk (2006) reviewed current practices in assessing the subjective
quality of interfaces in human–computer interaction research, includingmea-
surements of an interface’s effectiveness, its efficiency, user satisfaction, and
user attitude. Brave and Nass (2008) reviewed empirical methods for mea-
suring subjective experience, including neurological measures (e.g. eeg and
fmri), autonomic activity (e.g. heart rate, pupil dilation, and skin conductiv-
ity), and self-report measures.
While it is widely recognised that an interactive experience’s subjective
qualities are important to its overall value, there is little agreement on the
methods for measuring them (Frøkjær, Hertzum, & Hornbæk, 2000; Horn-
bæk, 2006; Hornbæk & Law, 2007; Kissel, 1995; Nielsen & Levy, 1994). In
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a meta-analysis of 57 studies, Nielsen and Levy (1994) found that objective
performance measures predicted user preferences in 75%. However, a more
recent meta-analysis of 73 studies by Hornbæk and Law (2007) found a much
weaker correlation between efficiency and satisfaction (r = .20), commenting
that ‘perceptions of phenomena are generally not correlated with objective
measures’ (p. 617).
Some of this variance may be due to different methodological approaches
for collecting subjective data, as fewer than 10% of the papers reviewed by
Hornbæk (2006) reported any efforts to confirm the validity or reliability of
their satisfaction metrics. The inconsistency in measurement makes it diffi-
cult to assess and meaningfully discuss user preferences, or to identify trends
and biases as they vary with interface manipulations.
2.7.4 Interaction Biases
User Performance. Acognitive bias specific to active interaction (i.e. where
subject behaviour influences outcomes) is the paradox of the active user: ex-
pert users often settle on suboptimal strategies for completing tasks, and
are reluctant to learn methods that could improve their overall productivity
(Bhavnani & John, 2000; Carroll & Rosson, 1987). Fu and Gray (2004) found
users preferred methods that were well-practiced and could be applied gen-
erally because they required less cognitive effort to maintain. For example,
Lane, Napier, Peres, and Sándor (2005) found that even highly experienced
users of Microsoft Word preferred to use menus and toolbars over keyboard
shortcuts – despite the significant potential performance savings that would
amortise the learning costs. Subsequent work has refined this paradox into
models of cognitive satisficing (Charman & Howes, 2003; Fu & Gray, 2006;
Gray, Sims, Fu, & Schoelles, 2006, cf. §2.1.2).
Examining how users perceive their own performance during interaction,
Nicosia, Oulasvirta, and Kristensson (2014) had subjects complete pointing
tasks in two interfaces and retrospectively judge their performance. In the
first experiment, the two interfaces had identical pointing difficulties but
with different width and size configurations. The results showed that sub-
jects could reliably judge time performance, but that the distance and width
also had an impact on their judgement (despite there being no theoretical dif-
ference in difficulty). A second experiment developed a model for the proba-
bility that a user could make such a judgement.
Interface Performance. Time perception effects (§2.5.4) have been observed
in two studies of progress bars (Harrison, Amento, Kuznetsov, & Bell, 2007;
Harrison & Hudson, 2010): subjects observed pairs of progress bars (both five
seconds long) and chose which appeared to be faster. The first study found
that users perceived accelerating rates of progress (i.e. slow start→ fast finish)
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to be faster than several alternatives, including decelerating progress. The sec-
ond study found similar effects for progress bar animations: increasing rates
of pulsing animation were perceived as faster than decreasing rates. They
partially attributed these findings to peak-end effects (§2.5.2).
Users are also known to quickly form impressions of an interface’s perfor-
mance from very little exposure, and that these impressions result in stable
judgements. In a series of experiments, Tractinsky, Cokhavi, Kirschenbaum,
and Sharfi (2006) found that users formed aesthetic impressions of web pages
after only 500 milliseconds of exposure, which were correlated with their rat-
ings after a further 10 seconds of exposure (see also Lindgaard, Fernandes,
Dudek, & Brown, 2006; Schenkman & Jönsson, 2000). Further work has con-
nected these impressions to evaluations of trustworthiness and perceived us-
ability (Lindgaard, Dudek, Sen, Sumegi, & Noonan, 2011; van Schaik & Ling,
2008), and identified mitigating factors (van Schaik & Ling, 2009).
Information Processing Biases. Several studies have examined behavioural
economics tasks in computing contexts – such as leveraging status quo bi-
ases to influence dietary choices (Lee, Kiesler, & Forlizzi, 2011), the effects of
social information on investment decisions (Zhao, Fu, Zhang, Zhao, & Duh,
2015), and the effects of website information framing on quality judgements
(Hartmann, De Angeli, & Sutcliffe, 2008). However, these studies primarily
manipulate the information that is presented to users, and not the quality of
the interaction – that is, testing economic and psychological experimental
tasks and methodologies, but on a computer system.
Studies of choice behaviour have identified applications of cognitive work
on decision-making processes (§2.4) for interactive tasks. For example, stud-
ies of choice overload (Schwartz, 2004) when users interact with search engine
results have found that their behaviour is influenced by the ordering of results,
and that the number of results effects their satisfaction when under time pres-
sure (Chiravirakul & Payne, 2014; Oulasvirta, Hukkinen, & Schwartz, 2009).
Suchwork underlies choice frameworks for understanding howusers develop
interaction strategies (e.g. Bhavnani & John, 2000; Payne & Howes, 2013).
2.7.5 Utility & Prospect Theory
Models from behavioural economics (such as those reviewed in §2.2) have
been postulated to apply in interaction, but with limited experimental sup-
port. Jameson et al. (2014) developed a framework for understanding the is-
sues created by choices during computer use – for example, which application
to use, whether to customise an interface or learn shortcuts, or how to con-
figure a tool. Their framework focussed on six choice patterns that each rep-
resents an approach to evaluating alternatives and developing an interaction
strategy. Within each pattern they reviewed issues for the goals and values
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that users have, how users assess their context and options, how users learn
from feedback and experience, and so forth.
Their analysis included prospect theory as a potential method for under-
standing how users evaluate the consequences of interaction outcomes (e.g.
the time taken to complete a task relative to another method) – however,
they cite no work that supports this hypothesis. In more targeted studies,
Bergman, Tucker, Beyth-Marom, Cutrell, and Whittaker (2009) suggested
that prospect theory may explain why users resist deleting files (the status
quo bias establishes keeping a file as a reference point, and deleting it is a risky
alternative; §2.3.1); and Banovic, Grossman, and Fitzmaurice (2013) briefly dis-
cussed the use of utility theories as a consideration when users are developing
pointing strategies. However, the connection remains speculative.
Utility has also featured in interaction research as a potential assessment
and user modelling tool. While the uses of the term are more general than
the formulation of expected utility reviewed above, some of the models based
around its premises have been successful in analysing interaction behaviour:
• Payne and Howes (2013) explored measures of utility and strategies of
utilitymaximisation in a framework based on the influences of cognitive
resources, context, and utility. They used the framework to understand
interaction behaviour in button selection and online purchasing tasks.
• Norman (1983) modelled user satisfaction for an interface attribute (e.g.
response time, display size) with a power function. Comparing the func-
tions for pairs of attributes produces indifference curves for the trade-
off between them, and can be collectively maximised to find an optimal
interface configuration.
• Lelis and Howes (2011) developed and tested a utility model (although
the measure of utility is unspecified) to describe how people use online
ratings to inform their decision making.
• Gajos andWeld (2005) used utility functions learned from user feedback
about user interface customisations to improve automatically generated
interfaces.
However, these applications of utility are somewhat ad hoc as there is little
direct connection to the broader economic or psychological models of utility
reviewed earlier (§2.2).
2.7.6 Persuasive Technology & Decision Support Systems
In addition to observing behaviour, the interactive aspect of interfaces pro-
vides opportunities for helping users to make better decisions through per-
suasive technology and decision support systems.
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Persuasive technology research studies how the ubiquity of technology
can be used to influence people’s behaviour and choices (reviewed by Con-
solvo, McDonald, & Landay, 2009; Fogg, 2003). Much of this work draws on
cognitivemodels of behaviour from the social psychology literature (reviewed
by Bandura, 2001; Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007), and studies
their application and integration with interactive systems. For example, en-
couraging users to actively record and reflect on their experiences or negative
behaviours (e.g. smoking or over-eating) can progressively improve subjective
well-being and reduce bad habits (Hollis, Konrad, & Whittaker, 2015; Isaacs
et al., 2013). Consolvo et al. (2009) reviewed major social theories and design
strategies for effecting lifestyle behaviour changes through persuasive inter-
actions, and Klasnja, Consolvo, and Pratt (2011) critiqued and reviewed the
methodologies for evaluating interfaces that implement them.
In a similar vein, decision support systems aim to improve the choices peo-
ple make by helping them analyse and process the available information. For
example, Edwards and Fasolo (2001) reviewed a number of rules and devices
for helping people make better decisions as part of a 19-step decision-making
model. Many of their steps involved the routine application of the utility
and probabilitymodels reviewed earlier, which Edwards and Fasolo suggested
could be automated.
Zhang, Bellamy, and Kellogg (2015) explored two methods for reducing
loss aversion and conservatism⁵⁰ 50. People insufficiently adjust
subjective probabilities when
new information is presented
(Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu,
1994).
biases when making investment decisions
through a user interface. Their interfaces displayed investment options to
the user, and showed the calculated expected returns of each alternative –
and were successful in reducing the impact of the biases (see also Gunaratne
& Nov, 2015). A similar suggestion system was tested by Solomon (2014) for
a fantasy sports game, and found that users came to over-rely on the sugges-
tions – suggesting that such systems need to be carefully designed to avoid
creating their own biases.
The choices that interface designers make for even the static components
of a user interface can also have substantial consequences for user behaviour.
E. J. Johnson and Goldstein (2003), and Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & Metrick
(2004) discussed the impact that default options have on behaviour: in partic-
ular, the default mode of an opt-in or opt-out choice has a substantial impact
on resultant behaviour.⁵¹ 51. Organ donation and retire-
ment savings, respectively.
This is because default options can reduce the re-
quired decision-making effort, imply some endorsement, or establish a refer-
ence point for evaluating the alternatives (Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein, & Liu,
2011). Although this work has not studied user interfaces, users are known to
only rarely actively customise their user interfaces and are likely to be simi-
larly impacted by the ease and persuasiveness of defaults (Furnell, 2005; Gross
& Acquisti, 2005; Mackay, 1990, 1991; Page, Johnsgard, Albert, & Allen, 1996).
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a model of interactive preferences 3
during interaction with computer systems, users choose methods for This chapter develops a utility
model of preferences for inter-
active prospects and describes
the methodological issues for
testing it (demonstrated in the
following two chapters).
completing tasks and make judgements about the value of the system’s re-
sponse. A collection of methods and corresponding system responses can
be analysed as an interactive prospect in a manner analogous to how psycholo-
gists and economists analyse monetary prospects. The utility of an interactive
prospect is a measure of its value: how much it is worth to the user in con-
sideration of what they invested in obtaining it. As with economic prospects,
users like interactions with positive utility, dislike those with negative utility,
and prefer interactions with higher utility to those with lower.
Interactive tasks are oriented around a goal that a user wants to achieve,
and therefore the utility of a system’s response can be measured in terms of
the progressmade towards completing that goal. Perceptions of this progress
are moderated by the user’s expectations regarding the amount of progress
that should be achieved for their invested effort. High expectations reduce
the utility that a system’s response can provide and exaggerate its failings (and
vice versa for low expectations and its successes). The relationship between
goals, progress, expectations, and utility can be expressed in an expected util-
ity model for interactive prospects.
Empirically testing these relationships requires careful manipulation of in-
teractive outcomes. Unlike economic experiments, where outcomes can be
plainly stated, interactive outcomes are complex and are mixed with a user’s
ability to operate the interface. For example, a user’s typing ability determines
a substantial portion of the performance they stand to gain from a text-entry
suggestion system. This complicates the application of experimental and ana-
lytical techniques from behavioural economics research in human–computer
interaction, and necessitates careful adaptation of their methods to the char-
acteristics of interactive prospects.
This chapter develops a model of reference-dependent preferences for in-
teraction based on the model of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, §2.3.3). Existing
cognitive models of interaction (goms and klm) are first reviewed to serve
as the basis for analysing the structure of interactive tasks (§3.1), followed
by the definition of an interactive prospect using that structure (§3.2.1). The
utility-based reference-dependent preference model for interactive prospects
is then detailed (§3.2.2), followed by the methodological issues for testing and
validating it (§3.3) – applied empirically in the following two chapters.
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3.1 cognitive models of interaction
The structure of an interactive task can be understood using cognitive models
that decompose it into a series of actions that a user performs and system
responses that they receive (reviewed by Dix, Finlay, Abowd, & Beale, 2004;
Sutcliffe, 2000). Cognitive models mechanically express the steps that a user
must undertake to achieve a particular outcome, and the choices that they
will encounter as they navigate through the system. This makes them useful
tools for identifying the invested effort and received outcomes of an interac-
tive prospect.
The goms family of cognitive models (Card, Moran, & Newell, 1980a) has
extensive research support (e.g. Gray, John, & Atwood, 1993; John & Kieras,
1996a, 1996b), and decompose an interactive task into a set of Goals that a user
wants to achieve, which are completed using elemental Operators (perceptu-
al/motor/cognitive actions) assembled into Methods, with Selection rules for
choosing between competing methods. For example, (Card et al., 1980a) de-
composed text editing tasks into their constituent goals (e.g. locate-line and
modify-text) and methods for achieving them (e.g. use-qs-method and use-lf-
method). Through a series of experiments, they discovered the operators that
completed those methods, and the selection rules users employed to choose
between them.¹
Given a task structure, performance models predict objective qualities
about how an expert user will execute the task. For example, the Keystroke-
LevelModel (klm; Card, Moran, &Newell, 1980b) predicts the time for a user
to execute a goms method by summing together time predictions for its con-
stituent operators. The klm has components for actions that include typing,
pointing, mental consideration, and system response – with a set of rules for
assembling them into a time prediction.²
These cognitive models allow complex interactive tasks to be analysed as
a series of elemental actions that a user performs, and responses from the sys-
tem that they receive (Card, Moran, & Newell, 1983). However, as the follow-
ing paragraphs demonstrate, these cognitive models are strictly concerned
with the system’s operation and do not assess methods or responses in terms
of their utility to the user.
The actions required from a user to complete a task can be specified using
a goms method, and a user’s performance in executing those actions can be
1 Alternative models, such as cct (Kieras & Polson, 1985) and tag (Payne & Green, 1986), produce
functionally identical results, but with different grammars and decomposition rules. Any such
model is appropriate for the purposes of the present research.
2 More granular analyses can be achieved using cognitive architectures, such as act (Anderson,
1996) and epic (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a, 1997b), on human–computer interaction tasks (e.g. Ehret,
2002; Hornof, 2004; Kieras & Meyer, 1997; Kieras, Wood, & Meyer, 1997; Salvucci & Lee, 2003).
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predicted by a klmmodel – but these are not necessarily indicative of the cost
to the user of performing those actions. For example, a 500ms klm pointing
operator may be comparable in time to a 500msmental operator but differ in
the amount of overall exertion. That is, even if two operators yield the same
outcome, a user may not be indifferent to a choice between them (e.g. they
may prefer pointing to thinking). Although time is a convenient metric that
is easy to measure, interpret, and use for comparative judgements, it is not a
comprehensive metric for the work performed by a user, nor does it predict
or explain preferences.
Similarly, the outcome of a system’s response is an objective state that can
be measured against the task goal,³ 3. Such as the remaining goms
operators or klm time.
but this is not necessarily indicative of
its benefit to the user. That is, the delta between the system’s current state
and the user’s goal state can be measured, and can be analysed with respect
to whether it increases or decreases as a result of an action – however, this
delta does not indicatewhether or not the user’s effort invested to produce it is
recompensed. For example, a text entry system that offers to complete partial
words may be objectively excellent if it always suggests the user’s intended
word, but effectively worthless if it only does so as they are about to type the
last character.
The perception of an interaction’s value is also dependent on a user’s ex-
pectations of how they believe the system should behave. These beliefs come
from the user’s experience of similar systems, reasoning through a model of
interaction they possess, or their desires about how they want the system
to perform. The reference point this creates changes over time as the user
gains experience with the system and becomes accustomed to its particular
behaviours and level of performance. For example, a text entry system that au-
tomatically corrects errors may initially have positive value when it corrects
true errors, negative value when it incorrectly replaces entered text, and no
value (neutral) when it offers no correction at all. However, as a user gains
experience with the system they may come to expect corrections for certain
habitual errors or shortcuts (e.g. automatically replacing im with I’m). These
corrections will have less value than before because the baseline for assessing
outcomes has increased with the user’s expectations, and the system now has
a negative value when it fails to offer them.
Interaction therefore involves a collection of objective and subjective fac-
tors: the objective user actions and system responses that can be described
using cognitive models of interaction, and the subjective cost of performing
those actions and the perceived benefit of the responses. The specification of
an interactive prospect can be given by these objective factors, with a utility
model describing their relationship to the subjective factors – detailed in the
following section.
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3.2 a utility model of interaction
This model is based on Kőszegi and Rabin’s (2006) model of reference-depen-
dent preferences (§2.3.3). Given two alternative interactions I1 and I2 for com-
pleting a particular task (e.g. two methods from a goms model), users deter-
mine their preference based on the overall utility U:
I1 ≻ I2 ⇐⇒ U(I1) > U(I2). (3.1)
The overall utility of the interactionU is determined by the sum of utilities
u for the constituent sub-interactions: U(I) = ∑u(i), described below. Each
sub-interaction i is a chunk of an action and system response that are psy-
chologically perceived by the user as a single unit (e.g. each step in a goms
model). Chapter 7 discusses how this summation is knowingly naïve due to
psychological effects (such as peak-end; §2.5.2), but it is sufficient for now.
3.2.1 Interactions
Each sub-interaction i consists of some user action a that yields an actual
system outcome c, as well as some expected system outcome r(a):
i ∶ a→ ⟨c, r(a)⟩. (3.2)
Actions. Each action a may be an elemental operation (such as a goms
operator), or a small collection of them that form a unit task that has a rou-
tine solution (such as pointing and clicking on a button) and does not rely on
extensive problem solving.
Outcomes. The actual outcome c is a K-dimensional consumption bundle
that represents updates to the system’s state arising from the user’s actions.
These updates include internal state changes, feedback elements to the user,
and the temporal components of those changes (e.g. the response time). The
bundle is deterministic and invariant to the user: given some initial state, a
particular action a∗ always produces the same outcome c∗.
A consumption bundle encapsulates the multi-dimensional properties of
an outcome. For example, typing a character on a mobile device may yield
outcomes on several dimensions, including:
1. The character is added to the internal text buffer.
2. The character is displayed in a text field.
3. A click sound is played.
4. A haptic vibration is produced.
Some of these dimensions are observable by the user, but others are internal
and can only be inferred/confirmed by feedback or subsequent actions. For
example, the user infers the state of the internal text buffer from the contents
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of the text field, but they are not necessarily identical (such as when entering
a password).
Reference Expectations. For each action a, the user has some reference ex-
pectations for the outcome derived from that action, r(a). The function r is
specific to a particular user and is allowed to varywith theirmental state (such
as their past experiences and affective disposition) – no particular constraints
are placed on the factors that influence r. It is desirable that r determines ex-
pectations rationally from recent experience with the system, but it is likely
to also be influenced by the user’s beliefs and desires (Kőszegi, 2010) – even
if they are known to not be realistic (e.g. reference expectations for a system
that is consistently slow may reflect a desire for faster performance).
As reference expectations represent outcomes, they are also represented
using K-dimensional consumption bundles. Actual outcomes c and expected
outcomes r(a) are pairwise comparable: for instance, if ck contains the time
for the system to respond, rk(a) is the expectation for that time. To maintain
this comparability, either bundle may contain dimensions that are irrelevant
to the other. For example, if a user expects haptic feedback for each key-
press but none is produced by the device, then their dimension for haptic
feedback in their expectations r(a) is comparable with a null dimension for
haptic feedback in the actual outcome c (and vice versa for an interface that
produces such feedback that the user is not expecting).
Reference expectations are determined in consideration of the action a
invested, which includes the cognitive, perceptual, and mental processing ef-
fort of producing that action. Users are likely to expect greater outcomes as
the effort of achieving them increases (potentially in excess of what the sys-
tem can actually provide). Expectations also change as users become familiar
with new forms of interaction. In general, expectations increase as devices
and interfaces improve: faster processing, brighter screens, higher resolution,
improved design, and so forth.
3.2.2 Utility
The utility u of an interaction i (see Equation 3.2) can be expressed with Equa-
tions 3.3–3.5, which are functionally identical to those fromKőszegi and Rabin
(Equations 2.14–2.16 in §2.3.3):
u(c∣a) =m(c) + n(c∣a), (3.3)
m(c) = K∑
k=1mk(ck), (3.4)
n(c∣a) = K∑
k=1 µ(mk(ck) −mk(rk(a))´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
marginal utility
). (3.5)
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Equation 3.3 states that the utility of an outcome c given action a is the sum
of two functions: m and n, which respectively determine utility values for
objective progress and the user’s sense of gain-loss for the progress attained.
Consumption Utility (Equation 3.4). The consumption utility function m
determines the objective utility of an outcome – either an actual outcome
c or an expected outcome r(a). Consumption utility is analogous to other
measures of progress towards a goal, such as those evaluated by goms/klm.
Importantly, it is an objective measure and does not encapsulate subjective el-
ements of the user’s experience. The function yields a quantity that is positive
when the outcome advances towards the goal (or assists in advancing towards
the goal), negative when it moves away from the goal, and zero when there is
no change.
As shown in Equation 3.4, consumption utilitym(c) is the sumof consump-
tion utilities across the K dimensions of its argument (a consumption bundle).
Separately applying the function to each dimension of a consumption bundle
allows the importance of each dimension to be weighted (that is, each dimen-
sion k has a separately shaped consumption utility function mk). Dimensions
closely tied to attainment of the goal are likely to havemore utility than super-
ficial changes (Bordalo et al., 2013; Heath et al., 1999). For example, showing
the typed character in the text field (dimension two in the above text entry
example) is likely to have a higher utility weighting than the dimensions for
audio or haptic feedback. Similarly, the visual feedback is likely to have higher
utility than changes to the internal text buffer (dimension one) as it is the only
directly observable representation of it.⁴
4. A lack of agreement between
the internal text buffer and vi-
sual feedback is likely to lead to
a large disparity between actual
outcomes and reference expecta-
tions at a later point in the task.
These utility functions mk share the properties of classic economic utility
functions (e.g. Figure 2.1 and reviewed in §2.2), and in particular must be ‘dif-
ferentiable and strictly increasing’ (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006, p. 1138). However,
empirical work in economics (or in human–computer interaction) does not,
and is unlikely to, directly seek to expose the exact functions – instead, studies
typically demonstrate that the predicted preference between two outcomes
occurs within the manipulated dimensions and constraints of the model (re-
viewed in §3.3).
Gain-Loss Utility (Equation 3.5). The gain-loss utility function n evaluates
the subjective elements of a user’s sense of value derived from any disparity
between actual and expected consumption utilities. The function µ has the
properties of prospect theory’s value function, which incorporates features of
diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion (shown in Figure 2.3 and reviewed
in §2.2.4). The argument to µ is the marginal utility between actual and ex-
pected consumption utility: mk(ck) − mk(rk(a)). Marginal utility considers
the equity between expectations for the invested effort on the right, and the
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received reward on the left. If actual consumption utility exceeds expecta-
tions (mk(ck) > mk(rk(a))), the user experiences a gain; conversely, if actual
consumption utility fails to meet expectations, the user experiences a loss.
The function µ transforms the marginal utility gains and losses into subjec-
tive value assessments according to prospect theory’s value function, with
losses having a stronger effect than gains.
For example, if a user types a character and expects to see it appear im-
mediately, but its appearance is delayed by a second, then the user experi-
ences a loss with respect to their expectation (amplified by the value function
µ). That is, the consumption utility along the outcome’s time dimension for
the expected immediate output exceeds that for the actual, delayed output:
mk(1 second delay) < mk(0 second delay). As another example, if a user ex-
pects audio feedback for each key-press but none is produced, the user experi-
ences a loss along the relevant dimension – however, this may be recovered by
gains along another dimension that has a greater mk weight (such as offering
a correct suggestion that completes the word).
3.3 measuring interactive utility
This utility model, as with utility theories in general, assumes that its com-
ponents have quantitative values (i.e. mk and µ are measured on ratio scales).
However, actual values for these components are rarely measured directly in
experiments that test utility theories due to the challenges inmeasuring them
– particularly the psychological contributions. Instead, theories of utility are
typically tested using the predicted relationships between components, and
the ordering of preferences they imply – which can be used to construct a
utility scale. For instance, many of the experiments reviewed in Chapter 2
presented subjects with two prospects (A and B) with controlled inputs and
outputs (investments and returns), and asked them to indicate their prefer-
ence between them (a forced-choicemethodology).⁵ 5. Indifference was rarely
permitted.
From the pattern of these
A ≻ B or B ≻ A responses, utility relationships were constructed and axiom
conformancewas tested. That is, while the inputs and outputs of an economic
prospect are easily measured (such as the monetary value of investments and
probabilities of monetary returns), the psychological contributions (such as
endowment, framing, andmental accounting) and utility scores are only mea-
surable indirectly, through comparison with alternatives.
Although the forced-choice methodology is readily amenable to testing
new types of prospects, interactive prospects have features that make them
hard to clearly express in the style of economic experiments:
• Multi-dimensionality. Interactive prospects are difficult to reduce to a
single feature, and comprise multiple disparate components (such as
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task progress, time required, invested effort, feedback awareness, etc.).
Some of these components are split between the inputs to the prospect
and its outputs (such as the time required to perform an action vs. the
timewaiting for the system to respond), and their relationshipwith each
other may be orthogonal or covariant.
• Ineffability. Many of the components of an interactive prospect are diffi-
cult to reliably quantify (such as invested effort and task progress). Even
when components are measured in the same units, they may be difficult
to compare and may not be fungible (e.g. pointing vs. thinking time).
• Skilful. A user’s ability to process and understand the feedback from
a system, and their skill in operating its input devices and interfaces
has an effect on the outcomes they experience. That is, different users
performing identical tasks may invest slightly different actions and re-
ceive/perceive different outcomes depending on their skill and experi-
ence with the system.
• Opacity. Users depend on feedback from the system to inform them of
outcomes, which may be indirect and incomplete. For example, select-
ing a copy command (e.g. a file or some text) does not typically produce
any feedback to indicate a successful copy operation – success or failure
is only discovered upon a subsequent paste command.
• Uncertainty. The risk in probabilistic outcomes is not known a priori,
and therefore interactive prospects usually feature uncertainty (if not
ignorance; §2.2.5). For example, the efficacy of a text entry suggestion
system is never told to users (and varies with their typing skill) – they
can only infer its efficacy from repeated use and observation.
These features of interactive prospects raise significant challenges for experi-
menters that seek to test their utility, including: how to design experimental
interfaces (§3.3.1), which methods to use for measuring utility (§3.3.2), how to
elicit preferences (§3.3.3), and how to analyse those data (§3.3.4).
3.3.1 Materials
Interactive experiences are a combination of objective and subjective com-
ponents that contribute to a user’s overall satisfaction with a system. While
objective metrics are readily quantifiable for some aspects of a system’s out-
comes (such as the time to complete a task or the number of errors in doing
so) it is less clear how to address the subjective side. Additionally, unlike eco-
nomic prospects where the inputs are readily manipulated (e.g. an investment
of $100), the inputs to interactions are less amenable to precise manipulation
and require active participation from the user (such as mental or physical
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exertion). For instance, any two actions may differ in the time for execu-
tion (measurable) – or in the perceptual, cognitive, or motor costs of complet-
ing the action (largely unmeasurable). Testing utility theories for interactive
prospects therefore requires designing experimental interfaces that can con-
trol and/or measure gains and losses in these components around a known
reference point.
Reference Interfaces. The reference point for an interactive prospect is a
baseline interface that experimental interfaces will be judged against (i.e. the
intended r or r(a) for each experimental interface outcome c). The exper-
imental interfaces are those under test, and feature some trade-off in their
outcomes relative to the reference interface – for example, an assistive fea-
ture that works for some tasks but not others, or an interface that reduces
one dimension of effort in exchange for increasing another (e.g. an interface
that replaces the physical exertion of navigating menus with the mental de-
mands of memorising keyboard shortcuts). In many cases the reference inter-
face will be the status quo or a bland baseline that isolates the trade-off in the
experimental interfaces. To validate that exposure to the reference interface
sets the intended reference point, it should be compared with experimental
control tasks that provide subjects with only the gains (or losses) of the ex-
perimental interface – that is, control tasks feature no trade-off and should
be uniformly accepted (or rejected) when compared to the reference.
Experimental Interfaces. The experimental interfaces should be controlled
to manipulate a limited number of components relative to the reference inter-
face (and to each other). As described in the model above, each component
has its own utility function (mk) and unnecessary manipulation of compo-
nents can confound the interpretation of subject preferences. If the intention
is to reveal a particular utility function mk, then only that component should
differ between the reference and experimental interfaces.
Constructing trade-offs is difficult for interactive prospects because the
gains and losses are often on different scales, and it is not always clear how
to equate or separate them to measure their relative contributions to over-
all preferences. For example, a system may decrease the time to perform
an action but increase the physical or mental effort required to do so – an
exchange across different scales that are unlikely to be independently ma-
nipulable. Such problems are not unique to interaction, but are also present
in psychological research on negativity bias (§2.6.1) – for example, is it diffi-
cult to construct positive equivalents of traumatic experiences (Baumeister
et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Ensuring perfect scale and manipula-
tion compatibility between interactive prospects is not essential for testing
utility models, but it does limit the interpretation of results and demands fur-
ther experimental work to tease apart the details. Rozin and Royzman (2001)
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discussed several methods for constructing alternatives when it is difficult
to equate their components – such as comparing series of combined stimuli
to show that choices are more positive/negative than their algebraic sum im-
plies, or introducing positive/negative events into a series of neutral events to
show an asymmetric response (revisited in Chapter 6).
3.3.2 Methods
Although it appears advantageous to measure preferences on a scale or have
subjects rank alternatives, there is no natural unit for an interface preference
scale (cf. valuing monetary prospects in monetary units), and it is difficult to
ensure internal validity and comparability of responses (reviewed in §2.7.3).
However, an overall measure of preference can be obtained from a binary
choice between two alternatives. That is, if a user consistently expresses a
preference for interface A over interface B, it can be inferred that the com-
bined objective (known) and subjective (unknown) experience of A is greater
than that of B.⁶6. And by Equation 3.1,
A has a greater utility.
While this does not indicate the strength of the preference,
by tightly controlling the objective factors that distinguish A and B, repeated
experimentation can uncover the ordering of preferences for its components
and their weightings. This approach is similar to that adopted in behavioural
economics (e.g. §2.6.4).
However, a forced-choice methodology implies that the completeness ax-
iom and asymmetry of ‘≻’ holds⁷7. Any two outcomes have ei-
ther a ‘≻’ or ‘∼’ relationship. (§2.1.1). This may be permissible when thedifference between outcomes is small and comparable along a limited num-
ber of similar dimensions (such as two text-entry suggestion algorithms), but
becomes harder to justify when there are complex trade-offs between the
outcomes (such as text entry using a keyboard vs. voice recognition). In par-
ticular, critiques of preference patterns (e.g. tests of transitivity; §2.1.1) rely
on these assumptions being defensible (Regenwetter & Davis-Stober, 2012).
Another commonly used methodology in behavioural economics has sub-
jects matching outcomes to make them equivalent (e.g. the preference rever-
sal experiments reviewed in §2.6.4). These methods find the point where two
trade-offs balance each other and subjects would respond to a choice between
them with indifference. Once this balance is found, a weighting for the dif-
ferent components of the prospect can be established. Matching methods
include directly asking subjects for a balancing value, or repeatedly testing
small manipulations with binary choices to home in on the point of indiffer-
ence (e.g. Fischer et al., 1999). Patterns in these points of indifference can
indicate the utility weightings of salient factors and other biases.
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3.3.3 Design
There are many possible experimental designs for exposing subjects to alter-
natives and eliciting choices from them. The major trade-offs in experimen-
tal designs can be seen in the differences between how psychologists and
economists have approached their experiments for studying behavioural bi-
ases (reviewed by Camerer, 1995; Camerer & Loewenstein, 2004; Hogarth &
Reder, 1986b):
• Psychologists typically pose hypothetical questions to subjects, framed
by descriptions of ordinary situations that subjects can empathise with;
whereas economists typically lay bare a prospect’s outcomes.
• Psychologists avoid giving subjects financial incentives to prevent con-
taminating the trade-off under test and confounding the primary depen-
dent measure; whereas economics experiments are almost exclusively
concerned with financial outcomes.
• Psychologists focus on subjects’ first responses to a stimulus and avoid
repeating choices; whereas economists are interested in how responses
regress towards an equilibrium.
These differences are not matters of methodological superiority, but of differ-
ences in the underlying questions. Human–computer interaction researchers
have interests that are closer to those of psychologists than economists when
they seek to understand behaviour (rather than the prescriptive approach that
is typical of economics), but they also have independent questions that will
lead to distinct methodologies.
For instance, interactive choices are rarely made only once – they are
usually repeated many times over the system’s useful life. A user may be
prompted each time the need for a decision arises, or their choice may be en-
coded as the default behaviour for the system. The repeated evaluation of an
interactive prospect provides opportunities for potential costs of the choice
to be recovered, but also may expose the user to an intertemporal decision
about future interactions – which have their own psychological considera-
tions (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992, revisited in §7.6.2). The environment for
these choices is difficult to replicate in a laboratory experiment, and subject
responses for an experimental task in the short-term may differ from those
when faced with long-term use. For example, Wedell and Böckenholt (1990)
found that preferences for gambles became more consistent with their ex-
pected value when they were played multiple times.
Hershey, Kunreuther, and Schoemaker (1982) reviewed five sources of bias
in procedures that may influence the results of utility theory experiments:
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• Response mode. What is the method used by subjects to indicate their
preferences?
• Risk dimensions. How many factors need to be distinguished between
outcomes, and to what depth?
• Domain. Are the outcomes pure losses, pure gains, or mixed?
• Transfer versus assumption of risk. Are subjects being asked to give up
the risk of an outcome, or obtain it?
• Context. Under what context is the decision being made under?
Even if the stated outcomes are identical, procedural differences along these
dimensions can impact subjective responses. These may be intentional (such
as tests of context effects), but requires cognisance when interpreting results
or comparing them across experiments.
Experimenters also need to decide upon the experimental conditions that
will be administered, and the assignment of subjects to conditions. Of course,
if subjects are never exposed to a real trade-off (e.g. the experimental condi-
tions objectively dominate reference conditions) or the set of experimental
conditions do not sample a balanced range of trade-offs, then the results will
be facile. A few experimental structures have support in the literature as stan-
dards for testing paradoxes of choice. For example, the hilo structure tests
common consequence and common ratio effects (Chew &Waller, 1986), and
preference reversal bets (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971). However, such method-
ologies often require that probabilities and outcomes can be arbitrarily com-
bined (which is difficult to do for many interactive tasks).
Keren and Raaijmakers (1988) discussed the issue of within-subjects ver-
sus between-subjects experimental designs in tests of utility theories. Most
economic work administers experimental choices using a within-subjects de-
sign due to the high experimental power and subject economy,⁸8. Some exceptions were
noted in §2.6.
but this raises
concerns about cross-condition contamination. In particular, if stimuli are
highly similar then subjects may become aware of the experimental manip-
ulation and adjust their responses to be proportionate (e.g. their reference
point shifts to the average of the other conditions they have been exposed
to, rather than the intended reference interface set by the experimenters).
Between-subjects designs avoid these problems by only exposing subjects to
a single choice, which preserves their first-impression responses and better
reflects the environment that such choices are typically made in. However,
between-subjects designs lose the ability to test for preference patternswithin
subjects (Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980).
3.3.4 Analysis
If all subjects have performed the same actions and received the same out-
comes, then preferences across subjects can be tested with binomial sign tests
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(e.g. Birnbaum &McIntosh, 1996; Gonzalez &Wu, 1999; Tversky & Fox, 1995;
Wu & Gonzalez, 1998). However, as the number of choices being compared
increases, so too does the chance of a Type-I error, and applying statistical cor-
rections for those comparisons similarly increases the chance of a Type-II er-
ror (reviewed by Regenwetter et al., 2011). Statistical techniques for analysing
the pattern of choiceswithin subjects (e.g. the transitivity of their preferences;
§2.1.1) remains an area of active research (reviewed by Regenwetter et al., 2011;
Regenwetter & Davis-Stober, 2012).
In human–computer interaction experiments, the skilful nature of out-
comesmeans that subjects are unlikely to all perform the same actions and re-
ceive the same outcomes. Variability in individual skill and ability across sub-
jects will cause identical prospects to have different realised outcomes. For
example, studies of pointing techniques typically manipulate the Fitts’ law In-
dex of Difficulty (ID) model (Fitts, 1954;Wright & Lee, 2013), and although the
model is robust, its parameters vary with the individual (reviewed by Schmidt
& Lee, 2005). A pointing technique that objectively lowers difficulty by two
bits will not realise identical time savings across all users or compel an identi-
cal influence on their preferences (e.g. Quinn, Cockburn, & Delamarche, 2013;
Quinn, Cockburn, Räihä, & Delamarche, 2011). In such cases, the realised out-
come is itself a measurable variable that may influence choice.
If the outcomes that were actually received can be measured (such as time
gained or lost), then choices can be analysed using a logistic regression – a re-
gression model for a binomial dependent variable (i.e. the choice for either A
or B). Logistic regression models predict the probability of the choice being
one way or the other, given the outcome that was received. Logistic regres-
sion modelling is common in econometrics (reviewed by Cramer, 2003), and
has been used to isolate variables in models of choice (e.g. Kusev, van Schaik,
Ayton, Dent, & Chater, 2009; Larrick & Boles, 1995).⁹
9. Multinomial versions are used
for multiple or ranked choices
(reviewed by Louviere, 1991).
3.4 summary
The utility model of interaction presented in this chapter (§3.2) describes the
relationship between a user’s expectations and their evaluation of system out-
comes – whether an interaction is perceived as a gain or a loss, and the influ-
ence of those gains and losses on overall preference. The model considers ob-
jective changes to a system’s state, the utility weighting of each change, and
the subjective sensation of gains and losses in utility. Although the model
is based on established findings and models from behavioural economics, it
is unfamiliar to human–computer interaction research and requires experi-
mental validation in human–computer interaction contexts. This is challeng-
ing because the model describes interactive preferences in general terms (e.g.
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there are few constraints on how reference expectations are developed), and
it is not obvious how to adapt experimental methodologies from behavioural
economics to human–computer interaction. These methodological issues are
not specific to the model developed here but are general issues with exper-
iments that aim to test preferences for interactive outcomes (§3.3). As re-
viewed in the previous chapter, small changes to experimental designs can
have substantial effects on their results – but utility models that encapsulate
these design choices aid in controlling and understanding these effects.
Given the broad scope of the model, three key aspects of it will be the
focus of the experimental work in the remainder of this thesis:
• The salience of perceived progress towards a task goal in the weighting
of utility functions mk.
• Reference-dependence in the evaluation of interactive outcomes (the
marginal utility in n).
• The psychological aversion to losses of progress in µ (loss aversion).
The following two chapters describe experiments that undertook this work.
Chapter 7 reviews their results in the context of the model, discusses future
directions for establishing support (including the use of risk), and potential
applications of the model.
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the model presented in the previous chapter makes claims and predictions This chapter presents two exper-
iments demonstrating reference-
dependent loss aversion for
interactive tasks – as described
by the model in the previous
chapter.
about how users evaluate interactive prospects. A thorough examination of
the model’s claims requires extensive experimental work and methodologi-
cal development (beyond that which is possible in a single thesis). However,
its fundamental hypotheses are readily testable, and therefore the experimen-
tal work in this thesis focusses on the broad predictions it makes about task
progress, the reference-dependence of preferences, and loss aversion. These
aspects are fundamental to the model and establish parallels with the litera-
ture reviewed in Chapter 2.
In the two experiments that follow, a choice-basedmethodology was used
to examine subjective preferences for interactive tasks engineered to contain
controlled elements of progress gain and loss. In both experiments, subjects
were given a choice between a neutral reference interface that worked equally
well for all tasks, and an experimental interface that sometimes assisted task
completion (yielding outcomes above expectation) and sometimes impeded
it (yielding outcomes below expectation). By forcing a choice between these
two interfaces across varied conditions of assistance and impediment, the
magnitude of gain necessary to compensate for losses was revealed. The asym-
metry of this compensation indicates biases for or against the differences be-
tween the two interfaces.
With respect to the model, the key difference between the two experi-
ments concerns the utility of the actual outcome m(c). Actions a and expec-
tations r(a)were largely held constant, and a dimension of the outcome cwas
manipulated to produce a controlled gain or loss (while still enabling subjects
to complete the task successfully). In Experiment 4.1, certain sub-interactions
required subjects to back-track in order to complete the task – perceptu-
ally removing progress already attained. In Experiment 4.2, analogous sub-
interactions were engineered to require actions and time costs comparable to
those of Experiment 4.1, butwithout the appearance of back-tracking and neg-
ative progress. These manipulations examine the consumption utility func-
tion mk and its effect on overall utility u.
Both experiments were built around a text selection task, with the refer-
ence and experimental interfaces differing in their method of selection. Text
selection provides a convenientmethod for examining the predicted effects of
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themodel because it uses simplemouse interaction that is well understood, al-
lows for precise control over the objective gains and losses in time, is a familiar
interaction for subjects, and exemplifies a design trade-off that has ecological
validity (i.e. real interfaces incorporate the experimental behaviour).
The basic experimental method involved subjects completing a set of tasks
with a conventional letter-by-letter selection technique (where text was se-
lected one character at a time) to establish a reference point for neutral per-
formance, and a set of identical tasks with a word-by-word technique that
snapped the selection to word boundaries. After completing tasks with both
letter-by-letter and word-by-word techniques, subjects chose which they pre-
ferred to use for a third set of identical tasks.
4.1 experiment 4.1: observing loss aversion
Experimental tasks involved dragging a selection across an underlined por-
tion of a sentence. The letter-by-letter technique selected all characters be-
tween the start of the dragging action and the position of the cursor. The
word-by-word technique began similarly, but snapped the selection to word
boundaries after the selection crossed a space. This snapping behaviour could
be disabled by back-tracking the selection to anywherewithin the initial word
(reducing the selection back into the word it began in), after which selection
followed letter-by-letter (illustrated in Figure 4.1). This behaviour has been
implemented in some versions of Microsoft Word (U.S. Patent No. 5,832,528,
1998, claim 7).
Individual tasks were designed to be either congruent or incongruentwith
theword-by-word snapping behaviour. When congruent, the target selection
was aligned with word boundaries, which allowed the snapping behaviour
to assist selection (effectively enlarging the target size of the selection’s end-
point). When incongruent, the target selection was misaligned with word
boundaries, which impeded task completion due to the requirement to disable
snapping by backtracking to the initial word.
The experimental method manipulated the overall marginal utility (Equa-
tion 3.5) of the word-by-word technique by controlling the number of congru-
ent and incongruent tasks within the set of tasks completed by each subject.
When all tasks were congruent, the marginal utility of word-by-word was
positive with respect to the letter-by-letter reference condition, and subjects
were hypothesised to prefer it. When all tasks were incongruent, there was
a corresponding negative marginal utility, and subjects were hypothesised to
reject it. However, when sets included a mixture of congruent and incongru-
ent tasks, subjects were hypothesised to exhibit a bias against word-by-word
due to the shape of µ – even when there were objective gains.
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my favourite subject is psychology
Letter-by-Letter Word-by-Word
À my favourite subject is psychology Ê my favourite subject is psychology
Á my favourite subject is psychology Ë my favourite subject is psychology
Â my favourite subject is psychology Ì my favourite subject is psychology
Ã my favourite subject is psychology Í my favourite subject is psychology
Ä my favourite subject is psychology Î my favourite subject is psychology
Ï my favourite subject is psychology
Ð my favourite subject is psychology
Ñ my favourite subject is psychology
FIGURE 4.1 Examples of the letter-by-letter and word-by-word techniques in Experi-
ment 4.1: tasks involved selecting the underlined portion of text, shown at the top. The
letter-by-letter technique (left) allowed text to be selected between any two characters,
one letter at a time (À–Ä). The word-by-word technique (right) began identically to
letter-by-letter (Ê–Ì), but the selection snapped to word boundaries when a space
character was crossed (Í andÎ). In this example the snapping is not desired and is
disabled by backtracking the selection to any point within the first selected word (Ï);
subsequent selection follows letter-by-letter (Ð–Ñ).
4.1.1 Modelling Preferences
With letter-by-letter selection, all tasks were completed in the same man-
ner and were equally difficult (given a fixed number of characters to select
and a monospace font). During ideal letter-by-letter operation, dragging to-
wards the end of the selection region continually advanced towards the goal,
progressively increasing the number of correctly selected characters. That is,
the subject’s actions a moving the cursor rightwards (Figure 4.1) produced
commensurate progress towards selecting the required characters; ∀a ∈ I ∶
mk(ck) = mk(rk(a)), for the dimension k of character selection. The reference
expectations in this case came from subjects’ prior experience (as it emulates
existing text selection practice) and what could be reasonably expected for
such direct-manipulation actions.
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However, word-by-word task difficulty hinged on whether the target se-
lection was aligned with word boundaries (its congruency – illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.2). As the letter-by-letter and word-by-word techniques were being
compared against each other, congruent tasks were intended to have a higher
utility with word-by-word selection than letter-by-letter, and incongruent
tasks were intended to have a lower utility with word-by-word selection than
letter-by-letter selection.
The benefit of congruent tasks for word-by-word selection came from the
positive marginal utility returned for the subject’s pointing actions. The sub-
ject’s reference expectation¹1. i.e. letter-by-letter. was that exact pointing was required, but snap-
ping to word boundaries allowed pointing actions to be less precise,²2. After crossing the first
word boundary.
and task
completion was therefore faster. Such progress exceeded letter-by-letter ref-
erence expectations, had positivemarginal utility, and therefore a higher over-
all utility than that for letter-by-letter: ∀a ∈ I ∶ mk(ck) ≥ mk(rk(a)).
For incongruent tasks, the word-by-word selection interface yielded a
lower utility than for letter-by-letter. When the snapping behaviour was mis-
aligned with the target selection, additional actions were required to disable
the behaviour (i.e.º–» in Figure 4.1). These actions were not present in the
letter-by-letter method and required extra time and effort to perform. In ad-
dition, their outcome appeared to remove progress previously acquired. That
is, the letters selected in steps¹ andºmust be deselected and reselected in
steps» and¼. These actions to manipulate the snapping behaviour required
negative progress away from the goal state.³3. In actuality, progress was al-
ways positive overall as these
actions were necessary as part
of the method to reach the goal;
the losses were perceptual.
These elements gave a sensation
of progress that was negative (moving backwards before moving forwards):∃a ∈ I ∶ mk(ck) < 0. This element had an amplified effect due to the saliency of
the dimension k and the loss aversion manifest in µ.
However, the loss of progress for incongruent word-by-word tasks was
not isolated from the additional actions that these tasks required (compared
to letter-by-letter). Therefore, any preference for the letter-by-letter tech-
nique might be explained by either (a) strongly felt progress losses (the hy-
pothesis), or (b) the presence of additional actions. These issues are revisited
in Section 4.1.7, and Experiment 4.2 isolated them using a technique that con-
tained similar additional actions but without the perceived progress losses.
4.1.2 Measuring Preferences and Hypothesis
The primary dependent measure was subjects’ response to whether or not
they chose to repeat an experimental set of mixed congruent and incongru-
ent tasks using the letter-by-letter selection technique or the word-by-word
selection technique. An affirmative response forword-by-word indicated that
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I once saw a deer riding my bicycle
(a) Word-to-Word
I once saw a deer riding my bicycle
(b) Word-to-Letter
I once saw a deer riding my bicycle
(c) Letter-to-Word
I once saw a deer riding my bicycle
(d) Letter-to-Letter
FIGURE 4.2
Examples of the different
types of selection task. Only
(a) is congruent for word-by-
word selection.
they felt its behaviour was of higher utility than letter-by-letter, while a neg-
ative response indicated lower utility.
The primary hypothesis was that the losses associated with incongruent
tasks have subjectively more impact (i.e. fewer subjects chose to repeat them)
than their objective performance measures would imply. That is, subjects
have a tendency to reject word-by-word selection when the set of tasks con-
tains one or more incongruent tasks, even when combined with congruent
tasks that more than compensate for the objective performance losses in-
curred. If confirmed, this supports the presence of aversion to the perceived
loss of progress (and additional actions).
4.1.3 Apparatus & Participants
The experiment ran on Intel Core i7 computers running Linux Mint 17, ren-
dering to a 22′′ LCD monitor running at a resolution of 1680 × 1080 px, with
input received through a wired Logitech optical mouse. The X server was
configured to use a polynomial pointer acceleration profile, with a constant
deceleration factor of 4. The software was written in Python and logged all
user actions and responses.
Ninety volunteer undergraduate computer-science students took part in
the experiment (21 female). Participation lasted approximately 10 minutes.
4.1.4 Procedure
To ensure familiarity with the two selection techniques, subjects first com-
pleted 5 letter-by-letter practice tasks and 10 word-by-word practice tasks.
The 10 word-by-word tasks exposed subjects to all selection possibilities (con-
gruent and incongruent).
Subjects then completed three sets of 10 experimental selection tasks. In
the first two sets, subjects used letter-by-letter and word-by-word techniques
in a counterbalanced order (even numbered subjects used letter-by-letter first,
odd numbered usedword-by-word first). They then selectedwhich of the two
techniques they wanted to use for a third set of 10 selections, which was then
completed using that choice (illustrated in Figure 4.3).
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I once saw a deer riding my bicycle
You are about to repeat the same 
tasks again. Would you prefer to use 
letter-by-letter or word-by-word 
selection?
◯ Letter-by-Letter
◯ Word-by-Word
⨉10 ⨉10
Letter-by-Letter Word-by-Word
⨉10
Word-by-Word
Time
Time
my favourite subject is psychology
police help dog bite victim
A
B
C
D
B
A
D
C
C
D
B
A
FIGURE 4.3 A schematic of the Experiment 4.1 procedure (following practise tasks).
The first two sets of tasks (top row) were counterbalanced, and the final set (bottom-
right) used themode chosen by the subject on the preceeding screen (bottom-left). The
order of tasks within each set (A, B, C, D) was randomised.
For each subject, the experimental tasks were identical in all three sets
(the same sentences and selection ranges), but were administered each time
in a random order. After completing the first two sets, subjects were asked:
You are about to repeat the same tasks again. Would you prefer
to use letter-by-letter or word-by-word selection?
(Forced-choice radio button selection: ‘Letter-by-Letter’ or ‘Word-
by-Word’.)
For simplicity, this choice was coded as either accepting or rejecting word-
by-word. Subjects were informed of this procedure (the two sets of identical
tasks, the decision, and the final set of tasks using their choice).
Each task presented the sentence to be selected in a 880 × 66 px box, po-
sitioned in the centre of the screen. Subjects pressed a Start button directly
beneath it to reveal the portion to be selected and begin the task. The text
was rendered in a black monospace font (white when selected), which gave
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each character a bounding box of 22 × 44 px. The selection highlight was nor-
mally black, but turned dark green when the selected region exactly matched
the target (° and ½ of Figure 4.1). Releasing the mouse button completed
the selection. If the selection matched the target, the next sentence was auto-
matically cued (with the Start button reset), otherwise the sentence remained
and subjects had to repeat the selection until it was correctly selected.
Selection could be performed in either direction. A message above the
text box and before each set of tasks informed subjects of the initial selection
mode (‘Letter-by-Letter’ or ‘Word-by-Word’).
4.1.5 Design
The sets of ten tasks were constructed to control the number of tasks that
were congruent with word-by-word selection (i.e. aligned with word bound-
aries); the remaining tasks in each set were incongruent (i.e. misaligned with
word boundaries) – see Figure 4.2. Six different selection set configurations
were used, with {0, 2, 4, 6, 8, or 10} congruent tasks within each set (coded as
the proportion of congruent tasks).
These six conditions evenly sampled the complete range of possible set
constructions and therefore controlled the amount of intended gain and loss
experienced. The conditions with 0 and 10 congruent tasks served as control
conditions as they did not require subjects to respond to a trade-off between
the two types of task – subjects were expected to reject the word-by-word
interface when there were 0 congruent tasks (as there was never any benefit
to using it), and theywere expected to accept word-by-wordwhen there were
10 congruent tasks (as there was never any cost).
Each subject completed only one of the conditions (between-subjects; in a
counter-balanced order of 15 subjects per condition). This reduced the effects
of practice and learning (which were not under investigation), and preserved
subject sensitivity that may be confounded if they were exposed to repeated
sets that were highly similar (see §3.3.3).
The tasks were randomly constructed from the MacKenzie and Soukoreff
(2003) phrase set: each task was 15 characters long (±2 characters for those
that needed alignment with word boundaries), with start and end points in
words that were 6±2 characters in length. This ensured that the pointing
difficulty was roughly equal across tasks.⁴ No subject was exposed to the same
sentence more than once per set.
4 These tasks can also be considered under a Fitts’ law paradigm (Fitts, 1954): letter-by-letter tasks
have an ID of approximately 4.70–5.09 bits, and congruent word-by-word tasks have an ID of
approximately 1.70–3.09 bits. However, the additional cognitive and physical actions required to
recognise and disable word-by-word snapping perverts such an analysis for incongruent tasks.
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Figure 4.2(b–d) shows three types of incongruent tasks that can be con-
structed by placing the misaligned boundary at the start, end, or both po-
sitions of the selection. As the placement of the misaligned boundary may
affect performance,⁵5. e.g. for word-to-letter tasks,
subjects may not notice the
problem until late in the task.
and pilot subjects were observed to consistently select
from left-to-right, incongruent tasks were alwaysmisaligned at their leftward
edge (Figure 4.2(c) and (d)).
Each task was timed from when the Start button was pressed until suc-
cessful completion. To avoid the influence of outliers, the geometric mean of
a set’s constituent task times was used as the measure of performance.⁶6. Using the arithmetic mean
does not significantly affect
the results, but does increase
the between-subjects variance.
The
time difference between letter-by-letter and word-by-word sets (prior to a
subject choosing between them) was the objective measure of performance
gain or loss that a subject received when using word-by-word.
4.1.6 Results
Time Performance. Analysis of selection time data showed that the manip-
ulation of congruent and incongruent tasks had the intended effect on objec-
tive performance gains and losses – shown in Figure 4.4. Mean selection time
for letter-by-letter tasks was 2.23 seconds (95% CI [2.13,2.33]), with word-by-
word ∼30% faster for congruent tasks (1.61 s, 95% CI [1.53, 1.69], t(162.94) =
10.59, p < .001, d = 1.63)⁷7. All t-tests are for unequal vari-
ances with Welch-Satterthwaite
degrees-of-freedom approxima-
tions.
and ∼60% slower for incongruent tasks (3.51 s, 95%
CI [3.31, 3.71], t(107.04) = −11.80, p < .001, d = 1.94). Although unimportant
for the primary hypothesis, there was a small effect of practice, with letter-
by-letter and congruent word-by-word tasks completed significantly faster
when repeated (t(149.87) = 3.47, p < .001, d = 0.54; and t(57.57) = 3.17, p = .002,
d = 0.64, respectively) – but not for incongruent word-by-word tasks (p = .93).
Overall performance with letter-by-letter tasks was consistent across con-
ditions (mean 2.26 s, 95% CI [2.03,2.49], one-way anova p = .27). In contrast,
word-by-word time decreased linearly as the number of congruent tasks in-
creased (Figure 4.5(a); R2 = .99, F(5,84) = 29.59, p < .001, η2g = .63). These re-
sults confirm that the word-by-word selection technique had the intended ef-
fects of losing and gaining time (relative to letter-by-letter), and outperformed
letter-by-letter when at least 60% of the tasks were congruent.
Errors. Errors were classified in terms of the number of excess selection
attempts for each task. That is, if a subject was unable to complete a selec-
tion with their first attempt and had to try again (e.g. their start location was
incorrect), each additional attempt was counted as excess. A Kruskal-Wallis
test between letter-by-letter (mean 0.16 excess attempts, 95% CI [0.13,0.18]),
word-by-word for congruent tasks (0.13, 95% CI [0.09,0.16]), and word-by-
word for incongruent tasks (0.22, 95% CI [0.15,0.26]), revealed a significant
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FIGURE 4.4 The mean time subjects took to complete each type of task in Experi-
ment 4.1, before (left) and after (right) subjects made their choice (error bars show 95%
confidence intervals).
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Experiment 4.1 time and
choice results by condition.
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FIGURE 4.6 A binomial logistic regression model (dashed ±95% confidence interval
band) for subject choice by the actual amount of time lost or gained in Experiment 4.1.
The intersection with the vertical axis – when no timewas lost or gained – is highlighted
(dashed, maroon).
main effect (χ2(2) = 6.68, p = .04). Bonferroni-corrected pairwise compar-
isons using Dunn’s test (Dunn, 1964) only found a significant difference be-
tween the two word-by-word task types (z = −2.49, p = .02).
Choice Response. In the control conditions with either 0 or 10 congruent
tasks, all subjects received the expected loss⁸8. A negative time difference
using word-by-word, relative to
letter-by-letter.
or gain,⁹
9. A positive time difference.
respectively. When no
tasks were congruent, all but one subject (14 of 15) rejected the word-by-word
technique; conversely, all but two (13 of 15) accepted the word-by-word tech-
nique when all tasks were congruent – indicating that subjects were success-
ful in identifying the impediment or benefit of the word-by-word technique.
Figure 4.5(b) shows the proportion of subjects accepting word-by-word for
each condition.
To examine the primary hypothesis – that losses have subjectively more
impact on utility – subjects’ decisions were analysedwith respect to the objec-
tive gain or loss received. Figure 4.6 shows a binomial logistic model (§3.3.4)
of the probability that a subject would accept the word-by-word technique
given themean time per task gained or lost usingword-by-word (χ2(1) = 25.31,
p < .001; Odds-Ratio = 9.94, 95% CI [3.60, 34.79]). The intercept of this model
indicates the probability that a subject would have accepted the word-by-
word technique over the letter-by-letter technique when the time difference
between the two techniques was zero (that is, no objective gain or loss). This
probability is 30.68% (95% CI [19.30%,42.07%]), which is significantly less
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than a null model of indifference (50%; binomial p < .001) – indicating a bias
against the word-by-word technique.
This bias is also indicated in the contrast between Figures 4.5(a) and (b).
The linear time reduction across the proportion of congruent tasks shown in
Figure 4.5(a) is not reflected by a linear increase in the proportion of subjects
accepting word-by-word in 4.5(b). Rather, Figure 4.5(b) shows that themajor-
ity of subjects rejected word-by-word across conditions (except for the 100%
congruency condition in which subjects did not encounter any trade-off).
4.1.7 Discussion
The results of the logistic regression model (Figure 4.6) indicate that if objec-
tive performance outcomes were balanced (the zero point along the abscissa),
a significant majority of subjects (69%) would reject the word-by-word tech-
nique. The word-by-word technique would need to exhibit a benefit of at
least several seconds before subjects would be indifferent to its behaviour (the
model in Figure 4.6 intercepts the 50% indifference point at ≈300ms per task,
representing a total of 3 s for the 10 tasks in a set). The primary hypothesis
attributes this bias against the word-by-word technique to an overweighted
aversion against the negative progress of incongruent tasks. However, there
are several possible explanations for this bias, including the following:
• Aversion to progress losses. The word-by-word technique requires back-
tracking that perceptually removes previously completed progress to-
wards the goal state. This removal of progress may have been subjec-
tively overweighted as negative (the primary hypothesis).
• Aversion to additional actions/workload. The actions required to recog-
nise and disable the snapping behaviour may contain extra cognitive
costs that increased theworkload of the technique beyond that captured
in the measure of time. In other words, subjects may have disliked the
actions and work required by the word-by-word technique more than
they liked its overall time savings.
• Aversion to time losses. Incongruent word-by-word selection tasks were
slower than neutral letter-by-letter selection, and subjects may have re-
sponded negatively to these time losses (rather than the progress, work-
load, or cognitive losses).
• Speculative assessment. Rather than responding to their experienced
task sets, subjects may have chosen between techniques based on their
speculation of what the word-by-word technique would be like for real
use (rather than the task at hand).
• Familiarity preference. Subjects may have chosen letter-by-letter in pref-
erence to word-by-word based on their familiarity with the technique.
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Distinguishing between these alternatives requires manipulating one candi-
date explanation while holding all others constant. The next experiment
addresses this by using identical tasks, but altering the mechanism used to
disable snapping with the word-by-word technique. The key difference to
Experiment 4.1 is that the modified technique preserves progress by using a
key-press and time-consuming animation to disable snapping, rather than by
requiring the user to back-track the cursor and remove previously selected
characters.
4.2 experiment 4.2: neutralising loss aversion
To examine whether the preference choices observed in Experiment 4.1 stem
predominantly from an aversion to progress losses or to one of the other ex-
planations in Section 4.1.7, a second experiment was undertaken with a small
change to the design of the word-by-word technique. The revised word-by-
word technique was designed to require similar additional actions and time
costs when compared with letter-by-letter, but removed the need to back-
track to turn off the snapping behaviour.
The behaviour of the letter-by-letter selection technique and the word-by-
word selection technique for congruent tasks was identical to Experiment 4.1,
but the method for disabling the snapping behaviour for incongruent tasks
was modified – illustrated in Figure 4.7.
To disable snapping, subjects tapped on the Control key, which began an
animation that gradually shrank the selection (at 80ms per character) until
it matched the letter-by-letter selection region (i.e. as if the task had been
started with letter-by-letter selection). A similar snapping behaviour (with-
out the animation) has also been implemented in some versions of Microsoft
Word (U.S. Patent No. 5,832,528, 1998, claim 5). This mechanism preserved all
characters that had already been selected, and did not require back-tracking
of the cursor: ∄a ∈ I ∶ mk(ck) < 0, for the dimension k of character selection.
The animation during the mode switch (steps ²–´ in Figure 4.7) was con-
trolled to ensure that the objective time cost of the technique was at least as
large as that of back-tracking in Experiment 4.1.
While the key-press action was not identical to the back-tracking action,
the other elements of a subject’s actions were largely comparable between
both experiments:
• Both techniques involved a cognitive component in recognising a need
to disable snapping.
• The time costs of performing the key-press and animation were engi-
neered to match the time costs of backward pointing in Experiment 4.1.
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my favourite subject is psychology
Word-by-Word
Ê my favourite subject is psychology
Ë my favourite subject is psychology
Ì my favourite subject is psychology
Í my favourite subject is psychology
Î my favourite subject is psychology
Ï control
Æ my favourite subject is psychology
Ç my favourite subject is psychology
È my favourite subject is psychology
Ó my favourite subject is psychology
FIGURE 4.7 An example of the revised word-by-word selection technique in Experi-
ment 4.2: tasks involved selecting the underlined portion of text, shown at the top. The
letter-by-letter technique behaved as in Figure 4.1 – as do stepsÊ–Î of the word-by-
word technique. However, to disable the snapping behaviour, the Control key is tapped
(Ï), which initiates an animation that shrinks the selection to its letter-by-letter equiv-
alent (Æ–È). Subsequent selection follows letter-by-letter (Ó).
• Both techniques required forward pointing to complete the selection
once snapping was disabled.
• The key-press action required coordinating input across two hands, but
freezing the selection region during the animation prohibited subjects
from fully exploiting parallel actions.
In summary, there is relatively little reason for hypothesising that an addi-
tional small pointing action (Experiment 4.1) will be substantially less prefer-
able to a key-press and frozen wait (Experiment 4.2). These issues are further
discussed in Section 4.3.1.
4.2.1 Apparatus & Participants
The experimental apparatus was identical to Experiment 4.1 (§4.1.3). Sixty-
four volunteer undergraduate computer-science students participated in the
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experiment (14 female), which lasted approximately 10 minutes. None had
participated in Experiment 4.1.
4.2.2 Procedure & Design
The procedure was identical to Experiment 4.1 (§4.1.4), but the experimen-
tal design was altered slightly. To increase experimental power and subject
economy, four selection sets were used (instead of six), and to evenly sample
the range of possible set constructions, the number of tasks in each set was
increased to 12 (instead of 10). The four selection sets varied in the number of
congruent tasks, and contained either {0, 4, 8, or 12} congruent tasks. Sixteen
subjects were assigned to each of the four selection sets (between-subjects, as
with Experiment 4.1).
The selection tasks were constructed as with Experiment 4.1 (§4.1.5), but
with the additional constraint that incongruent tasks either started or ended
exactly five characters from the opposing word boundary. As the animation
that shrank the selection progressed at one character every 80ms, this en-
sured that disabling snapping took at least 400ms, which pilot studies indi-
cated would maintain the overall level of objective time loss observed in Ex-
periment 4.1’s incongruent tasks.
To prevent subjects from prematurely disabling the word-snapping be-
haviour (e.g. pressing the Control key at the start of the selection), the feature
only worked after at least one word boundary had been crossed (i.e. word-
snapping had begun). During the animation, the selection region was not
manipulatable until the animation completed, after which the technique con-
tinued with letter-by-letter selection.
Practice tasks (5 with letter-by-letter, 10 with word-by-word) were identi-
cal to Experiment 4.1, as was the presentation of the tasks and time recording.
4.2.3 Results
Time Performance. Similar to the results of Experiment 4.1 (§4.1.6), the
mean selection time for letter-by-letter tasks was 2.08 s (95% CI [1.98,2.18]),
with congruent word-by-word tasks ∼20% faster (1.63 s, 95% CI [1.50, 1.76],
t(76.96) = 6.77, p < .001, d = 1.37), and incongruent word-by-word tasks ∼60%
slower (3.33 s, 95% CI [3.12, 3.54], t(58.00) = −10.96, p < .001, d = 2.32) – shown
in Figure 4.8. There was a small effect of practice for all three—
• Letter-by-letter: t(83.90) = 2.71, p < .01, d = 0.53.
• Congruent word-by-word: t(71.90) = 3.14, p < .01, d = 0.68.
• Incongruent word-by-word: t(41.38) = 2.22, p = .03, d = 0.54.
There was no effect of congruency level on letter-by-letter performance
(mean 2.11 s, 95% CI [1.96,2.26], one-way anova p = .81), but word-by-word
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FIGURE 4.8 The mean time subjects took to complete each type of task in Experi-
ment 4.2, before (left) and after (right) subjects made their choice (error bars show 95%
confidence intervals).
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Experiment 4.2 time and
choice results by condition.
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FIGURE 4.10 A binomial logistic regression model (dashed ±95% confidence interval
band) for subject choice by the actual amount of time lost or gained in Experiment 4.2.
The intersection with the vertical axis – when no timewas lost or gained – is highlighted
(dashed, maroon).
performance increased linearly as congruency increased (R2 = .99; F(3,60) =
57.76, p < .001, η2g = .74) – shown in Figure 4.9(a).
Errors. For the number of excess selection attempts, a Kruskal-Wallis
test between letter-by-letter (mean 0.14 excess attempts, 95% CI [0.10,0.18]),
word-by-word for congruent tasks (0.10, 95% CI [0.07,0.13]), and word-by-
word for incongruent tasks (0.26, 95% CI [0.18,0.33]), revealed a significant
main effect (χ2(2) = 13.34, p < .001). With significant pairwise differences be-
tween letter-by-letter and incongruent word-by-word (z = 3.08, p < .01), and
the two word-by-word task types (z = 3.45, p < .001).
Choice Response. In the control conditions, all but two subjects (14 of 16)
rejected word-by-word when all tasks were incongruent, and all but five (11
of 16) accepted word-by-word at the opposite end. Figure 4.9(b) shows the
proportion of subjects accepting word-by-word for each condition.
A binomial logistic regression for subject choice across the time gained or
lost is shown in Figure 4.10 (χ2(1) = 14.12, p < .001; Odds-Ratio = 4.54, 95%
CI [1.98, 12.15]). The probability that a subject would choose word-by-word
when the time difference between the two techniques was zero is 54.67% (95%
CI [40.38%,68.95%]) – which is not significantly different from indifference
(binomial p = .73). This indicates that subjective preferences were predomi-
nantly aligned with the objective outcomes of the two interfaces. This con-
clusion is also reflected in the comparison between Figures 4.9(a) and (b): the
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proportion accepting word-by-word roughly reflects the time gained or lost
in the associated condition. In other words, there is no indication of a bias
for or against the word-by-word technique.
These results indicate that if objective outcomes were balanced – that is,
letter-by-letter and word-by-word had no difference in time performance –
subjects would not express a preference for one technique over the other.
4.3 discussion
Themain finding is in the contrast between results of Experiments 4.1 and 4.2.
In Experiment 4.1, a significant majority of subjects rejected word-by-word
snapping, even when it improved their task performance – that is, subjects
exhibited a bias against the technique, which was hypothesised to be an aver-
sion to the progress losses required to disable the snapping behaviour (back-
tracking). Experiment 4.2 showed that this bias was neutralised when sub-
jects used a variant technique that replaced back-tracking progress losses
with a similarly time-consuming action that preserved progress.
However, the difference between a significant effect (Experiment 4.1) and
a non-significant effect (Experiment 4.2) is itself not necessarily statistically
significant (Gelman & Stern, 2006; Nieuwenhuis, Forstmann, & Wagenmak-
ers, 2011). As Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 use the same dependent variable to pre-
dict choice (mean time saved per task), the two logistic models (Figures 4.6
and 4.10) can be compared by pooling the data and using a dummy variable to
encode experimentmembership. The logistic regression slope for this variable
shows the effect of the experimental manipulation (the difference between
Experiments 4.1 and 4.2), and is significantly different from 0 (1.00, 95% CI[0.23, 1.81], p = .01). A likelihood ratio test also shows a significant difference
between the two experimental models (χ2(1) = 8.01, p = .02).
The only substantial difference between the interactive tasks in Experi-
ments 4.1 and 4.2 was the mechanism used to disable word-by-word snapping.
Rather than back-tracking the selection, in Experiment 4.2 the mode switch
was accomplished by pressing a key that gradually shrank the selection to
its letter-by-letter equivalent. Other elements of the two experiments were
similar: the actions required to use the two word-by-word techniques were
consistent in cognitive scope (requiring the user to identify the need to disable
snapping, then execute a motor action to achieve it), and the time to perform
the actions and the incidence of errors were equitable (shown in Table 4.1).
With respect to the model of reference-dependent preferences (§3.2), the
difference between the experiments is attributed to the utility of the out-
comes while disabling word-by-word during incongruent tasks: mk(ck) in
Equation 3.5, where k is the dimension of character selection progress. In
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TABLE 4.1 Comparison of the task time and error rate metrics from Experiments 4.1
and 4.2.
Task Time
Letter-by-Letter 2.33 s [2.23, 2.43]2.08 s [1.98, 2.18]
Word-by-Word 1.61 s [1.53, 1.69]
(Congruent) 1.63 s [1.50, 1.76]
Word-by-Word 3.51 s [3.31, 3.71]
(Incongruent) 3.33 s [3.12, 3.54]
Error Rate
Letter-by-Letter 0.16 [0.13, 0.18]0.14 [0.10, 0.18]
Word-by-Word 0.13 [0.09, 0.16]
(Congruent) 0.10 [0.07, 0.13]
Word-by-Word 0.22 [0.15, 0.26]
(Incongruent) 0.26 [0.18, 0.33]
Note: Experiment 4.1 means are reported above those for Experiment 4.2 (both with 95% confi-
dence intervals in brackets). Task times are the mean for a single selection, and error rate mea-
sures the mean number of excess selection attempts per task.
Experiment 4.1, the gain-loss utility while backtracking was negative because
users were required to remove previously attained progress (mk(ck) < 0, while
mk(rk(a)) > 0). However, in Experiment 4.2 the same component was at
least neutral: mk(ck) ≈ 0. This dimension was heavily weighted because of
its saliency and relationship to the goal (more-so than the time required to
disable the snapping technique), and therefore had a significant impact on
overall utility U. In both experiments, other elements of the interaction were
substantially constant: the subjects’ actions a, and therefore the utility of
their expectations mk(rk(a)) from letter-by-letter selection, were consistent;
as were errors, time costs, and aesthetics.
4.3.1 Experimental and Modelling Issues
Experimental work in human–computer interaction typically focuses on ob-
jective performance measures, such as time and errors. These measures are
readily obtained, amenable to inferential statistics, easily replicated, and es-
sential in contexts where there are performance requirements. However, the
user’s experience of interactive systems is also a critical design consideration.
When this is the case, the forced-choice methodology provides a pragmatic
approach for examining subjects’ overall evaluation of the utility of user in-
terface manipulations – avoiding the issues found with more granular psycho-
metric measures of experience (reviewed in §2.7.3). Prior research has also
demonstrated that subjective outcomes need not reflect objective measures
(e.g. Hornbæk, 2006), and these experiments demonstrate conditions under
which this deviation between performance and subjective outcome occurs.
The reference-dependent utility model establishes a framework for separat-
ing the objective and subjective components of interaction and understand-
ing howmanipulations of objective outcomes can influence subjective prefer-
ences. The following paragraphs highlight some experimental and modelling
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limitations. More general conclusions and opportunities for future work are
described in Chapter 7.
Consumption versus Marginal Utility. Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 provide ev-
idence of conditions under which loss aversion occurs during interaction:
progress losses via elements of negative consumption utility. However, these
experiments have not been explicitly separated the model’s has separate com-
ponents for consumption utility and marginal utility.
Experiment 4.1 ensured a negative input to the value function µ by re-
quiring subjects to encounter a perceptual progress loss – mk(ck) < 0, for the
dimension k representing the number of characters selected – as they had to
back-track. Experiment 4.2 replaced these progress losses with elements of
substantially neutral progress – mk(ck) ≈ 0 (no loss in characters selected).
However, the model of reference-dependent preferences explains that the in-
put to the value function µ is not consumption utility, but marginal utility
(Equation 3.5), which is the difference between actual and expected outcomes.
In both experiments, the overall marginal utility was negative during in-
congruent tasks because the additional actions to disable the snapping created
expectations for outcomes that exceeded those attained (i.e. the actions are
not required in the letter-by-letter reference condition for the same selection
task). This marginal utility was very negative for Experiment 4.1, and slightly
negative for Experiment 4.2 – making it easier to recover from when a set
contained other, congruent tasks.
There are opportunities for further research that separately analyses the
gains and losses of actual and expected consumption utility, as well as positive
and negative marginal utilities. For example, a text entry interface might as-
sist a user by correcting erroneous typing when the user expects to manually
re-enter it (positive consumption utility, low expectations, positive marginal
utility); it might fail to correct the word when the user expects it to be auto-
matically corrected (neutral consumption utility, high expectations, negative
marginal utility); or it might incorrectly replace a correctly typed word (neg-
ative consumption utility, moderate expectations, negative marginal utility).
Actions. The actions required to disable snapping were slightly different
between the two experiments. In both experiments there was an initial cogni-
tive component that required subjects to identify the need to disable snapping.
Then, in Experiment 4.1, subjects had to drag to re-enter the initial word, and
then re-drag out to reach the terminating selection point. In Experiment 4.2,
subjects had to press the Control key, wait, and then complete the dragging
movement (the time taken for these actions was controlled to be similar).
Therefore, the core difference in actions between the experiments com-
prises a leftwards pointing action in Experiment 4.1 versus a key-press and
wait in Experiment 4.2 (other differences were summarised in §4.2). It is
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unlikely that this small difference in actions could cause the substantial dif-
ference in response, but the fact that there were any differences in actions
remains an experimental risk that can be mitigated through further exper-
imental work. For example, a future study might replace the key-press and
wait of Experiment 4.2 with a vertical pointing action that maintains progress
(this technique was not used here because it lacks ecological validity and no
viable text selection technique could use this method because vertical cursor
movement is reserved for multi-line selections).
Consumption Bundle Dimensions. In the reference-dependent preferences
model, utility values are summed across the dimensions of outcome consump-
tion bundles (c and r(a)). Both experiments held the dimensions of these
bundles constant (with the caveats about the actions above), except for the
dimension of the number of characters selected. Character selection progress
was chosen as the dimension for analysis because it is among the most salient
for the task, and therefore most heavily weighted (Bordalo et al., 2013) – giv-
ing the greatest experimental sensitivity. However, the model and method
are also applicable to other dimensions of interface outcomes that are not di-
rectly related to visible progress – for example, the perceived value of other
objective qualities relating to feedback latencies, and so on.
Number of Losses versus Magnitude of Loss. Both experiments varied the
magnitude of loss by altering the number of congruent tasks within the task
set, where each incongruent task involved the same magnitude of loss. How-
ever, the model predicts that interactions with different magnitudes of ob-
jective loss will generate different levels of utility, creating opportunities for
further investigation. That is, eight incongruent tasks that lose one second
each will, according to the model, have a different utility to a single task with
an eight second loss (cf. Figure 2.1). However, it is difficult to arbitrarily ma-
nipulate interactive losses – which often depend on human factors – in this
way (revisited in the following chapter).
Analysing the data of Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 in terms of the proportion
of congruent or incongruent tasks does not change the results as this factor is
correlated with the amount of time lost (and the manipulation is equitable be-
tween experiments). However, the collinearity of these variables also means
that the effect of introducing incongruent tasks cannot be isolated.
4.3.2 Summary
The two experiments presented in this chapter have demonstrated the pres-
ence of an aversion to perceived losses of interactive task progress (in excess
of the objective performance losses), and its subsequent neutralisation by al-
tering the perceptual output of that progress loss (while maintaining the ob-
jective performance loss). These results can be understood in the context
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of the model presented in Chapter 3: in Experiment 4.1, a deficit was cre-
ated between a subject’s expectations and actual interactive outcomes, result-
ing in a substantially negative gain-loss utility; in Experiment 4.2 this deficit
was narrowed, and preferences become more moderate. This is not a conclu-
sive demonstration of the model’s validity, but it does demonstrate several of
its key components that are aligned with the foundational behavioural eco-
nomics work presented in Chapter 2.
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a positivity bias for progress 5
the experiments in the previous chapter developed support for themodel This chapter describes an ex-
periment that uses a new task
to develop further support for
the model by demonstrating a
positivity bias for progress over
objective losses.
of reference-dependent preferences from Chapter 3: in particular, they found
that perceived progress losses overwhelmed subjective evaluation, even when
subjects experienced objective performance gains. The experimental tasks
were either congruent or incongruent with a potentially-assistive feature¹
1. Word snapping text selection.
to
stimulate certain gains or losses. However, a single incongruent task always
inflicted a loss upon subjects (although the perceptual progress loss was ma-
nipulated between Experiments 4.1 and 4.2), and the outcome of an incongru-
ent task was always objectively negative. That is, although the experiments
demonstrated an aversion to perceived progress losses under a constant ob-
jective loss, they did not examine a manipulation of the objective loss or the
perception of progress gains under such losses.
This chapter describes a new experimental task that allowed the marginal
utility of incongruent tasks to be manipulated (§5.1). That is, the gain or loss
of the technique could be tested independently of the task’s congruency. This
removed the task’s congruency as a prima facie indication of gain or loss, and
allowed experimental conditions to be constructed where incongruent tasks
performed objectively better than the reference condition – or objectively
worse, but with perceptual gains in progress. Table 5.1 compares the task ma-
nipulations for the two experiments in the previous chapter with the exper-
iment presented below using this new task. The task is based around simple
drag-and-drop actions, which are substantially similar to the text selection
tasks in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2: both involved simple pointing actions and
emulated existing interface behaviour.
An experiment (Experiment 5.1) examined the effects of these new ma-
nipulations on subjective preferences using a methodology similar to that of
Experiments 4.1 and 4.2. However, unlike those experiments, subjects were
exposed to incongruent tasks that contained gains in progress with a vari-
able amount of objective performance with respect to the neutral reference
condition. Subjects were hypothesised to exhibit a bias in favour of the ex-
perimental technique due to the salience of the progress gains.
5.1 experimental manipulation
The text selection task used in Chapter 4 was successful in creating condi-
tions where subjects either gained or lost time. However, the magnitude of
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TABLE 5.1 Summary of the Experiment 4.1–5.1 task manipulations for perceived
progress and objective time.
Congruent Tasks Incongruent Tasks
Experiment Progress Time Progress Time
4.1 + + − −
4.2 + + ∶ ∶ −
5.1 + + +/∶ ∶ +/∶ ∶/−
Note: The +/∶ ∶/− symbols denote intended gain (i.e. faster progress or less time), proportionate,
and loss outcomes (compared to the neutral reference condition), respectively.
these objective gains and losses could not be easily manipulated: for exam-
ple, incongruent word-by-word tasks forced subjects to revert back to letter-
by-letter selection, which set an upper-limit for task performance (i.e. it was
not possible to create incongruent word-by-word tasks with objective perfor-
mance above what could be achieved using letter-by-letter selection). Rather,
congruent and incongruent tasks were mixed in a set to create a particular
level of overall objective gain or loss. Similarly, incongruent tasks always ap-
peared to be negative (4.1) or neutral (4.2) with respect to progress as subjects
reverted to letter-by-letter behaviour. That is, incongruent tasks never offered
a progress advantage and always had a performance disadvantage.
To remove these limitations, and explore the effects of manipulated gains
and losses for either congruent or incongruent tasks, a grid snapping task was
developed wherein subjects performed drag-and-drop tasks under controlled
levels of grid snapping assistance or impediment. Aswith text selection, these
tasks used simple mouse and keyboard interactions, and leveraged an ecolog-
ically valid interaction that was already familiar to subjects. However, the
technique’s design allowed the both objective time and perceived progress
gained or lost to be experimentally controlled.
The basic experimental method had subjects complete a series of tasks
with no grid snapping assistance to establish a reference point for neutral per-
formance, followed by a series of visually identical tasks with some manipu-
lated snapping behaviour.
5.1.1 Task Design
Each task involved dragging a black square into a hollow square of exactly
the same size. The square turned blue as it was dragged and green once
its boundaries exactly matched the target. During neutral tasks the square
moved directly according to mouse control (without any snapping), and dur-
ing snapping tasks the object initially moved between locations aligned with
an invisible grid of some resolution R1 (i.e. to the screen pixel location closest
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control
FIGURE 5.1 An example of a grid snapping task with illustrative grid lines (not shown
to subjects). The object (solid, black) cannot be alignedwith the target (hollow,white) in
the initial grid resolution (top row), and so the object must be released and reacquired
with the Control key held to increase the resolution such that it can be aligned (bottom
row). The top row corresponds toÊ in Figure 5.2(b), and the bottom row corresponds
toË andÌ.
to the cursor that is a multiple of R1). In congruent conditions the target lo-
cation was aligned with this grid and the task could be completed quickly;² 2. Akin to congruent word-by-
word snapping.however, in incongruent conditions the final target location was purposely
misaligned with the grid – subjects had to release the object and reacquire it
with the Control key held. This action increased the resolution of the grid to
R2 – chosen such that the target would be aligned with the grid, allowing task
completion (illustrated in Figure 5.1).³
These actions and behaviours are both conceptually and physically sim-
ilar to those of the selection technique in Experiment 4.2. Both tasks are
fundamentally a dragging action towards a target location, with a physical
key-press to adjust the resolution of the object–target alignment: in Experi-
ment 4.2 a switch from word-by-word to letter-by-letter, and here a switch
from R1 to R2. The key differences are: (a) Experiment 4.2 used textual stimuli,
whereas this task uses geometric shapes; (b) Experiment 4.2 involved a one-
dimensional pointing task, whereas this task is two-dimensional; and (c) Ex-
periment 4.2 maintained the dragging action throughout (with a forced wait
period), whereas this task uses a release-and-reacquire action.
3 Under a Fitts’ law paradigm (Fitts, 1954; MacKenzie, 1992), congruent tasks have an ID of
log2(D/R1 + 1). Incongruent tasks can cover a distance of D∗ = nint(D/R1) ⋅ R1 using the R1 grid,
with the balance under R2: log2(D∗/R1 + 1) + log2([D − D∗]/R2 + 1); however (as with Experi-
ments 4.1 and 4.2), the release-and-reacquire action jeopardises such an analysis.
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(b) Snapping: Grid snapping alongÊ at a resolution of R1; if
the resolution is not aligned with the target, the subject re-
leases and reacquires inË, and completes dragging along
Ì at a resolution of R2.
FIGURE 5.2
Characterisation of grid
snapping task progress.
5.1.2 Modelling Preferences
Progress towards the target in each type of task is characterised in Figure 5.2.
With neutral tasks (Figure 5.2(a)), subjects rapidly reduced the distance to the
target (potentially overshooting), and then precisely aligned the object with
the target (a typical aimed movement: Meyer, Abrams, Kornblum,Wright, &
Smith, 1988;Woodworth, 1899). With snapping tasks (Figure 5.2(b)), the task
contained three elements (with respect to neutral behaviour):
¶ Target approach assistance through coarse snapping.
· An element of impediment in requiring the object to be released and
reacquired to change the grid resolution.
¸ An element of assistance when the terminating resolution is larger than
that of the reference neutral task.
By controlling the resolution of the grid during approach (R1; ¶) and final
positioning (R2; ¸), the amount of overall assistance and impediment from
the grid was controlled. The release-and-reacquire component (·) was a con-
stant impediment.
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In all cases, progress towards the goal was preserved: the dragged object
always moved towards the target, and switching from the R1 to R2 grid main-
tained its location (the object never moved away from the target unless the
user dragged it so – as with Experiment 4.2). However, the rate of progress
wasmanipulated through the R1 and R2 resolutions. For instance, if the R2 res-
olution was greater than that of a neutral task (i.e. there was some element
of snapping during ¸), then the achievable progress and performance after
the release-and-reacquire action could exceed that for a neutral task. This al-
lowed experimental conditions to be created that had objective performance
benefits using incongruent tasks – without mixing them in a series with con-
gruent tasks (as in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2).
In the context of the model presented in Chapter 3, there was always neu-
tral or positive progress during any snapping task: ∄a ∈ I ∶ mk(ck) < 0, for the
dimension k of the distance to the target (the ordinate in Figure 5.2). Utility
losses were created with the release-and-reacquire action, which was not re-
quired during neutral tasks (mk(ck) < mk(rk(a))), and could now be balanced
with gains in the R1 or R2 resolution (wherein mk(ck) > mk(rk(a))).
5.1.3 Grid Resolution Selection
To achieve the above utility relationships, R1 must be a multiple of R2 (i.e.
R1 = γR2, where γ, R2 ∈ Z+), and R2 must be a multiple of the target distance.⁴ 4. If γ = 1, or R1 is a multiple ofthe task distance, then the taskis congruent.
The grid resolution creates an effective width for the target: even if the visual
target is smaller (or larger) than the grid spacing,⁵ 5. e.g. the bottom row of
Figure 5.1
the cursor only needs to be
within an R2-sized square centred around the grid intersection for the object
to become aligned with the target. If the dragged object and target location
are not aligned along a cardinal axis, the grid resolution needs to be adjusted
tomaintain the same effectivewidth (for a given fixed target distance). For ex-
ample, along an ordinal axis, R1 and R2 are scaled by a factor of 1 /
√
2 (rounded
to an integral number of pixels).
These requirements restrict the number of possible R1 and R2 combina-
tions that create completable tasks (particularly if the target distance is held
constant). As such, the following experiment used a single task distance
(252 px) that was large enough to create a meaningful task and had many di-
visors to create viable grids.
5.2 experiment 5.1: positivity bias
An experiment was conducted to examine the effects of variable gains and
losses under a constant task type (congruent or incongruent) on subjective
choices. The experiment used the task described above to create conditions
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of gain or loss, but unlike the previous experiments, all tasks within a condi-
tion were either congruent or incongruent and the grid resolution was ma-
nipulated to create the overall gain/loss in time or progress. As with Experi-
ment 4.2, progress towards the target was never negative in the experimental
conditions and therefore subjects were not expected to display a bias against
the snapping behaviour. Furthermore, subjects could not use the congruency
of a task per se to determine whether they gained or lost time from the snap-
ping behaviour.
Themethod involved a set of 10 tasks in a neutral condition that offered no
assistance (Figure 5.2(a)), followed by a set of 10 tasks using a snapping inter-
face that was engineered to include elements of impediment while also deliv-
ering variable levels of assistance (Figure 5.2(b)). After the two sets of tasks,
subjects were asked to choose whether they would enable or disable the snap-
ping behaviour if they were to repeat the set of tasks. That is, whether or not
the trade-off between the assisting and impeding elements of the snapping
behaviour was acceptable to them.
Theprimary dependentmeasurewas each subjects’ choice ofwhether they
would use the neutral or snapping behaviour if repeating the tasks. An affir-
mative response to use the snapping behaviour indicated that it was subjec-
tively valued higher than neutral; a negative response indicated the opposite.
5.2.1 Apparatus & Participants
The experiment ran on Intel Core i7 computers running Linux Mint 13, ren-
dering to a 22′′ LCD monitor running at 1680 × 1080 px. Input was received
through a wired HP Optical mouse, configured with the default polynomial
acceleration profile of the X server. The software was written in Python and
logged all user actions and subjective responses.
Twenty-seven volunteer undergraduate computer-science students took
part in the experiment (six female). None participated in the prior experi-
ments. Participation lasted approximately 20 minutes.
5.2.2 Procedure
Subjects completed 12 practice tasks of selections in representative neutral,
congruent snapping, and incongruent snapping configurations. They then
completed 17 conditions administered in a random order, with each involv-
ing 10 neutral tasks followed by the same number of tasks with a snapping
configuration.
As the differences between experimental conditions were sometimes sub-
tle (see below) and tasks within each condition were uniformly congruent
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(a) Pure-assisting: The object can be aligned
with the target without an R2 component.
(b) Pure-impeding: When the object is se-
lected, it will snap to the closest grid loca-
tion – further away from the target.
FIGURE 5.3
Illustrations of the control
tasks in Experiment 5.1.
or incongruent, there was less risk of subjects becoming aware of the manip-
ulation and artificially constraining their responses to be consistent across
conditions. Therefore, a within-subjects design was used to increase power
and economy, and allow preferences across conditions for a single subject to
be analysed.⁶
6. In Experiments 4.1 and 4.2
subjects only needed to count
the number of congruent and
incongruent tasks to reliably
distinguish conditions.
At the end of each condition, subjects were asked:
If you were to repeat the last set of tasks, would you prefer the
snapping behaviour to be on or off?
(Forced-choice selection: ‘On’ or ‘Off’.)
This choice was coded as whether or not they preferred snapping. Subjects
did not repeat the tasks.
5.2.3 Design
All tasks involved selecting a 50 × 50 px solid black square, and dragging it
a distance of 252 px onto a hollow target (a 50 × 50 px unfilled square with a
1 px black outline). While selected, the black square turned blue, and when
positioned exactly over the target it turned green (and completed the task
when released, as illustrated in Figure 5.1).
The start locations were randomly placed anywhere on the screen within
the grid alignment constraints, but not within 100 px of the display edge. The
target location was computed to be along one of the randomly selected cardi-
nal/ordinal directions (within the same constraints as the start location).
All neutral tasks were completed with a 4 px movement resolution, with-
out the need to release and reacquire the object.⁷ 7. A Fitts’ law ID of 6 bits.This 4 px resolution eased
the difficulty of a task that would have otherwise required a high degree of
precision,⁸ 8. A Fitts’ law ID of 8 bits.and was not noticeable to subjects – the object appeared to move
smoothly and continuously.
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Four control conditions were used to confirm that snapping tasks with
only assistive components were preferred to neutral tasks, and neutral tasks
were preferred to snapping tasks with only impeding components:
• In two pure-assisting conditions (Figure 5.3(a)), the target was aligned
with the R1 resolution grid of either 18 or 84 px – which negated the
need for the release-and-reacquire and R2 components.
• In two pure-impeding conditions (Figure 5.3(b)), the object was initially
placed 12 or 61 px from the target with an R1 resolution of 126 or 510 px,
respectively. This caused the object to snap further away from the target
when first moved (i.e. negative progress). The pure-impeding R2 resolu-
tion was set to 4 px, offering no advantage over neutral tasks.
Tasks in the remaining 13 conditions included elements of both assistance
and impediment. These conditions are described with tuples of the form (R1,
R2), and were chosen to sample a range of gains and losses. Larger values for
R1 provide greater assistance during target approach, and larger values for R2
provide greater assistance during final positioning. All of these conditions
require the user to release-and-reacquire the object, and tasks could always
be completed using the R2 resolution at any time. The conditions (in pixels,
ordered by R2) were:
(192, 4), (224, 4), (90, 6), (35, 7), (91, 7),
(231, 7), (189, 9), (98, 14), (189, 21), (224, 28),
(210, 42), (216, 36), and (189, 63).
5.2.4 Results
Control Conditions. Across all conditions (control and experimental), the
mean time to complete a neutral task was 1.57 s (95% CI [1.54, 1.60]).⁹9. Given the 10 tasks in each set,
total time is ∼10 times higher. As in-tended, pure-assisting snapping tasks were significantly faster than neutral
tasks: pooledmean 0.82 s, 95%CI [0.75,0.94], paired t(53) = 16.37, p < .001, d =
2.23. Similarly, pure-impeding snapping tasks were significantly slower than
neutral tasks: pooled mean 2.55 s, 95% CI [2.53,2.57], paired t(53) = −20.78,
p < .001, d = 2.81. Subjects’ choices confirmed the expected subjective prefer-
ences for the control conditions: 95% chose the pure-assisting snapping over
neutral, whereas only ∼5% chose the pure-impeding snapping. The time and
choice data for these control conditions are shown at the extreme left and
right of the plots in Figure 5.4.
Experimental Conditions. Themean time to complete the remaining (non-
control) snapping tasks varied between 1.34 and 2.33 s – between 0.74 s slower
and 0.29 s faster than for neutral tasks. Figure 5.4(a) summarises the task
time results by condition, and highlights the division of time around the R1/R2
switch: before (¶ in Figure 5.2(b)), during (·), and after (¸). In general, the
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(a) The mean division of task time in each condition. The dashed line shows
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(b) The proportion of subjects who preferred snapping by each condition’s mean
time lost/gained per task (±95% confidence interval). The /♢/#marks indi-
cate the pure-assisting/experimental/pure-impeding conditions, respectively.
FIGURE 5.4
Summary of the time and
choice results for Experi-
ment 5.1.
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FIGURE 5.5 A binomial logistic regression model (dashed ±95% confidence interval
band) for subject choice by the actual amount of time lost or gained in Experiment 5.1.
The intersection with the vertical axis – when no timewas lost or gained – is highlighted
(dashed, maroon).
Mean (s) 95% CI
Before Switch (Ê) 0.63 [0.57, 0.71]
During Switch (Ë) 0.32 [0.25, 0.39]
After Switch (Ì) 0.80 [0.57, 1.04]
Note: CI = Confidence Interval.
TABLE 5.2
The division of time around
the R1/R2 switch. Plotted
per condition in Figure 5.4.
time spent before and during the switch were relatively constant, with the
overall gain or loss largely determined by the final R2 component (Table 5.2).
Choice Response. The proportion of subjects choosing the snapping be-
haviour in each condition is shown in Figure 5.4(b). As expected, this propor-
tion correlateswith themean time lost or gained from the snapping behaviour
(R2 = .89).
When snapping offered no performance benefit, the majority of subjects
(∼75%) chose to turn snapping on (top-left quadrant of Figure 5.4(b)). Even
when the snapping behaviour cost subjects half a second per task (around
five seconds in total), ∼48% chose to turn it on. Only the pure-impeding con-
ditions showed a strongmajority of subjects rejecting the snapping behaviour.
Subject choices were analysed using a binomial logistic model (shown in
Figure 5.5). The model was fit to the data for all conditions completed by
all subjects and describes the overall probability of a subject choosing the
snapping behaviour when given a particular mean task gain or loss (χ2(1) =
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137.93, p < .001; Odds Ratio = 7.20, 95% CI [4.85, 11.11]). Of particular interest
is the intercept: the probability of a subject preferring the snapping behaviour
when therewas no time gained or lost by using it. Objectively, subjects should
be indifferent to such an outcome (a probability of 50%), but the intercept
here at 74% (95% CI [69%,79%]) confirms a significant bias in favour of the
snapping behaviour when it offered no performance benefit (binomial p = .02).
The within-subjects design allows analysis of the choices made by each
subject using a logistic model across only their samples (the model shown
in Figure 5.5 is the average of these individual models). This analysis pro-
vides insight into the variability of individual decision-making choices, rather
than only the global average behaviour. In particular, the consistency of sub-
jects can be classified from the separation of the models: is there some task
gain/loss time below which snapping is uniformly rejected, and above which
snapping is uniformly accepted? A lack of separation indicates that there was
a range of objective time gains or losses that subjectswere either insensitive or
indifferent to. Across all 27 subjects, only 4 (15%) had models with complete
separation – indicating that the conditions they rejected could be reliably dis-
tinguished from those they accepted based on the objective time alone. For
the others, there was some overlap between the greatest gain where they re-
jected snapping and the greatest loss where they accepted snapping (mean
0.85 s, 95% CI [0.58, 1.12]).
5.2.5 Discussion
The results of this experiment indicate a positivity bias in favour of the snap-
ping behaviour – even when it offered objective performance losses. This can
be viewed in contrast to the negativity bias in Experiment 4.1 and the balanced
responses in Experiment 4.2 (although the experimental designs do not per-
mit a statistical comparison), and can be understood within the context of
the model presented in Chapter 3.
The release-and-reacquire action added mental and motor costs to the
task, and added a constant time overhead. However, any possible negativ-
ity towards these actions did not overwhelm subjective responses: subjects
chose to turn snapping on despite its additional actions and slower perfor-
mance. Evenwhen performancewith the snapping behaviourwas 45% slower
than without it, 44% of subjects preferred it – suggesting that the additional
task time and actions had a relatively weak effect on experience. This is not
simply a preference for any sort of snapping behaviour as the pure-impeding
conditions were almost uniformly rejected (indicating that subjects could re-
liably identify when snapping was obviously not beneficial).
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A key feature of the experimental snapping conditions was that progress
towards the goal was consistently positive: The snapping prior to the grid res-
olution switch (duringR1;¶ in Figure 5.2(b)) always provided greater progress
towards the goal than that for neutral tasks, and even after the switch (dur-
ing R2,¸) the progress was also often greater than that for neutral tasks (and
never any worse). That is, the snapping behaviour was assistive (both percep-
tually and actually) in terms of bringing the object closer to the target – even
if this was not the case for the objective time consumed in doing so. In terms
of the model, the snapping behaviour featured consistently positive consump-
tion utility: mk(ck) ≥ 0 for the dimension k of distance to the target. And even
though the release-and-reacquire action had a negative marginal utility as
progress was not being made (mk(ck) < mk(r(a))), this was ameliorated by the
positive marginal utility before and possibly after it. The pattern of responses
from subjects indicates that this dimension has substantiallymoreweight that
any alternative dimension (such as objective task time – which generally had
negative marginal utility during and after the release-and-reacquire action),
and therefore supported a higher overall utility for the snapping behaviour.
This is not to say that time is of no concern to users – only that the con-
sumption utility weighting of progress is greater than that for time. The ef-
fects of duration neglect, violations of temporal dominance, and other studies
of time perception (§§2.5.3–2.5.4) also support a model of preferences that un-
derweights the importance of time on subjective experience. However, these
two components (time and progress) are not perfectly separable: progress
correlates with, and is bounded by, the objective time taken to complete the
task. That is, tasks that take more time to complete when using the snapping
behaviour necessarily have some element of negative marginal progress.
Both R1 and R2 were positively correlated with the proportion of choices
to turn snapping on (Pearson’s r = 0.43 and r = 0.82, respectively), suggesting
that both forms of assistance were positively valued. The fact that subjects
chose to enable the snapping behaviour even when it was slower overall sug-
gests that subjects positively valued these elements of assistance more than
they negatively valued the release-and-reacquire impediment.
The lack of separation in subjects’ responses – that they could not perfectly
discriminate the amount of time they gained or lost – is not particularly sur-
prising as a certain amount of variance and error is expected in any human re-
sponse. However, the time overlap between conditions that subjects rejected
and those that they accepted provides insight into the range of objective gains
and losses that users either cannot reliably distinguish between, or are indif-
ferent to. The results of this experiment indicate this is approximately one
second per task, but as this was not the primary hypothesis, further work is
required to draw a robust conclusion.
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5.3 summary
This chapter developed a new experimental task that can be used to further
test the model and explore the psychological biases described in this thesis.
An experiment using the task found a positivity bias for its drag-and-drop
snapping behaviour (Experiment 5.1). These results can be compared with
those of Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, and complement them when understood
in the context of the model presented in Chapter 3: the positive perceived
progress towards the task goal that the snapping behaviour provided weighed
heavily on subjective preferences – in excess of the negative objective perfor-
mance losses it inflicted.
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peak-end effects & experienced utility 6
the task developed in the previous chapter is general enough to create ex- This chapter uses the task devel-
oped in the previous chapter to
examine two experienced utility
biases that are beyond the scope
of the model: the peak-end rule
and duration neglect.
periences with positive, negative, and proportionate objective and subjective
experiences (Table 5.1). This flexibility allows for some of the other psycho-
logical biases (reviewed in Chapter 2) that are not covered by the model (men-
tioned in §3.2) to be examined by constructing interactive experiences that
have specific experiential properties. In particular, it can be used to test the ef-
fects of experienced utility (reviewed in §2.5), wherein the order of moments
in an experience affects the subjective experience (remembered utility). Ex-
periments on experienced utility effects have demonstrated that the remem-
bered utility of an event can diverge from the arithmetic sum of its compo-
nents (total utility).
The model of reference-dependent preferences does not capture these ef-
fects on experienced utility – consumption utility mk is independent of the
actions or outcomes that preceded it, or will succeed it. That is, the model
describes the total utility of an experience,¹ 1. The time integral of moment-
to-moment instant utilities.
and not its remembered utility.
As noted in Section 3.2, this is knowingly naïve of the effects studied in the
experienced utility literature.
This chapter presents an experiment that examined two well-established
experienced utility effects: the peak-end rule and duration neglect. Experi-
ment 6.1 used the drag-and-drop task detailed in Section 5.1 with the forced-
choice methodology detailed in Section 3.3 to create series of tasks that would
have the hypothesised peak-end and duration neglect effects.
6.1 experiment 6.1: peak-end and duration neglect
The peak-end rule suggests that people evaluate an experience primarily from
its most intense moment and its terminating moment. That is, people prefer
experiences that terminate with a positive moment, or spread painful mo-
ments over a long period of time (to avoid creating a peak). The latter also
relates to the effects of duration neglect – wherein people do not discrim-
inate between experiences based on their duration. Duration neglect (and
other time perception effects) are alluded to in the experiments presented so
far: the gain or loss of objective time has not been a reliable predictor of pref-
erence (although they are correlated). However, these experiments did not
seek to study these effects in their designs.
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The drag-and-drop task with grid snapping can be used to analyse these
effects by constructing series of tasks that mix various snapping configura-
tions (grid resolutions) to create controlled peaks, ends, and series durations.
For example, adding a few congruent snapping tasks to the end of a series
of incongruent snapping tasks can create a positive end to the experience of
completing a substantially negative series. Such a series can be compared to
one with the congruent tasks at the start of the series (or spread throughout).
Both series will have identical objective completion times, but the peak-end
rule predicts an asymmetric response to a choice between them. In particu-
lar, that more subjects will prefer the series with a positive end – indicating
that the order of the tasks has an effect on subjective experience.
The method of this experiment followed that of the other experiments in
this thesis, and the peak-end experiment for interactive tasks of Cockburn,
Quinn, and Gutwin (2015): subjects completed two series of drag-and-drop
tasks, and then selected which of the two they would prefer to repeat a third
time. However, unlike the other experiments in this thesis, there was no ref-
erence condition because a utility/preference scale was not being constructed
(i.e. the change in subjective preferences relative to a baseline as the propor-
tion of incongruent tasks increased was not under examination).
6.1.1 Materials
Task series were constructed from mixtures of three snapping behaviours:
• Control. The object moved directly according to mouse control (as with
the neutral baseline in Experiment 5.1). Targets were at a distance of
252 px, with an inconspicuous movement resolution of 4 px.
• Positive. The target was aligned with an 84 × 84 px R1 grid, which pro-
vided snapping assistance (as with the pure-assisting control conditions
in Experiment 5.1).
• Negative. The object snapped to a 224 × 224 px R1 grid and the target was
misaligned by 24 px – with an R2 resolution of 4 px (as with the (224, 4)
experimental condition in Experiment 5.1).
The control behaviour serves as a neutral experience, with the intention that
subjects preferred positive snapping behaviour over the control, and preferred
the control over the negative snapping behaviour.
Six conditions were constructed that involved subjects choosing between
a pair of task series (illustrated in Table 6.1):
• Control Conditions:
1. Positive versus Control. Ten control tasks were compared against
10 positive tasks.
2. Control versus Negative. Ten control tasks were compared against
10 negative tasks.
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• Peak-End Conditions:
3. Positive End versus Positive Start. A random mix of 10 control and
10 negative tasks, followed by 4 positive tasks (a positive end expe-
rience), were compared with the inverse. Subjects were hypothe-
sised to prefer the positive end over the positive start.
4. Negative Start versus Negative End. A random mix of 10 control
and 10 positive tasks, followed by 4 negative tasks (a negative end
experience), were compared with the inverse. Subjects were hy-
pothesised to prefer the negative start over the negative end.
• Duration Neglect Conditions:
5. Positive End versus Short. A random mix of 10 control and 10 neg-
ative tasks, were compared with same followed by 4 positive tasks
(a longer series with a positive end). Subjects were hypothesised
to prefer the longer series extended by positive tasks over the un-
extended series.
6. Long versus Negative End. A random mix of 15 control and 15 posi-
tive tasks, were compared with a similar mix of 10 control and 10
positive tasks, followed by 4 negative tasks (a shorter series with
a negative end). Subjects were hypothesised to prefer the longer
series over the shorter series that had a negative end.
6.1.2 Apparatus & Participants
The experiment ran on Intel Core i7 computers running Linux Mint 17, ren-
dering to a 22′′ LCD monitor running at a resolution of 1680 × 1080 px, with
input received through a wired Logitech optical mouse. The X server was
configured to use a polynomial pointer acceleration profile, with a constant
deceleration factor of 4. The software was written in Python and logged all
user actions and subjective responses.
Forty-six volunteer undergraduate computer-science students took part
in the experiment (nine female). None participated in the other experiments.
Each received a $5 café voucher for their participation, which lasted approxi-
mately 10 minutes.
6.1.3 Procedure & Design
Subjects were instructed that they would make several choices between two
series of drag-and-drop tasks, choosing which they would prefer to repeat if
asked to do so. They first completed a series of 18 practice tasks to familiarise
themselves with the control, positive, and negative task behaviours.
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TABLE 6.1 Summary of the condition construction and choice results of Experiment 6.1.
Condition Experience Choice (%)
A B A B p
1 Positive Control 87 13 <.001
(10P) (10C)
2 Control Negative 72 28 .004
(10C) (10N)
3 +End +Start 63 37 .10
(10[CN]+4P) (4P+10[CN])
4 -Start -End 63 37 .10
(4N+10[PC]) (10[PC]+4N)
5 +End Short 61 39 .18
(10[CN]+4P) (10[CN])
6 Long -End 78 22 <.001
(15[PC]) (10[PC]+4N)
Note: TheAconditionswerehypothesised tobepreferred, and theBconditionswerehypothesised
to be not preferred. The taskmakeup (in parentheses) describes their construction – for example,
‘10[CN]+4P’ indicates 10 control and 10 negative tasks (in a random order), followed by 4 positive
tasks. The Experience plot shows the hypothesised subjective experience across time for the A
(solid) and B (dashed) conditions. Statistically significant preferences (binomial sign test) are in
boldface.
TABLE 6.2 Summary of the time results and series differences for each condition in
Experiment 6.1.
Condition Mean Time and 95% CI (s) Difference
A B A B B−A 95% CI t(45) p
1 Postive Control 7.62 [7.06, 8.18] 17.15 [16.27, 18.02] 9.53 [8.61, 10.45] 20.78 <.001
2 Control Negative 17.08 [16.40, 17.75] 27.48 [24.77, 30.19] 10.41 [7.72, 13.09] 7.80 <.001
3 +End +Start 44.28 [41.80, 46.76] 44.51 [42.72, 46.31] 0.23 [-1.47, 1.94] 0.28 .78
4 -Start -End 35.28 [33.76, 36.79] 34.62 [33.24, 35.99] -0.66 [-2.02, 0.70] -0.98 .33
5 +End Short 46.26 [44.10, 48.43] 40.34 [38.76, 41.92] -5.93 [-7.67, -4.18] -6.93 <.001
6 Long -End 36.26 [34.93, 37.59] 34.46 [32.95, 35.98] -1.80 [-2.97, -0.62] -3.08 =.003
Note: Refer to Table 6.1 for the construction of each condition. Unlike previous experiments, times
are reported for the entire series (rather than per task). CI = Confidence Interval. Significant differ-
ences (paired t-tests) are in boldface.
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They then completed the six experimental conditions: the two control
conditions first, followed by the remaining four in a random order. Within
each condition, the order of exposure to the two series was counterbalanced.
After completing the second series in each condition, subjects were asked:
If you were to repeat one of the last two sets of trials, which would
you prefer to do?
(Forced-choice selection: ‘First’ or ‘Second’.)
The primary dependent measure was subjects’ response to this question. Sub-
jects did not repeat the tasks.
Tasks were generated as they were for Experiment 5.1 (§5.2.3).
6.1.4 Results
The results are analysed separately for each of the conditions, and are sum-
marised in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
Control Conditions. Nearly all participants preferred (40 of 46, 87%) the
positive snapping behaviour in favour of the control (Condition 1; binomial
p < .001) and rejected (33 of 46, 72%) the negative snapping behaviour in favour
of the control (Condition 2; binomial p = .004). The snapping behaviours also
had the intended gain or loss in time, with positive snapping performing sig-
nificantly faster than the control (d = 3.85), and negative snapping performing
significantly slower than the control (d = 1.56) – both detailed in Table 6.2.
These results confirm that the manipulated snapping behaviours in isola-
tion had the desired subjective preference responses.
Peak-End Conditions. Neither peak-end condition (Conditions 3 and 4)
had significantly different time performance between the series (as intended
– the tasks in each condition were identical, but simply ordered differently).
Although a majority of subjects favoured the positive end (Condition 3) and
negative start (Condition 4) series (29 of 46, 63% for both), the proportions
were not statistically significant (binomial p = .10, revisited in §6.1.5).
These results do not confirm the presence of a peak-end effect.
Duration Neglect Conditions. Both duration neglect conditions (5 and 6)
had a significantly different time performance between the series in the in-
tended direction: the short (d = 0.93; Condition 5) and long (d = 0.38; Condi-
tion 6) series performed as described against their counterpart series (detailed
in Table 6.2). Condition 6 found a significant proportion preferring the longer
series over the series with a negative end (36 of 46, 78%, binomial p < .001),
but although a majority preferred the positive end over the shorter series in
Condition 5 (28 of 46, 61%), this was not significant (binomial p = .18).
These results provide some support for a duration neglect effect in the
presence of a negative end effect.
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(a) Choice results for the hypothesised preferred (A) and not preferred (B) series in
each condition (see Table 6.1).
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(b) Order effects in the preference choices. The proportion of choices for the hy-
pothesised preferred (A) and not preferred (B) series in each condition are di-
vided by the series completed first (see Table 6.1).
FIGURE 6.1
The choice results
for Experiment 6.1.
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Order Effects. Figure 6.1(a) shows the choice data, with 6.1(b) showing the
same data divided by the series completed first by subjects – for example, the
left-most pair of bars shows that all subjects chose the hypothesised preferred
condition (A – positive) when they completed the control series first, but only
75% chose it when they completed the positive snapping series first. This
was significant for Conditions 1 (two-sample test for equality of proportions
χ2(1) = 4.3, p = .04) and 5 (χ2(1) = 5.8, p = .02).
6.1.5 Discussion
These results provide support for the peak-end and duration neglect psycho-
logical biases in human–computer interaction tasks, but the results do not
reach the level of statistical significance. This follows prior human–computer
interaction work that has either sought (Cockburn et al., 2015) or appealed
(Harrison et al., 2007; Harrison, Yeo, & Hudson, 2010) to the peak-end rule,
but using the choice-based methodology described in Chapter 3. However,
there are some significant limitations to these results, which can be resolved
through further experimentation.
Peak-End. Although neither of the peak-end conditions found a signifi-
cant effect (p = .10, α = .05 for both conditions), a one-tailed test in the hypoth-
esised direction (Fisher, 1954, 1971; Kimmel, 1957) of the peak-end effectwould
find statistical significance (p = .05 for both conditions). Such an analysis was
similarly performed for the seminal peak-end experiment of Kahneman et al.
(1993) to reach the same threshold. However, as the use of one-tailed tests in
psychological experiments is controversial (Burke, 1953; Eysenck, 1960; Hick,
1952; Marks, 1951), such an appeal will not be made here. Rather, these results
support the presence of peak-end effects in an interactive context – but fur-
ther work is required to verify this claim, establish the size of the effect, and
the conditions under which it appears.
Unlike prior psychological work which has used strong hedonic stimuli
such as physical pain (e.g. Ariely, 1998; Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993; Kah-
neman et al., 1993), this experiment used comparatively weak stimuli for in-
ducing the subjective peaks and end effects. In particular, the negative ex-
perience was not particularly aversive (as physical pain is), which is likely
to contribute to a weakening of the effect. Therefore, more punishing inter-
actions (such as task failure) may more readily expose it. For example, the
pure-impeding control conditions in Experiment 5.1 offered tasks where the
snapping was effectively useless (although there were concerns that it would
overwhelm experience if used in this experiment).
Duration Neglect. Only one of the duration neglect conditions showed an
effect, with significantly more subjects preferring a longer series of tasks to
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one that finished with a negative end (Condition 6). However, the lack of a
corresponding effect for Condition 5 and the lack of any negative snapping
tasks in the longer series raises an alternate explanation: subjects responded
to the presence of negative tasks, rather than the extension of the series.
The lack of an effect for Condition 5 may also be due to the substantial
time difference between the two series. Subjects were ∼6 s faster with the
shorter series in Condition 5, whereas they were only ∼2 s slower with the
longer series in Condition 6. Therefore, the large difference in Condition 5
may have made time more salient to subjects; and conversely, the small dif-
ference in Condition 6 may not have been detectable. The duration neglect
hypothesis describes an underweighting of the duration of an event in favour
of the magnitude of its constituent experiences – this is distinct from igno-
rance or a lack of sensitivity to the duration. For example, in the cold-pressor
experiment (Kahneman et al., 1993) subjects could reliably detect the differ-
ence in condition durations – but it was not subjectively felt as much as the
water temperature. To be confident about the presence of a duration neglect
effect it is important that subjects are aware of a time difference but choose
to ignore it. As such, these results for duration neglect are inconclusive.
Other Experimental Issues. There is an interesting contrast between the
results of Experiments 5.1 and 6.1. The negative snapping behaviour used in
this experiment was also one of the conditions in Experiment 5.1 (224, 4).
However, while 44% of subjects accepted snapping in that condition of Ex-
periment 5.1, only 28% did so in Condition 2 of this experiment. Although
an unplanned comparison does not find these proportions to be significantly
different (χ2(1) = 1.33, p = .25), there are some factors of the experimental
design that may contribute to a difference in subjective responses. In particu-
lar, Experiment 5.1 featured conditions with behaviour that was much worse
than that in this experiment – which may have established a preference scale
for subjects.²2. Although conditions were
counterbalanced, subjects were
exposed to the different vari-
eties of snapping behaviour
during the practice session.
That is, subjects’ choices may not only have been influenced by
the reference condition without snapping, but also the conditions they could
potentially experience. This influence is undesirable, but difficult to eliminate
entirely: even with a between-subjects experimental design, subjects would
still need to be exposed to the behaviour at some point to ensure a lack of
familiarisation doesn’t impair performance.
This contamination of the reference expectation is indicative of a decision-
by-sampling approach to decision making (Stewart et al., 2003; Vlaev et al.,
2011, §2.4), wherein the set of options presented to a subject influences their
choice. Even though subjects were not given a set of options to select between
and were not choosing between conditions they had not experienced in these
experiments, the knowledge of what the range of conditions was³3. In particular, the most positive
and most negative.
may have
induced a similar effect (e.g. Quiggin, 1982).
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6.2. Summary
6.2 summary
This chapter described an experiment that used the choice-based methodol-
ogy and drag-and-drop tasks from earlier chapters to test the effects of ex-
perienced utility (reviewed in §2.5)⁴ 4. As opposed to the total utility
studied previously.
– in particular, the peak-end rule and
duration neglect (Experiment 6.1). The hypotheses of Experiment 6.1 were
not captured by the model, but can be tested using the same experimental
methodology and analysis practices. The experimental results were mixed,
but provided some support for the presence of the peak-end rule for interac-
tion tasks.
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the experimental results of this thesis found that subjects responded This chapter reviews the exper-
imental results in the context
of the judgement and decision-
making literature, and discusses
its applications, limitations, and
directions for future work.
negatively to an interface with objective benefits (Experiment 4.1), positively
to an interface with objective costs (Experiment 5.1), and proportionately
with the objective costs and benefits of an interface (Experiment 4.2). These
seemingly discordant results can be understood coherently with a model of
reference-dependent preferences (Chapter 3): the objective costs and bene-
fits did not weigh on subjects’ preferences as much as the perceived progress
towards the task goal. The model describes the utility of an interaction as
a psychologically-biased weighting of the difference between the outcomes
that a user is expecting and those they actually receive. These outcomes are
multi-dimensional bundles, with one dimension for each aspect that was ei-
ther expected or received (such as the response time, system state changes,
and feedback). Not all dimensions are weighted equally, with the experimen-
tal results demonstrating a significant emphasis on the perceived progress to-
wards a task goal, and an underweighting for the objective time performance.
Crucially, the received outcomes are compared with the user’s reference ex-
pectations of the outcome. Failing to meet expectations is more detrimental
to overall utility than exceeding expectations is beneficial.
The methodology used to test this model exposed subjects to two condi-
tions: a baseline interface to establish reference expectations, and a manipu-
lated experimental interface. After completing a set of tasks with each, sub-
jects were asked which they wanted to use when repeating the tasks. These
choices imply a utility relationship between the two conditions and construct
a preference scale that tested the predictions of the model. The methodology
can also be used to test psychological preference biases in general – demon-
strated for the peak-end rule and duration neglect (Experiment 6.1).
The model has broad implications. These experiments were designed to
parallel work on asymmetric experience in the behavioural economics liter-
ature (Chapter 2): negativity bias, prospect theory’s value function, and the
reference-dependence of subjective evaluation. This expands the applicabil-
ity of behavioural economics methods and models to a new choice domain,
and introduces them to the practice of human–computer interaction research.
Given the breadth of the literature, the work here is not comprehensive and
offers many opportunities for future work to refine the model or investigate
other behavioural biases.
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Chapter 7. General Discussion
This chapter reviews the applications for the findings presented here (§7.1),
limitations of the presented experiments (§7.2), and opportunities for further
development: including the effects of risk and uncertainty (§7.3), the pres-
ence of other psychological effects (§7.5), and helping improve user produc-
tivity through prescriptive models (§7.4). A brief discussion of the potential
applicability of other economic fields to interaction is also given (§7.6).
7.1 applications
Interface designers often develop systems that seek to assist task completion
by adapting to the user’s input. Examples are abundant: suggestions inmobile
text entry, url type-ahead in web browsers, search query rewriting, auto-
correction, recency lists, history, automatic formatting, spam filters, and so
on. These potentially assistive features will periodically fail, requiring addi-
tional user actions beyond those that would have been necessary if the feature
was absent or worked correctly. This raises questions about how to design
interfaces that avoid provoking strong negative responses, and how to experi-
mentally measure asymmetries between objective and subjective experience.
The experiments in this thesis used word selection and drag-and-drop
tasks that are supported in real-world user interfaces. The interfaces eval-
uated therefore represent real design issues that may have been considered
prior to their release. For example, word snapping behaviour is implemented
in current versions of Microsoft Word, and grid snapping is a common fea-
ture of graphics applications. The presence of these features indicates that
the application’s designers felt that the potential for assistance was at least
balanced with the potential for impediment (although their actual approach
to the design of these features is not known).
7.1.1 Implications for Design
In general, the results presented in this thesis suggest that designers should
exercise conservative design in the provision of assistive features if they aim
to maximise user experience (rather than objective performance). They also
suggest that assistive features, where possible, should avoid returning the user
to a previously attained state or moving them further away from their task
goal. For example, there are risks associated with an assistive text-entry sys-
tem that automatically replaces a user’s typed characters because doing so
may trigger a loss aversion that creates a negative subjective experience (de-
spite overall improved performance). Passively offering text corrections, in
contrast, does not saliently remove progress, and may be preferred despite
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the additional cognitive requirements to attend and act upon them (demon-
strated by Quinn & Zhai, 2016, Appendix B).
A design focus on the potential benefits of an assistive technique is risky
if users will periodically encounter minor impediments that are likely to have
a stronger influence on their subjective experience. The negativity bias asso-
ciated with losses may overcome the positive sensations derived from many
occurrences of correct assistance. This is not to suggest that assistive tech-
niques should be avoided, but that the design of their failure cases should
receive proportionate attention. This is further emphasised by confirmation
bias (Wason, 1968): the psychological tendency to seek information that con-
firms one’s hypotheses rather than rejects them. This suggests that designers
tend to overemphasise the potential for their systems to assist, and underem-
phasise their potential impediments – leading to naïve and vacuous experi-
mentation (Hornbæk, 2015). Negativity bias suggests that designers should
closely scrutinise the impact of potential failures to assist the user, as they
may be more formative of their overall assessment.
However, designers should not be cynical about assistive features, but take
a considered approach to their design. This echoes approaches to interaction
design which emphasise the same aspects of goals and progress that are sug-
gested here. For instance, activity-centred design (Norman, 2005, 2006) and
goal-directed design (Cooper, Reimann, & Cronin, 2007) advocate approach-
ing interaction design in terms of the goals that a user wants to accomplish
(in contrast to a focus on the discrete features or tasks of an application that
users assemble to complete a goal). For example, a text-entry suggestion sys-
tem may be designed with an awareness of the text-entry context (e.g. a text
message to a friend vs. an email to a work colleague) to improve the con-
tent of its suggestions for achieving common types of messaging goals. The
model of reference-dependent preferences embodies a similar sentiment: util-
ity is maximised when assistive features help users complete their goals with
monotonically increasing progress.
7.1.2 Implications for Research
Themodel and methodology provide tools for researchers to understand user
preferences and conduct controlled experiments that examine how specific
components of a system’s behaviour influence those preferences. The model
decomposes the components of an interactive task, and formalises the rela-
tionship between interactive actions and their utility. The model leverages
existing research tools in human–computer interaction – such as goms and
klm – to find these components and their objective value, and applies utility
principles from economics to understand their psychological value.
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The methodology can be used to test the model, but also offers a generic
framework for testing user preference manipulations. Generic experimental
frameworks support research through a consistent experimental design and
common dependent variables that are amenable to the comparison of results
between experiments, and meta-analyses of research agendas (which are rare
in the human–computer interaction literature [Hornbæk, 2015]). This is in-
tended to advance the current practice of arbitrary experimental design for
subjective measures of user experience – which have produced turbid results
(e.g. Hassenzahl & Monk, 2010, and reviewed in §2.7.2). The choice-based de-
pendent measure lessens the problems of validity and calibration associated
with preference scales (reviewed in §3.3.2), and can be used to construct such
a scale from a series of preference orderings (although this requires more ex-
perimental control and data collection).
The creation of a reference point for comparing interface preferences is not
common in human–computer interaction experimental practice: typically,
the subjective features of experimental interfaces are studied in isolation¹1. e.g. preference or workload
scales, such as the nasa-tlx
(Hart & Staveland, 1988).
or
ranked across experimental conditions.²
2. In contrast, objective mea-
sures are usually compared
against a reference interface.
This makes it difficult to draw gener-
alisable conclusions from the data or conductmeta-analyses of experiments as
the ground truth for the scale is unknown.³
3. e.g. rating scales may not
have the same meaning be-
tween subjects or experiments.
In contrast, concerns about the
baseline for such comparisons are common in economic and psychological
experiments – and are a central feature of the model of reference-dependent
preferences. The work presented in this thesis promotes analogous experi-
mental controls in human–computer interaction research.
7.2 limitations
As mentioned throughout this thesis, the behavioural economics literature
has significant breadth and depth. This thesis has served primarily to intro-
duce the literature to human–computer interaction and provide a foundation
for future exploration into it. As such, many features of the model and biases
in the literature have not been established or tested. The following sections
describe general areas for future work, with this section describing some par-
ticular limitations of the experimental work.
Additional Actions. The experimental conditions all involved some addi-
tional action to trigger the outcome trade-off (the switch between snapping
modes): a mouse movement in Experiment 4.1 and a key-press in the other
experiments. The design of Experiment 4.2 was intended to alleviate con-
cerns that subjects were responding to the additional action, rather than the
progress offered by the experimental behaviour. However, an ideal experi-
mental conditionwould expose subjects to the trade-offwithout their actions
114
7.2. Limitations
differing from the reference condition – that is, subjects would perform the
same actions in both conditions, but receive different outcomes. This is dif-
ficult to engineer for the low-level pointing tasks used in these experiments
as subjects expect a direct-manipulation style of interaction for their mouse
movements. Higher-level tasks or more novel interaction techniques may be
able to create such conditions without confusing subjects.
Consumption Utility Shape. Each condition used an experimental inter-
face that offered subjects a controlled consumption utility mk (Equation 3.4).
However, the shape of this utility curve was not examined.⁴ 4. The independent variable was
marginal utility; §4.3.1.
The economic
literature assumes that consumption utility follows ‘the outcome-based util-
ity classically studied in economics’ (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006, p. 1134), which
is well-understood for economic outcomes (§2.2.2) but has not been verified
for interactive outcomes. However, doing so is difficult because existing test
methodologies (§2.2.3 and §4.3.1) require conditions that have precisely ma-
nipulable outcomes (cf. §3.3).
Furthermore, interactive outcomes are often bounded and are likely to in-
troduce ceiling effects into the analysis. For example, although a monetary
gamble can always win or lose greater sums of money, the grid snapping be-
haviour has a limit to its assistance (when R1 equals the target distance) and
its impediment (when the user must drag the object across the entire length
of the screen).
Reference Point Manipulation. The experiments used a neutral interface
without any assistance or impediment for the reference point – either con-
ventional text selection (Experiments 4.1 and 4.2) or conventional drag-and-
drop behaviour (Experiment 5.1). This reference point was never manipulated
as an experimental factor.⁵ 5. The peak-end experiment
(6.1) compared interfaces with-
out a reference point, but used
comparisons between different
series constructions.
That is, the experiments did not verify that if
the reference point was adjusted, then preferences for the experimental in-
terfaces would adjust accordingly. The model predicts that if the utility of
the reference point increases, then the utility of an experimental interface
with positive marginal utility must increase by a larger amount in order to
maintain the same overall utility and preference for the experimental inter-
face. That is, if m(r∗) = m(r) + ω, ω > 0; then for u(c∣r) = u(c∗∣r∗) it must be
that m(c∗) = m(c) + ψ and ψ > ω.
This requires a reference interface with outcomes that are manipulable
without changing the actions of the interaction – which may not be always
possible for interactive tasks (e.g. in the text selection experiments, it is hard
to imagine a reference condition that is somehow better than letter-by-letter
but does not introduce any new actions and works equally well for all tasks).
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However, the task in Experiment 5.1 (object drag-and-drop) may support test-
ing such reference point manipulation by giving the neutral reference inter-
face some degree of congruent snapping or pointing enhancement.
Expectation Development. The choices that subjects made were intended
to be independent of the other experimental conditions. That is, subjects
were expected to choose between the neutral reference interface and the ex-
perimental interface without consideration of the other conditions used in
the experiment or speculation about performance beyond the experimental
tasks. To help ensure that subjects were aware of this and had both experi-
ences clear in their mind, the instructions to subjects emphasised the purpose
of the choice and the two interfaces were always completed in pairs. How-
ever, as discussed in Section 6.1.5, it is difficult to confirm that subjects were
not influenced by the other conditions or other expectancies. For example,
in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 all subjects practised on incongruent tasks, even
if they never completed any during the experimental tasks. Their choices to
use letter-by-letter or word-by-word snapping may therefore have been influ-
enced by their speculation about the general utility of word-by-word snap-
ping if they were to have encountered incongruent tasks.
Confirming that exposure to the reference condition creates a reference
point may be achievable through reference point manipulation (described
above), or by using more abstract tasks. For example, if the experimental in-
terface and the tasks are unlike any interaction subjects regularly encounter,
they may be less likely to speculate about its performance – but at the cost of
ecological validity.
Procedure Invariance. The forced-choice question in all of the experiments
asked subjects whether they wanted the snapping behaviour ‘on’ or ‘off’. This
question was designed to be neutral: it did not presuppose any default opin-
ion or state of affairs. This avoided potential procedure invariance violations
(wherein choices to reject are not inverses of choices to accept; §2.6.4), but
may not represent the environment that interactive choices are usually made
within. That is, most interfaces do not demand that users configure their fea-
tures, but use a default configuration that the designers believe will benefit
most users. Users are known to only rarely customise these defaults (§2.7.6),
and the default configuration may instil an endowment for that behaviour
(§2.6.2). If the experimental question was framed to ask subjects to deviate
from a default – for example, ‘Snapping will be enabled for the next set of
tasks, do you want to turn it off?’ (‘Yes’/‘no’ choices, with ‘no’ already se-
lected) – their responses may exhibit a bias for the default behaviour.
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7.3 risk and uncertainty
Although risk is a central component of judgement and decision-making re-
search (Chapter 2, and in particular §2.2.5), the experimental work in this
thesis has focussed exclusively on riskless prospects. That is, subjects were
always informed of, and were exposed to, the outcomes they were choosing
between – there was no ambiguity about what they would receive. This sig-
nificantly simplified the experimental design and interpretation of the results:
their responses can be attributed to the received progress, rather than an aver-
sion to risk or uncertainty in the experimental behaviour (e.g. aversion to the
possibility of incongruent trials).
However, some of the most interesting effects in the literature involve per-
ceptions of risk, and interactive prospects that users encounter are frequently
risky. As neither designers nor users know with certainty what tasks will be
encountered, they must consider the risk of impediment before deploying
or engaging a system. For example, choosing to enable (or disable) a predic-
tive text entry feature requires speculating about future interactions – the
frequency of words that will be unknown to the predictive system, and the
efficacy of the system in predicting desired words.
As reviewed in Section 3.3, it is difficult to design and expose experimental
subjects to risky interactive prospects in the samemanner as behavioural eco-
nomics experiments: the probability of an interactive outcome cannot sim-
ply be told to subjects, they must learn it through experience. This means
that experimental designs need to carefully isolate the elements of risk (the
probability of obtaining an outcome) from those of uncertainty (the lack of
knowledge about probabilities). For example, the text selection methodology
(Experiments 4.1 and 4.2) could bemodified so that the third set of tasks is ran-
dom – that is, the tasks completed after a subject makes their choice are not
a repetition of the ones before the choice. This would examine the aversion
to uncertainty that subjects have for the experimental interface (in consid-
eration of the construction of the first two sets), but it would not test their
aversion to risk as they have no information to estimate probabilities with.
Mobile text entry is a convenient interactive task to examine manipula-
tions of risk. Fluent text entry on mobile devices is hindered by the small size
of the keyboard and there are significant opportunities for systems to offer
suggestions that complete words or correct errors (e.g. Weir, Pohl, Rogers,
Vertanen, & Kristensson, 2014). Such suggestions are necessarily probabilis-
tic – based on dictionaries and language models (e.g. Fowler et al., 2015; Good-
man, Venolia, Steury, & Parker, 2001;Weir, Rogers, Murray-Smith, & Löchte-
feld, 2012) – and users can choose to attend to them, or ignore them. This
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presents an experimental opportunity for examining how users perceive and
respond to the risk in these systems: through manipulation of the suggestion
system’s efficacy, changes to a subject’s choice to engage with the system re-
veals the non-linearity of their decision weights (i.e. π in Equation 2.7).
The reference-dependent preferences model, as provided by Kőszegi and
Rabin (2006), captures risk as the integration of utility over a probability dis-
tribution (§2.3.3). An extension to the model refined its approach to risk at-
titudes (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2007), making it consistent with the major empiri-
cal work on risk aversion, risk seeking, disappointment aversion, and uncer-
tainty aversion. In contrast to other theories of risk attitudes, its reference-
dependent nature allows for prior expectations of risk in a prospect to mod-
erate a person’s level of risk aversion (e.g. Irwin, 1953).
7.4 rational behaviour
No claims aremade about the rationality of the choices subjects made in these
experiments. Even though their choices are described as biased, this does not
imply that they were poor or deficient – as reviewed in Sections 2.1 and 4.1.7,
subjects undoubtedly had reasons and justifications for their choices. How-
ever, the biases subjects revealed in their choices present an opportunity for
correction in the sense that Savage (1972) found his normative violations of
the Allais paradox (§2.2.2) in error: ‘There is, of course, an important sense
in which preferences, being entirely subjective, cannot be in error; but in a
different, more subtle sense they can be’ (p. 103).
7.4.1 Interactive Rationality
The economics literature has sought normative models that yield optimal
choices when followed. Although these models are not strictly adhered, a
person may be able to improve the choices they make by adopting such a
model. A contemporary application of this is nudge theory (Sunstein, 2014;
Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Thaler, Sunstein, & Balz, 2013), wherein people are
surreptitiously guided to subdue their biases and make better choices with
respect to their finances, health care, education, relationships, and so on.
Themotivating force behind much human–computer interaction research
into assistive interfaces and new interaction techniques is the improvement of
user productivity. New interfaces are often judged on objective criteria (such
as the time to complete a task or the incidence of errors in doing so), and
models of interaction stress these qualities in their predictions. For example,
if a text entry system improves average typing efficiency, this is presented
evidence for its merit and legitimacy. In this sense, productivity is a normative
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ideal for human–computer interaction – it is the quality that designers and
researchers most frequently strive to improve, with the assumption that users
are seeking to maximise it.
However, as demonstrated by the empirical results in this thesis (and sup-
ported by general work on psychological biases), even if users are seeking to
maximise their productivity, there are forces that inhibit a clear perception
and attainment of that ideal. All of the experimental work here has found a
correlation between objective time and choice – subjects generally preferred
the interfaces that were faster⁶ 6. Except for Experiment 6.1,
where manipulating this correla-
tion was intentional.
– however, subjects were poor at identifying
whether they gained or lost, and relied upon more salient cues (such as per-
ceived progress). If objective productivity was more salient, subjects may be
successfully nudged towards the interface that improved it. For example, if
Experiments 4.1–5.1 notified subjects of the exact time they gained or lost
before they made their choice, their responses may have been led by it.
7.4.2 Interactive Nudging
A fairly unique quality of interactive systems is their ability to adapt and alter
their behaviour in response to a user’s behaviour. That is, a system can adjust
the information or options presented to the user in response to their past be-
haviour. For example, if a text entry system observes that a user continually
rejects a particular word correction suggestion, it may choose to stop offer-
ing that suggestion to them. Quinn and Zhai (2016, Appendix B) explored
one metric for managing this – interface assertiveness: the tendency for an
interface to interrupt the user with probabilistic suggestions.
Awareness of the biases in users’ perceptions and subjective experiences
of interactive systems can be used by designers to create interfaces that guide
user choices to be both productive and subjectively satisfying. Persuasive
technology and decision support research actively explores using interactive
systems to effect changes in user behaviour (reviewed in §2.7.6), but only re-
cently have the behavioural changes been effected for the interactive tasks
themselves. For example, Kim et al. (2016) examined positive and negative in-
formation framing in a productivity-tracking application – either informing
subjects with a measure of their ‘productive time’ (positive framing) or their
‘distracted time’ (negative framing). They found that the negative framing
led to a significant improvement in subjects’ overall productivity (compared
with no improvement for the positive framing). This provides prescriptive
insight into how a system can use judgement and decision-making biases to
improve both user performance and satisfaction. Others have explored sim-
ilar interactive and interface techniques for helping users improve their se-
curity (e.g. Turland, Coventry, Jeske, Briggs, & van Moorsel, 2015), shopping
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(e.g. Kalnikaite et al., 2011; Todd, Rogers, & Payne, 2011), and privacy choices
(e.g. Choe, Jung, Lee, & Fisher, 2013; Wang et al., 2014).
7.5 other psychological biases
This thesis has reviewed many psychological biases, but only tested a small
fraction of them for their applicability to interaction. Some of the untested
biases are captured by the model presented in Chapter 3, but some are not
modellable with its parameters or construction. For example, Section 3.2
stated that the utility of an interaction I is determined by the sum of the
utilities of its sub-interactions: U(I) = ∑u(i). This simplification provides
a starting point for model-based analysis but is knowingly naïve with respect
to biases such as peak-end (Chapter 6). Other biases that have been docu-
mented in the psychology literature that could be experimentally examined
in human–computer interaction contexts include the following.
Hedonic Dimensions of Consumption. Kőszegi and Rabin (2004) discussed
an extension to their model with a vector of hedonic dimensions that were
applicable to a consumption bundle. For example, even if two goods are ob-
jectively perfect substitutes for each-other, hedonic properties (such as brand
loyalty) may factor into gain and loss assessments. For interfaces, such dimen-
sions may include aesthetics or social influences.
Endowment Effects. People have an aversion to change, preferring to keep
items they already own, rather than exchange them for items of equal value
(§2.6.2). This suggests that a new interface (e.g. that removes features or sub-
stantially changes interactions) must return additional utility to the user to
overcome endowment effects. This is captured in the formulation of our
model (by reference from Kőszegi and Rabin [2006]), and is likely reflected
in additional utility for interfaces that the user is already familiar with (e.g.
Sedley & Müller, 2013).
SunkCosts. Another interpretation of theword-by-word technique’s snap-
ping behaviour in Experiment 4.1 is that it contained a sunk cost (§2.6.5). The
actions to select text prior to disabling its snapping were sunk with respect
to the subsequent actions: some of the text that subjects selected prior to dis-
abling the snapping behaviour must be deselected, only to then be reselected.
This interpretation is consistent with the progress loss explanation – a loss
of attained progress is sunk – but other consequences of the cost are only
implied (e.g. an aversion to future interactions).
Framing Effects. As discussed with the experimental limitations (§7.2), the
choice questions in the experiments were designed to be neutral. However,
framing effects (§2.6.3) can have a powerful influence on how choices are per-
ceived, and have been demonstrated for interactive tasks (Kim et al., 2016).
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Careful management of framing may have important consequences for user
adoption and acceptance of new interaction techniques, or managing their
perception of changes to existing interfaces.
7.6 other economic factors
As with the above psychological biases, there are other areas of economics
that treat problemswhich sharemany properties with user interaction. Given
the fundamental presence of expected utility (i.e. §2.2.2) in economic study,
much of the material discussed in this thesis forms the basis for more ad-
vanced economic principles that may be adaptable to interactive contexts.
7.6.1 Game Theory
The inspiration for modern economic work on decision making was the for-
mulation of utility and the axiomatic system of decisionmaking given in game
theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). However, game theory’s pri-
mary contribution was its analysis of games: where one or more agents make
a series of choices (either sequentially or simultaneously) to advance towards
certain pay-offs. The decisions agents face may depend on the choices made
by themselves or other agents at prior points in the game, and their knowl-
edge of the state of the game can be complete or partial. Game theory provides
the tools for representing these games and analysing the decisions each agent
faces. Research questions in game theory often involve how agents, in collab-
oration or competition, make choices as a game progresses to maximise their
individual pay-offs.
Analyses of how an agent should respond to a decision in a game follow
many of the normative principles reviewed in Chapter 2 – that is, the nor-
mative choices for an agent depend upon all agents in the game behaving
rationally (and believing that the other agents will behave rationally, too).
As with simple economic decisions, games played experimentally by human
agents quickly violate these assumptions (reviewed by Camerer, 1997; Knee-
land, 2015; Rabin, 1993).
Such a structure may also be useful for analysing user interactions: as a
game between the user and the system.⁷ 7. And with other users in the
case of collaborative systems.
That is, an interaction could be anal-
ysed as a series of decisions and pay-offs: the system’s decisions about how
to assist the user, and the user’s decisions about how to respond to the sys-
tem. These games would usually not be competitive (the system’s pay-offs are
likely to be aligned with the user’s), but feature incomplete information sets
wherein the system lacks perfect knowledge about the user’s intentions and
the user lacks perfect knowledge about the system’s state. Analyses, strategies
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and solutions for such games from the game theory literature may provide in-
teraction designers with insight into how to manage assistive systems (e.g.
their assertiveness [Quinn & Zhai, 2016]).
7.6.2 Intertemporal Choice
When choices are made about prospects which have outcomes that will not
be received immediately or will be received over a period of time, two ques-
tions arise: an economic question of how to discount the outcomes to their
present value, and a psychological question of how people perceive the out-
comes. These questions are closely related to those of utility and psychologi-
cal value, but evoke biases in time perception and predicti on (i.e. how people
form beliefs about the benefit of a delayed outcome). The original economic
model for these prospects is P.A. Samuelson’s (1937) discounted expected util-
ity, wherein the utility (i.e. Equation 2.2) for an outcome that will be received
at time period t is discounted by some factor δt – where δ is the discount
factor for one period (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992).⁸
8. Samuelson was explicit that
his model should not be in-
terpreted normatively: ‘The
idea that the results of such a
statistical investigation could
have any influence upon ethi-
cal judgments of policy is one
which deserves the impatience
of modern economists’ (p. 161).
However, a number of bi-
ases have been observed when people face prospects that involve a temporal
aspect in their outcomes (reviewed by Frederick et al., 2002):
• The discount rate δ that people apply increases with t (known as hyper-
bolic discounting).
• People discount future gains more than future losses.
• People discount small outcomes are more than large outcomes.
• People discount more to avoid the delay of outcome than they do to
expedite the receipt of an outcome (a framing effect; §2.6.3)
• Normative axioms are violated (§2.1).
A number of models – some built upon prospect theory (e.g. Loewenstein,
1988; Loewenstein& Prelec, 1992) – aim to capture these effects (also reviewed
by Frederick et al., 2002).
Interactive choices share many features with intertemporal choices as the
outcomes of a choice to use a particular system or feature are typically realised
over some period of time (cf. §3.3.3). For example, the gains of a word-by-
word snapping behaviour may not be realised for an individual selection task,
but become realised over the useful life of the system if a large proportion
of all tasks are congruent with the behaviour. The discount rate applied to
the utility of an interactive prospect is also likely to increase with the initial
investment cost. For example, a spam filter may require a period of manual
training and periodic checks for false-positives. Similarly, users exhibit an
aversion to changes in the features of established products (Sedley & Müller,
2013) thatmay be analysedwith thesemodels. Models of intertemporal choice
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may assist human–computer interaction design and research by explaining
and predicting how users assess these types of interactive prospects.
7.6.3 Neuroeconomics
The success of the collaboration between economics and psychology has re-
cently expanded to include principles and findings in neuroscience that may
explain economic phenomena (and vice versa) – with the intersecting field
known as neuroeconomics (reviewed by Camerer, 2013; Loewenstein, Rick, &
Cohen, 2008). The fundamental insight from neuroscience that can be ap-
plied to economic problems is that decision making is not a unitary process,
but an interaction of multiple processes that guide behaviour (reviewed by
Evans, 2008, and briefly in §2.4). For example, the dual system theory of
Kahneman and Frederick (2002, 2005) argued that decision making is driven
by two systems – an unconscious and emotive system that operates quickly
on intuitions and heuristics, and a more contemplative and analytic system
that operates slowly on rules and reasoning (Stanovich & West, 2000). It is
the evocation or suppression of these systems that drives psychological bi-
ases and non-normative economic behaviour (e.g. Fudenberg & Levine, 2006;
Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2004).
Support for dual-system models is provided by work that employs meth-
ods from neuroscience (typically fmri scanning) to understand the neural
systems that correlate with behavioural biases – for example, there is a cor-
relation between loss aversion responses and dopaminergic activity in the
midbrain (Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007), and between activity in the
amygdala/orbitofrontal cortex and ambiguity aversion (Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs,
Tranel, & Camerer, 2005). Although such a level of precision is unlikely to be
of interest to human–computer interaction practice, themodels they produce
may be of use in picking apart the competing forces that guide user behaviour
and inform user experience in complex interactive systems.
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conclusions 8
Behavioural economics and psychological research on judgement and deci-
sion making provide theoretical foundations for understanding and explain-
ing important issues in user experience. In particular, the economics litera-
ture has developed models that suggest (a) non-linear utility scores connect
objective returns with subjective preferences, (b) gains and losses are divided
around a neutral reference point, and (c) there is an asymmetry between the
value derived from gains and the value derived from losses. The psycholog-
ical literature has developed empirical evidence that supports such models,
but also substantial evidence that subtle biases can disrupt them.
This thesis has sought to bridge this literature into human–computer in-
teraction by adapting a model of reference-dependent preferences from the
economics literature to interactive contexts. It has also developed an exper-
imental methodology that can be used to test the model and other issues of
user experience. The model explains how gains and losses are defined by the
difference between an actual interface outcome and the user’s expectations
for that outcome. These gains and losses are then transformed into subjective
experiences through an asymmetric value function that amplifies the expe-
rience of losses. The methodology tests this using a series of binary choices
made by subjects. The pattern of choices establishes a preference scale that
can be used to infer utility relationships and psychological biases.
The model’s predictions were tested in three experiments. The first two
measured user preferences for an assistive text selection interface in compar-
ison to a neutral reference interface:
• In the first experiment, the assistive interface snapped selections to in-
clude entire words and required subjects to back-track in order to dis-
able the snapping behaviour when it was an impediment to task com-
pletion. Subjects displayed a bias against the snapping interface, even
when it improved their performance (consistent with a negativity bias
against progress losses).
• In the second experiment, the assistive interface again snapped to select
entire words, but the mechanism to disable selections was altered to
maintain the user’s progress: subjects disabled snapping by tapping the
Control key and waiting for an animation to complete. The bias against
the snapping interface was neutralised.
The third experiment used a new experimental task: object drag-and-drop
with grid-snapping assistance. Subjects switched snapping resolutions by
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holding the Control key with a release-and-reacquisition of the object. Sub-
jects displayed a bias in favour of this snapping behaviour, even when it im-
paired their performance. All of these results are understood within the con-
text of the model: the objective costs and benefits did not weigh on subjects’
preferences as much as the perceived progress towards their task goal.
Two further psychological biases that are not captured by the model – the
peak-end rule and duration neglect – were also tested using the methodology.
The results showed some support for the effects but require further work.
These empirical findings establish a relationship between behavioural eco-
nomics and human–computer interaction that can be applied to enhance re-
search and design practice. There are extensive opportunities for further
work examining the application of the model and in extending it to account
for and validate other psychological biases. The forced-choice methodology
also has promise for examining nuanced factors influencing user experience.
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scribes an analysis of user interaction with text entry suggestions under vary-
ing levels of interface assertiveness (the frequency with which the user is in-
terrupted with suggestions). The results found that although suggestions sig-
nificantly impaired objective text entry performance, they were subjectively
enjoyed by users. This can be understood within the context of the model
presented in this thesis, but the work was not conducted or analysed under
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10.1145/2858036.2858305.
161
Appendix B. CHI 2016 Publication: Text Entry
A Cost–Benefit Study of
Text Entry Suggestion Interaction
Philip Quinn1,2 Shumin Zhai1
1Google Inc.
Mountain View, CA, USA
2University of Canterbury
Christchurch, New Zealand
philip@quinn.gen.nz, zhai@google.com
ABSTRACT
Mobile keyboards often present error corrections and word
completions (suggestions) as candidates for anticipated user
input. However, these suggestions are not cognitively free:
they require users to attend, evaluate, and act upon them.
To understand this trade-off between suggestion savings and
interaction costs, we conducted a text transcription experiment
that controlled interface assertiveness: the tendency for an
interface to present itself. Suggestions were either always
present (extraverted), never present (introverted), or gated
by a probability threshold (ambiverted). Results showed
that although increasing the assertiveness of suggestions
reduced the number of keyboard actions to enter text and was
subjectively preferred, the costs of attending to and using the
suggestions impaired average time performance.
Author Keywords
Interface assertiveness;predictive interfaces;mobile text entry.
ACM Classification
H.1.2 [User/Machine Systems] Human factors.
INTRODUCTION
A technique frequently employed to improve user performance
is to observe a user’s interactions, and detect potential errors
or predict intended interactions from their behaviour. Cor-
rections for these errors and candidates for these intentions
(collectively suggestions) can be offered to the user as short-
cuts that optimise away interactions the system can anticipate.
However, although these suggestions are frequently employed,
their costs and benefits are often not systematically studied [cf.
25]. That is, are the potential benefits of a suggestion worth
the costs of interrupting the user, the time and effort for them
to process it, decide if it is accurate, and ultimately accept or
reject it?
A particularly intense use of suggestion interfaces is with
mobile touch-keyboard interaction, where there are many
opportunities to adapt the keyboard interface to enhance user
performance [e.g. 5, 22, 32, 33]. Text entry suggestions
attempt to relieve the burden of precise and tedious character
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input by offering predictions of the user’s intended words or
corrections for errors in words that have already been entered.
The goal is to reduce the number of keystrokes or corrective
actions required to compose text. However, their use is not
perceptually or cognitively free: users must identify and attend
to the display of the suggestions, evaluate their correctness,
and possibly accept or reject them [13, 15].
A key consideration for these interfaces is ultimately when
to present suggestions to the user. Many systems maintain
an internal confidence value associated with each prediction
(determined from a language model or dictionary) and only
present those above a certain threshold. However, an aspect
that is often overlooked is the overall pay-off or utility to the
user – that is, does the user benefit over continuing to type the
word or correcting the error manually? Benefits include the
time from tapping on the requisite keys, but must be reconciled
with the costs of attending and interacting with the interface.
In this paper, we term the tendency for an interface to present
suggestions to a user its assertiveness, and examine its in-
fluence on user performance and satisfaction. Using such a
control may improve user experience by reducing the amount
of distraction and maximising the benefit of the suggestions.
We examine the costs and benefits of text-entry suggestion
interaction in an experiment that examines objective text-entry
performance and subjective preference at different levels of
assertiveness for word-completion suggestions. We find that
increasing assertiveness decreases time performance but in-
creases input economy and user preference; we discuss the
implications for suggestion interface design.
BACKGROUND
Mobile soft keyboards are rendered and interactedwith directly
on a display, using either a finger on a touch-sensitive surface
or a stylus with a digitiser [19, 21]. However, compared to
their physical counterparts, the lack of strong tactile feedback
limits users’ ability to touch type [2, 10, 23, 28, 32].
Suggestion Systems
Prediction and error correction systems aim to reduce the num-
ber of actions required from a user to enter their desired text
[4, 7, 8, 24, 31, 32]. Augmentative and Alternative Commu-
nication (AAC) research has investigated prediction systems
to improve input speed for users with physical impairments,
but has found that the benefits of suggestions are not always
clear [8, 31]. Koester and Levine [13–15] suggested that the
cognitive and motor costs of using suggestion interfaces may
outweigh their benefits, and their evaluations of several AAC
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systems found either marginal performance gains for novice
users, or performance impairments for experienced users.
Current commercial practice makes use of suggestion in-
terfaces by default. Google’s Android platform (version 5
‘Lollipop’) persistently presents up to three suggestions above
the keyboard. In contrast, Apple’s iOS platform (version 9)
can display one suggestion below the text insertion cursor, or
optionally, three in a bar above the keyboard. The suggestion
below the cursor is transient, and is accepted by tapping on
the spacebar (tapping on the suggestion will reject it).
Models of Interaction
Interactionwith soft keyboards has been successfullymodelled
using elemental cognitive models (such as GOMS/KLM [3])
in a chain of key-tapping actions [e.g. 18, 29, 30]. These
models have been extended to cover the actions involved in
using suggestion interfaces [e.g. 11, 14, 17]. However, such
models predict performance for expert users and focus on the
mechanical aspects of interaction – with limited scope for the
cognitive processes or novice users [cf. 1]. Models of attention
[e.g. 12] capture issues of interruption and distraction, but
have focussed on distractions from unrelated tasks (e.g. email
notifications) rather than potentially helpful suggestions for
the current task. However, recent work has begun to explore
the interaction between a system’s attempts at assistance and
subjective user preferences [25].
INTERFACE ASSERTIVENESS
Suggestions are a problem for interaction design because of
their probabilisitic nature: they are a guess about a user’s
intentions. Incorrect guesses will waste a user’s time and lead
them to spurn the interface (disabling or habitually ignoring its
suggestions). To create a productive experience, it is therefore
desirable to be maximally beneficial when suggestions are
correct, with minimal costs when they are incorrect.
To use a suggestion, a user must: (a) recognise the presence
of the suggestion(s), (b) evaluate the options presented, and
(c) optionally take action upon them [13]. As the cost of these
actions may be high and provide little benefit (distracting
the user for potentially incorrect suggestions), determining
precisely when to show suggestions should be assiduously
considered. For example, suggestions may only be shown if
they pass some confidence threshold (typically, according to
an a posteriori estimation from a language model). In these
cases, the user will only need to attend to the suggestions that
system decides they are worth the cost. Similarly, a system
may mediate suggestions with an H-metaphor control system
that is responsive to changes in user behaviour [6].
A method for assessing these costs is the utility of the sugges-
tions to be presented: a consideration of system’s confidence
that the suggestion is correct, weighted with the predicted time
savings offered to the user (e.g. time saved tapping keys or
editing the text) against the costs of attending to the suggestion.
For example, completing the last character of a word does
not offer much utility to a user as they may be able to hit
the key for that character faster than they could attend to the
suggestion interface, evaluate the suggestion, and confirm it.
Suggestion Presentation
The quality of suggestions depends on the system’s method for
generating them – such as a language model, adaptation from
a user’s behaviour [7], or characteristics of their input [6, 32].
However, while the quality of suggestions is a key factor in
user performance, so too is how the system communicates
them and how users interact with them.
Location. Where does the interface display suggestions? The
user’s awareness and attention to certain parts of the screen
may influence whether they notice the suggestions, and alter
the interaction requirements for using with them.
Presence. How many suggestions are shown at once? Each
suggestion presented increases cognitive costs, as the user
must evaluate its correctness. Showing only the top suggestion
reduces this, but at the risk of ignoring good secondary options.
Default Behaviour. Are suggestions with a high probability of
being correct automatically accepted? This eliminates the
cost of explicitly accepting a suggestion, but at the cost of
requiring the user to explicitly reject incorrect suggestions or
manually correct accidental acceptances.
Stability. Are suggestions continually changing, or are they
stable and minimise visual disruptions? Similarly, does the
system learn from the user’s use of them to help develop auto-
maticity? High stability promotes rapid use of the interface
and reduces cognitive costs, but risks hiding good suggestions.
These factors may in-turn influence the underlying model for
choosing suggestions. For example, if only a single suggestion
is presented, the system may want to ensure that there is a
large confidence gap between the first and remaining options.
Similarly, if the user has to explicitly reject poor suggestions,
then the confidence threshold may be higher.
EXPERIMENT
Weconducted an experiment to better understand the trade-offs
involved in text entry suggestions in terms of user performance
and subjective preference. Subjects copied simple phrases,
with word completions shown at opportune times. Comple-
tions were ranked by a probability function that emulated
current practice, and were presented to subjects in one of
three assertiveness conditions: always (extraverted), never
(introverted), and gated by a threshold (ambiverted).
Subjects & Apparatus
Seventeen (five female) volunteer subjects participated in the
experiment; all had experience typing on mobile keyboards
(from various vendors) and received a gift card for their time.
The experiment was run on an Apple iPod Touch (A1367)
under iOS 5.1.1 (640 × 960 px screen at 326 ppi). All visual
ornaments were hidden and default text editing features sup-
pressed. Feedback was identical to the English iOS keyboard,
but with the modifier keys removed (Figure 1). Letter keys
had a visual size of 52 × 76 px, but their targetable area was
expanded to consume the surrounding space (∼65 × 108 px).
Stimuli & Tasks
Subjects copied phrases using the keyboard, with up to three
suggestions occasionally appearing directly above it (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. The experimental interface.
Any combination of correct letter keys and helpful suggestions
could be used to complete the phrase.
Input. Suggestion interfaces are dependent upon a user’s
input accuracy to offer predictions: it difficult to generate
good predictions for error-laden input, while error-free input
eliminates any need for them. The input accuracy of subjects is
not of interest here – only their interaction with the suggestion
interface is. Therefore, we artificially constrained input to be
error-free and only examined word-completion suggestions
(not error corrections). This was accomplished by only
accepting taps on the correct key or suggestion (ignoring all
other taps with no feedback). Combined with the probability
scoring (described below), this controlled the occurrence and
content of suggestions.
Phrases & Suggestions. Phrases were randomly selected from
a set of 500 [20] – modified for consistent spelling in all-
lowercase, and without punctuation. Suggestions were gener-
ated from the open-source Google Android dictionary.1
Probability Scoring. Frequency information from the dictionary
determined an estimate of suggestion probability: ( f /255) ·
(1 − (c/s)), where f is the frequency of the word (in the
range [0, 255]), s is its length, and c is the number of letters
completed by it.2 The estimate was normalised by the sum of
all candidate estimates. With the given dictionary, this has a
theoretical average saving of 46% of the letters in each word
(i.e. the correct suggestion appears in the top three after the
user enters approximately half of the letters of a word).
Suggestions. After each key tap, the interface scored sugges-
tions matching the entered word prefix. In the extraverted
condition, or if any of the scores were above a threshold of
0.1 in the ambiverted condition, the top three suggestions
(sorted by score) were displayed. If all words were below the
threshold, any currently displayed suggestions remained. The
suggestion bar was cleared between words.
Suggestions were selected by tapping on them, whereupon
the characters it completed were inserted into the response.
1https://goo.gl/wN4vHn
2A simplified version of the scoring method used by Google Android:
https://goo.gl/vk4XNh, lines 1098–1147.
Design & Procedure
A within-subjects design was used for the factor assertiveness
∈ {extraverted, ambiverted, introverted}, with the order of
presentation counterbalanced. Subjects were instructed to
enter the text however they felt was fast and comfortable, and
should not feel compelled to use the suggestions.
Subjects first completed five practice phrases in an extraverted
condition. For each condition, they completed 18 randomly
selected phrases (without replacement), with the first three
discarded – followed by a NASA-TLX questionnaire [9].
RESULTS
There aremanymetrics that can assess typing performance [19,
21]. We analyse task completion time measured in characters
per second (CPS) for each phrase, but are also interested in
the number of taps (on keys and suggestions) required per
character of input (TPC), and the presentation/usage of the
suggestion interface.
Performance
Figure 2a shows the mean CPS, and a one-way ANOVA for
assertiveness revealed a significant effect (F2,32 = 12.16,
p < .001, η2G = 0.07), with introverted (mean 3.09CPS, 95%
CI ±0.12) outperforming both ambiverted (2.81 ± 0.09) and
extraverted (2.66 ± 0.09). For the number of taps required
per character (TPC; Figure 2b), a Friedman test revealed
a significant effect (χ22 = 34, p < .001), with extraverted
requiring significantly fewer (mean .93 TPC, 95% CI [.92,
.93]) taps than either ambiverted (.96 [.95, .96]) or introverted
(1 [1, 1]); Bonferroni-corrected Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
revealed significant differences (p ≤ .003) between all pairs.
Suggestions
While suggestions in the extraverted condition were updated
at every opportunity (after every letter key tap or suggestion
selection), they were updated after only 26.72% of such oppor-
tunities in the ambiverted condition (based on the threshold).
Figure 2c shows the proportion of those opportunities where
suggestions were shown, those where helpful suggestions
were shown,3 and those where subjects utilised them.
The tap savings that subjects could have obtained if they
selected the correct suggestion at the earliest opportunity and
the savings actually realised are shown in Figure 2d. Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests between the extraverted and ambiverted
conditions revealed significant differences for both the savings
offered and realised (bothW = 153, p < .001). In both cases,
extraverted provided higher potential (17.59% vs. 9.44%) and
realised (9.44% vs. 4.66%) tap savings than ambiverted.
Subjective Responses
Responses from the NASA-TLX surveys are shown in Table 1.
Friedman tests revealed significant differences for physical
demand (χ22 = 14.31) and effort (χ
2
2 = 16.04, both p ≤ .001).
Bonferroni-corrected Wilcoxon signed-rank tests found those
ratings for introverted to be significantly higher.
DISCUSSION
Our results found that an ambiverted interface – guarding
suggestions by a threshold – was faster, on average, than an
3Less than the theoretical 46% due to the relatively short words in the
experimental phrases and consideration of the tap to select a suggestion.
164
0.0
2.5
3.0
Extra. Ambi. Intro.C
ha
ra
cte
rs
 p
er
 S
ec
on
d
(a)
0
.9
1
Extra. Ambi. Intro.
Ta
ps
 p
er
 C
ha
ra
cte
r
(b)
0
25%
50%
75%
100%
Extra. Ambi.
Su
gg
es
tio
ns
Shown
Correct
Used
(c)
0
5%
10%
15%
20%
Extra. Ambi.
Ta
ps
 S
av
ed
Offered
Saved
(d)
Figure 2. Mean performance metrics (±95% CIs) for each condition: (a–b) entry speed; (c) the proportion of suggestions bars shown,
that contained a helpful suggestion, and that were actually used; and (d) the potential and obtained tap savings.
Mental Phys. Temp. Perf. Effort Frust.
Extra. 2.41 2.24 1.94 2.65 2.24 1.94
(0.94) (0.83) (0.56) (1.06) (0.56) (0.75)
Ambi. 2.00 2.18 1.00 3.12 2.53 2.29
(1.06) (0.88) (0.79) (1.17) (1.12) (0.99)
Intro. 2.12 3.41 2.47 3.06 3.59 2.59
(1.27) (1.12) (1.28) (1.03) (1.00) (1.33)
Table 1. Mean (and std. dev.) NASA-TLX ratings (scale: 1–5).
extraverted interface that always made suggestions visible;
and an introverted baseline that never made any suggestions
was faster still. The performance loss with suggestions was in
spite of the reduced average number of taps required to enter
text. Nevertheless, suggestions were subjectively considered
less physically demanding and effortful.
This result follows that of prior work in a different context
(motor-control-impaired users on physical keyboards [14, 15]),
which found it difficult for suggestions to gain a time advantage
over the perceptual and cognitive costs they introduced. Our
results are based on a modern touchscreen keyboard, and
the constraint of perfect input from subjects arguably gives a
greater time advantage to using suggestions. The maximum
theoretical letter savings of 46% is similar to the current limit
of production interfaces [7], but it is likely that developments
in prediction systems will change this cost-benefit balance.
Although the time cost of attending, deciding on, and selecting
suggestions lowered average speed, subjective comments
following the experiment (in addition to TLX responses)
indicated a strong dislike for the introverted condition: that
it felt more demanding and time consuming. This suggests
that the user experience benefits of suggestions lie beyond
average time performance (e.g. spelling assistance or learned
automaticity), and may be of greater psychological value than
their objective costs imply. Therefore, we cannot conclude
that that less assertiveness necessarily results in a better user
experience [25].
Our results are also limited to word completion suggestions.
N-gram word prediction and correction of input errors may
provide greater savings at the same or similar costs of attending,
deciding, and selecting them. Such suggestions may take
advantage of natural pauses in user input, or the high costs
of editing already entered text on mobile interfaces. The
experimental task was also a copying task, where subjects
could always see the exemplar text to be entered – and were
not encumbered by decisions about how to compose the text,
or uncertainty about spelling or grammar [16]. When a user
is unsure about the correct spelling of a word, a correctly spelt
suggestion may be substantially faster than trying out spellings
and editing the text when it is discovered to be incorrect.
Suggestion interfaces may also have an overhead cost in
addition to the costs of using them. That is, the anticipation
of making a decision, may introduce a persistent cost to the
use of the interface. Such overhead costs are likely to be
interface and user-dependent, but are critical to understand
if systems are to be designed to overcome them [e.g. 26, 27].
Conversely, common suggestions for habitual errors may be
learned and become an automatic part of a user’s behaviour
and removing them may impair performance and overall
experience. Teasing apart these factors will require detailed
and precise experimentation.
Our results have shown that suggestion interfaces face sig-
nificant challenges in enabling users to improve their input
performance. However, the costs associated with suggestions
deserve more attention, as do more principled approaches for
managing assertiveness (e.g. with models of economic risk
and utility). Researchers and practitioners developing systems
with such trade-offs should be cognisant of these costs, but
also that benefits may be realised in other types of assistance.
CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
Wehave presented an empirical analysis of interactionwith text
input suggestions, focussing on how eager interfaces should be
to show word completions (their assertiveness). A moderately
assertive (ambiverted) interface that guarded completions
with a confidence threshold afforded faster performance than
a more assertive (extraverted) interface that always presented
the best three. While both types of interface were, on average,
slower than never presenting completions at all (introverted),
the suggestions were utilised to save taps and were subjectively
preferred – indicating benefits not measured by time. Future
work will examine broader text entry tasks (e.g. composition
and error correction), and model this trade-off by examining
the utility of text entry suggestions.
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